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1 Introduction 
In recent years, multinational enterprises reporting rising profits combined with de-
creasing tax payments have been, repeatedly, in the news. A very prominent example 
is Google Inc. which managed to reduce its overseas effective tax rate to 2.4% in 
2010 through the concentration of taxable profits in low-tax countries (Drucker 
(2010)).
1
 Such an allocation of taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions can be 
reached by different strategies. On the one hand, production plants or business activi-
ties can be moved entirely to those countries, while, on the other hand, only book 
profits may be shifted across borders. Google Inc., for instance, has licensed intellec-
tual property rights to Bermuda, a well-known tax haven, at a rather low license fee. 
Royalty payments to Bermuda are, in turn, channeled from all over the world through 
an Irish and a Dutch subsidiary resulting in zero taxation. This strategy makes use of 
an adjustment of intercompany contracts in order to shift profits to low-tax affiliates. 
It is, thus, a considerably simple option to reduce the overall tax burden in contrast to 
a relocation of entire plants or other activities. 
As businesses are becoming more and more global – it is estimated that in 2008 
82,000 multinationals existed as compared to 3,600 in 1992 (UNCTAD (2010)) –, 
the opportunity to exploit the advantages of low-tax affiliates increases significantly. 
Governments face this development along two lines. On the one hand, they are aware 
of corporate tax planning strategies and try to sustain an attractive location for corpo-
rate investments. This awareness increases worldwide tax competition and, in many 
countries, results in a reduction of the corporate tax rate. This development is also 
called “race to the bottom” and has led to a significant reduction of corporate tax 
rates over the past years (Heinemann/Overesch/Rincke (2010)). On the other hand, 
governments are also threatened by decreasing tax revenues. Especially in times of 
the financial crisis and increasing national deficits, this threat gains in importance. 
Several studies have, so far, examined the extent of foregone tax revenues through 
profit shifting activities (for an overview see e.g. Fuest/Riedel (2009)). Due to data 
constraints, a great variation can be observed in the estimations, but all of them point 
out that the amount of lost tax revenues is remarkable. Furthermore, evidence is pro-
vided that developing countries are affected even more by the transfer of taxable in-
come across borders. Oxfam (2000), for instance, estimates that annual tax revenues 
                                                 
1
 Other examples are General Electric, Apple, Amazon, or Total which have all employed similar tax 
structures to cut tax payments. See e.g. CTJ (2011), CTJ (2012), Orange (2011). 
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lost in developing countries due to corporate profit shifting is almost equal to the 
financial aid they receive per year. 
Governments of developed as well as of developing countries have reacted to this 
development and have been introducing or tightening different measures to prevent 
profit shifting (Miller/Oats (2009), p. 17). Such anti-avoidance regulations follow 
different concepts and may either aim at the prevention of certain transactions by 
taxpayers, the improvement of tax administrative structures, or even national tax pol-
icy. Moreover, besides the national governments also international organizations, 
such as the OECD, the European Union, or the UN, have targeted this issue. 
Against this background, this thesis has several objectives. In a first step, it aims at 
discussing and evaluating the different anti-avoidance measures implemented to pre-
vent profit shifting within multinational companies as a whole. They are to be ex-
amined according to their compatibility with tax treaty law, European law, and other 
superior principles of international taxation, their practicability, as well as their fea-
sibility to prevent tax avoidance. In addition, the analysis shall especially focus on 
the differences between developed and developing countries and evaluate anti-
avoidance measures for both groups of countries. Overall, this first step will present a 
very comprehensive analysis of anti-avoidance measures against profit shifting in-
cluding their interaction and combined effect on tax avoidance which is rather unique 
in the literature. 
In a second step, two specific anti-avoidance measures, namely transfer pricing regu-
lations and thin capitalization rules, are to be described and analyzed in more detail. 
The analysis shall include a comparison of applicable regulations in developed and 
developing countries over several years. The perennial examination will allow inter-
preting the development of such rules over time not only for the different groups of 
countries, but also for different geographical regions. In addition, the thesis aims at 
developing a measure for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations which takes the 
presented aspects into account. In the empirical literature, different measures for the 
enforcement of transfer pricing regulations have been used (Borkowski (2010), Jost/ 
Pfaffermeyer/Stoeckl/Winner (2011), Beuselinck/Vanstraelen/Deloof (2009)). Com-
pared to those measures, this thesis, however, aims at introducing an index based on 
a more comprehensive data collection and more precisely defined categories. The 
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new measure may, thus, be an important component for future transfer pricing re-
search. 
Finally, the thesis intends to empirically investigate the impact of anti-avoidance 
measures on profit shifting activities, precisely whether they are feasible to prevent 
the reallocation of taxable income. The examination shall differentiate between de-
veloped and developing countries and include the index on the strictness of transfer 
pricing regulations developed in the second step as well as thin capitalization rules. 
In the empirical literature, the influence of tax policy, especially tax rates, on profit 
shifting behavior has been quite extensively examined (for overviews see Hines 
(1999), Devereux/Maffini (2007)). However, only few studies exist which provide 
evidence on the effectiveness of anti-avoidance measures (Buettner/Overesch/ 
Schreiber/Wamser (2012), Ruf/Weichenrieder (2012)). The empirical analyses in this 
thesis will, thus, close a gap in the existing literature and will provide evidence for 
the effectiveness of transfer pricing and thin capitalization regulations in developed 
and developing countries. The results will provide important insights into the func-
tioning of anti-avoidance measures and will be highly relevant for national tax legis-
lators in order to improve the effectiveness of such measures worldwide. 
The thesis is structured according to the different objectives. The second chapter 
provides an overview of the conceptual basics of international tax avoidance. Firstly, 
it will outline the basic principles of international business taxation. Besides the con-
cepts of source and residence taxation, it describes the principles of internation equi-
ty, efficiency, and simplicity, as well as the standards of European tax law. Secondly, 
the impact of international tax competition on corporate tax planning is described. 
This not only comprises a distinction of tax planning, tax avoidance, and tax evasion, 
but also points out the effects on foregone tax revenues due to increasing tax compe-
tition. Finally, the chapter describes the most common profit shifting strategies em-
ployed by multinational companies. 
In the third chapter, existing anti-avoidance measures against profit shifting activities 
are presented and evaluated based on the principles laid out in the second chapter. It 
is differentiated between unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures which vary in 
their legal and geographical scope. Subsequently, the interaction of the presented 
measures, caused by the three different implementation levels, is discussed. Finally, 
the chapter closes with a concluding evaluation and provides recommendations for 
1 Introduction 
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the design and further development of anti-avoidance measures in developed and 
developing countries. 
The fourth chapter comprises a more detailed discussion of transfer pricing regula-
tions and thin capitalization rules in more than 40 countries worldwide. The different 
aspects of such rules are described and the development over the years 1999 to 2009
2
 
is analyzed. Lastly, this chapter includes a categorization of transfer pricing regula-
tions according to their strictness based on the different aspects of such rules which 
will be used in the following empirical analyses.  
The empirical analyses are included in the fifth chapter. The first study focuses on 
European, mostly developed countries and examines the impact of transfer pricing 
regulations on profit shifting behavior in multinational companies. It employs differ-
ent measures for profit shifting activities as well as different aspects of transfer pric-
ing. It also includes an examination of profit shifting behavior over time. The second 
study provides evidence for the effect of transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules 
on profit shifting in developing countries. A combined anti-avoidance measure is 
used to control for the implemented regulations, but both profit shifting channels are 
also examined separately. Both studies make use of firm data provided by Bureau 
van Dijk for the years 1999 to 2008 and 2009 respectively which is supplemented by 
information on the tax systems implemented in the considered countries, as well as 
other time varying country characteristics. 
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes. 
                                                 
2
 For transfer pricing regulations the analysis regards the years 2001 to 2009, for thin capitalization 
rules, the years 1999 to 2008. 
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2 Conceptual Basics of International Tax Avoidance 
2.1 The International Taxation of Business Income 
2.1.1 Source vs. Residence 
It is widely accepted that governments may tax income according to the source or the 
residence principle. Under the residence principle, jurisdictions tax the worldwide 
income of their tax residents which is also known as an unlimited tax liability of res-
idents. Tax residence is, however, not necessarily equal to physical residence, i.e. for 
corporations residence is usually based on the place of incorporation and/or the place 
of effective management.
3
 The source principle, on the other hand, allows a jurisdic-
tion to tax income arising within its borders by non-residents, also known as limited 
tax liability. Thus, both principles follow different concepts: while residence taxation 
ensures the equal taxation of the residents of a country, source taxation accounts for a 
connection of tax revenue and access to public services, such as infrastructure or 
property protection (Graetz (2003), p. 5-17). The simultaneous application of both 
principles as well as different designs thereof may, nevertheless, lead to a double 
taxation of income. It is, therefore, important to avoid double taxation of income 
while respecting the taxing rights of the involved countries. The two main methods 
for the avoidance of double taxation are the exemption and the credit method. Under 
the exemption method, the residence country fully exempts foreign income, so that 
the source country has full taxing rights (= territorial tax system). This method en-
sures capital import neutrality since all income in the domestic market is taxed equal-
ly, regardless of the residence of the investor. Under the credit method, foreign 
source taxation is credited against income tax in the residence country (= worldwide 
tax system). In the case of profit distributions, a direct and an indirect tax credit can 
be distinguished. While under the direct tax credit, only the foreign withholding tax 
on dividends is credited, the indirect tax credit also includes the underlying corporate 
income tax on the distributed profits. The direct tax credit, therefore, only prevents 
juridical double taxation, i.e. the double taxation of the same taxpayer, while the in-
direct tax credit also prevents economic double taxation, i.e. the double taxation of 
the same income. Irrespective of the type of credit granted, jurisdictions usually limit 
the credit to the domestic tax liability on the foreign income in order to ensure that 
no tax refund is provided by the residence country for taxes received by the source 
                                                 
3
 This may result in double residency. For a discussion of this issue see Schwarzenhofer (2005). 
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country. The limit may be further restricted on a per-country or a per-item-of-income 
basis.  
Generally, with respect to the residence country, both methods lead to a different 
allocation of taxing rights and, thus, tax revenues. In case of the exemption method, 
all tax revenue is earned by the source country. Under the credit method, the alloca-
tion of tax revenues depends on the level of the foreign source taxation. If it is zero, 
full taxing rights apply to the residence country. If it is the regular income tax rate, 
full taxing rights are granted to the source country. The consequence in the residence 
country then depends on the level of the domestic and the foreign tax rate. In case the 
foreign tax rate exceeds the domestic tax rate, no further taxation takes place (excess 
tax credit). The overall tax burden then equals the tax burden levied by the source 
country which results in capital import neutrality. In the opposite case, where the 
foreign tax rate is below the domestic tax rate, an additional tax occurs. This constel-
lation provides capital export neutrality because all investments, independent from 
their location, are taxed equally.  
These methods are either laid out in domestic tax law (unilateral) or in bilateral tax 
treaties concluded between two countries. Bilateral tax treaties aim at avoiding 
double taxation between two jurisdictions and are based on extensive negotiations. 
Moreover, they respect the different economic circumstances of the respective coun-
tries.
4
 
2.1.2 Standards for International Taxation 
2.1.2.1 Principles of International Tax Law 
2.1.2.1.1 Internation Equity 
Equity is one of the most extensively discussed principles of taxation. It comprises 
several aspects, most importantly the equity in the levy of taxes between taxpayers. 
In this regard, equity has found expression through the ability-to-pay principle and 
the benefits principle.  
The ability-to-pay principle intends to tax the taxpayers according to their ability to 
contribute to the society, i.e. the sacrifice made through taxation should be equal for 
                                                 
4
 For the use of the source and the residence principle in bilateral model tax treaties see Chapter 
2.1.2.1.1. 
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all community members (Harris (1996), p. 15). However, this approach requires the 
determination of the ability to pay taxes which is also called the tax capacity. For the 
past two hundred years, tax capacity has been measured as the overall income of tax-
payers.
5
 It has been agreed that this concept is superior to other measurements for tax 
capacity as it is the most comprehensive measure which also comprises the holding 
of wealth as well as consumption (Harris (1996), p. 20). The ability-to-pay principle 
can be equally applied to individuals as well as corporations, where corporations 
must be seen as a legal tool for investments of shareholders. The corporate income 
taxation must then be interpreted as a prepayment of taxes of the shareholders (Schön 
(2009), p. 75). 
The benefits principle complements the ability-to-pay principle and suggests that 
taxpayers, individuals as well as corporations, should be subject to taxes according to 
the benefits they receive from public spending. This concept, thus, introduces a direct 
link between tax payments and provided goods and services and, in this regard, dif-
fers from the ability-to-pay principle. However, an assessment of the benefits re-
ceived is rather difficult, and taxation on this basis is even impossible where a redi-
stribution of welfare among taxpayers is considered. 
Both principles provide guidance on the allocation of taxing rights between countries 
which is the basis of internation equity. The ability-to-pay principle requires the de-
termination of overall income in order to tax according to the tax capacity of taxpay-
ers. In an international setting, this concept, thus, implies an assessment of world-
wide income on the basis of residence (Schön (2009)). Regarding foreign corporate 
investments and the understanding of corporate income tax as a prepayment of per-
sonal income tax, it, furthermore, requires an indirect tax credit of foreign taxes. The 
benefits principle, on the other hand, establishes a link between tax payments and 
received benefits and, thus, postulates a source taxation of income.  
Both principles are incorporated in tax regimes worldwide, which may lead to a si-
multaneous application of residence and source taxation on cross-border income. 
However, neither the ability-to-pay nor the benefits principle provides guidance on 
how to allocate the taxing rights among countries (Schön (2009)). But in the course 
of the development of model tax conventions, the allocation of taxing rights between 
                                                 
5
 Alternative concepts for the measurement of tax capacity include wealth, i.e. ownership, or con-
sumption, see Harris (1996), p. 17-20. 
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countries has been widely discussed.
6
 In this context, a general agreement has been 
reached that source countries have a prior right to tax as foreign owned capital equal-
ly benefits from the infrastructure or protection of property rights provided by the 
source country (OECD (1991), Musgrave (2002)). Residence countries, in turn, are 
expected to prevent international double taxation.  
In current model tax treaties, different standards for the division of tax revenue are 
adopted for different types of income regarding their affiliation with the source coun-
try. In the following, the allocation of taxing rights in the two most important model 
treaties, the OECD and the UN Model Tax Convention, will be compared for the 
types of income mostly relevant for multinational enterprises.
7
  
OECD Model Tax Convention 
The OECD Model is the basis for many double tax treaties concluded between de-
veloped countries. Accounting for the principles laid out above, the suggested level 
of source taxation generally depends on the level of affiliation of the source of in-
come with the source country. The OECD Model, thus, applies unlimited source tax-
ation to income from assets located in the source country, e.g. land or buildings (Art. 
6 OECD Model). Regarding business income, the source country is, moreover, only 
allowed to tax income if it originates from a permanent establishment. A permanent 
establishment is defined to be “a fixed place of business through which the business 
of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on” (Art. 5 OECD Model). This concept 
functions as a threshold for the taxation at source and aims at ensuring a certain ex-
tent of association with the source country.
8
 According to Articles 10 and 11 OECD 
Model, dividends and interest payments may be taxed in the source country, but only 
to a limited amount. This limitation is justified with the fact that such payments only 
derive from contractual relationships and do not show sufficient association with the 
source country. The source taxation of dividends is, therefore, limited to 15%, or 5% 
in case of substantial holdings (>25%), that of interest to 10%. No right to tax for 
source countries exists with regard to royalties (Art. 12 OECD Model) because in 
                                                 
6
 For more information see Chapter 3.2.1.1 and Chapter 3.2.1.2. 
7
 The United States base their double tax treaties on their own model treaty which, however, is very 
similar to the OECD Model, for a comparison of the OECD and the US Model see Rohatgi (2002), p. 
62-64. 
8
 For more information on the OECD concept of a permanent establishment, see Reimer (2011), p. 3. 
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that case an economic connection is, supposedly, even less present.
9
 The residence 
country is in Article 23 OECD Model, for cases where the source country has a full 
right to tax, offered two options for the avoidance of double taxation, the exemption 
and the credit method. The choice of a method, thus, depends on bilateral negotia-
tions. For dividends and interest payments, where limited source taxation applies, the 
credit method is recommended. 
UN Model Tax Convention 
Due to the unequal economic status of developing and developed countries, the nego-
tiation of double tax treaties is difficult. Developing countries have significantly 
higher imports from developed countries than exports to such countries. Therefore, 
the limitation of source taxation as implemented in the OECD Model would allocate 
a greater share of tax revenue to the developed country as it is more often the resi-
dence country. The UN Model accounts for this conflict and allocates a greater share 
of source taxation to the developing countries. The definition of a permanent estab-
lishment is, for those reasons, broader, so that more business activities fall under this 
provision and are subject to source taxation. The limited taxation of dividends and 
interest still exists, but no percentage is provided. A substantial holding, however, 
requires only a 10% shareholding. Royalty payments are treated accordingly to inter-
est and dividends. The double taxation avoidance methods available to the residence 
country are identical to the OECD Model. Table 1 provides an overview of the allo-
cation of taxing rights in the OECD and the UN Model. 
Table 1: Comparison of the Allocation of Taxing Rights and the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation under the OECD and the UN Model for Selected Types of Income 
 OECD Model UN Model 
 
source     
country 
residence    
country 
source     
country 
residence 
country 
Income from im-
movable property 
full taxation 
exemption/  
credit method 
full taxation 
exemption/ 
credit method 
Business profits 
(PE) 
full taxation 
exemption/  
credit method 
full taxation  
exemption/ 
credit method 
Business profits       
(no PE/exports) 
no taxation full taxation no taxation full taxation 
Dividends  15% credit method 
limited, but 
negotiable 
credit method 
                                                 
9
 14 OECD countries have reserved the right to tax royalties at source because they do not agree with 
this allocation of taxing rights, see Commentary on Article 12 OECD Model. For a discussion of the 
treatment of royalties in the OECD Model see Tadmore (2007). 
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Dividends (substan-
tial holding) 
5% credit method 
limited, but 
negotiable 
credit method 
Interest 10% credit method 
limited, but 
negotiable 
credit method 
Royalties no taxation full taxation 
limited, but 
negotiable 
credit method 
Source: own composition. 
The conclusion of double tax treaties based on either model is generally based on the 
reciprocity of the loss of tax revenue in the respective countries, i.e. both treaty part-
ners are willing to sacrifice an equal share of tax revenue. The reciprocity of with-
holding tax rates is, in this regard, widely accepted, i.e. both treaty partners apply the 
same rate of withholding tax on dividends or interest. But in case of dividends, this 
agreement may not always result in a reciprocal division of tax revenue (Harris 
(1996), p. 314) as the distribution also depends on the corporate tax system imple-
mented in the respective countries. In case one country applies a shareholder relief 
system (e.g. (partial) exemption of dividends) and the other country a classical sys-
tem, the country with the classical system will receive a greater share of the tax reve-
nue. The concept of “effective reciprocity” has therefore been broadly discussed (Sa-
to and Bird (1975), OECD (1991), p. 37), but due to its conflicts with other prin-
ciples of international taxation, namely the non-discrimination rule established in 
Article 24 OECD Model
10
 and capital import neutrality, it has been rejected. 
Concluding, internation equity is a very complex topic, especially when considering 
multinational enterprises. Neither the ability-to-pay nor the benefits principle is able 
to provide a convincing framework for the allocation of taxing rights between coun-
tries. Much rather, the allocation of taxing rights represents a general agreement 
which has evolved over the past decades (Lang (2005)). The OECD and the United 
Nations both provide a proposition of an allocation depending on the economic status 
of the involved countries. Considering the intensive negotiations and efforts underta-
ken by academics as well as practitioners in order to design and further amend the 
OECD and the UN Model, it can be assumed that the suggested allocation of taxing 
rights successfully satisfies the different needs of jurisdictions and taxpayers and 
may serve as a benchmark. Yet, there still exist several possibilities to undermine a 
fair allocation of tax revenues through various tax avoiding strategies. Chapter 2.3 
will, in this context, provide an overview of the most common profit shifting strate-
gies used by multinational enterprises. 
                                                 
10
 The non-discrimination rule prohibits the different tax treatment of residents and non-residents of a 
treaty country. 
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2.1.2.1.2 Efficiency 
There are generally two perspectives on efficiency. The first perspective focuses on 
the relationship between the tax revenue and the costs of compliance and administra-
tion, from both the taxpayer‟s and the tax authorities‟ perspective. Clearly, the lower 
compliance and administrative costs are compared to tax revenue, the more efficient 
is a tax.  
The second perspective regards the impact of taxes on the taxpayer‟s behavior. In a 
free market, economic resources should be allocated to be most productive. Taxes, 
however, may distort this allocation, especially in cross-border situations. The extent 
to which a tax distorts the free market allocation is also a measurement of its effi-
ciency. A tax that has no impact on such an allocation is also called neutral.  
As previously outlined, both concepts of international taxation, i.e. the source and the 
residence principle, follow different neutrality concepts. A strict source taxation 
leads to capital import neutrality which treats all investors in the same jurisdiction 
equally regardless of their residence. Residence taxation, in turn, ensures capital ex-
port neutrality which treats investments at home and abroad equally. Which of the 
two concepts promotes economic efficiency better than the other has been widely 
discussed and it is agreed that capital export neutrality is, generally, preferable to 
capital import neutrality. The reasoning behind this argument is that investors face 
equal effective tax rates on foreign and domestic investments under capital export 
neutrality. Thus, when achieving equal after-tax rates of return as a consequence of 
capital mobility, this consequently leads to equal pre-tax rates of return which, in 
turn, are required for a maximization of world income (Griffith/Hines/Sorensen 
(2010)). Traditionally, developed countries have preferred capital export neutrality 
because they often serve as the residence countries of investors and choose to tax 
domestic and foreign investment equally. Developing countries, on the other hand, 
prefer capital import neutrality to ensure that investments of domestic and foreign 
investors are taxed equally (Rohatgi (2002), p. 1). However, over the past decade a 
trend towards the exemption of foreign income and, thus, capital import neutrality in 
developed countries could be observed (Elschner/Heckemeyer/Spengel (2011)). This 
trend was justified by jurisdictions based on an improvement of the competitive ad-
vantage of domestic firms investing abroad (Mullins (2006)) and a reduction of ad-
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ministrative complexities connected with the credit method (Blanluet/Durand 
(2011)).
11
  
2.1.2.1.3 Simplicity 
According to Harris (1996), there are three different aspects of simplicity: policy 
simplicity, form simplicity, and action simplicity. Policy simplicity stands for the 
government‟s choice for simple taxes, i.e. simple regarding type and incidence. This 
principle may be in contradiction with equity or efficiency as more complex taxes 
that account for the taxpayer‟s circumstances are usually more equitable and effi-
cient. On the other hand, if taxes are too complex, they are not equitable since not all 
taxpayers can afford the assistance to understand and comply with the tax. 
Form simplicity denotes the taxpayer‟s and the tax administration‟s ability to under-
stand tax law. It relates to the certainty and accuracy provided in tax legislation and 
demands transparent guidelines for the application of the rules. Finally, action sim-
plicity focuses on convenient procedures for the collection and administration of the 
tax. 
2.1.2.2 Law of the European Union 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU) constitute the basis for the cooperation of the Member States 
in the European Union. They were both amended with effect from 1 December 2009 
by the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007 which introduced several prominent 
changes, e.g. the introduction of qualified majority voting in several policy areas. 
The treaties form primary law and rank before secondary law which is enacted by the 
organs of the European Union, usually in the form of directives or regulations. In the 
following the primary and secondary law relevant for direct taxation in the Member 
States will be outlined. 
Primary Law 
Tax policy is not included in the treaties, much rather it still falls under the sole re-
sponsibility of the Member States. Nevertheless, the introduction and implementation 
of regulations in the Member States has always to be in accordance with EU law. 
The most relevant regulations for tax policy are the non-discrimination rule on the 
                                                 
11
 For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of both concepts as well as the concept 
of capital ownership neutrality, see Desai and Hines (2004), Avi-Yonah (2000), p. 1604-1610, Beck-
er/Fuest (2010). 
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one hand, and the fundamental freedoms on the other hand. The non-discrimination 
rule is included in Article 18 TFEU and prohibits any kind of direct or indirect
12
 dis-
crimination based on nationality.
13
 European case law has defined for regulations to 
comply with the non-discrimination rule that “comparable situations must not be 
treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless 
such treatment is objectively justified”.14 The concept of non-discrimination only 
applies to cross-border situations, while internal discrimination in a Member State is 
not affected (Helminen (2009), p. 47).  
The fundamental freedoms included in Articles 28-37 and 45-66 TFEU substantiate 
the non-discrimination rule and are in their application primary to Article 18 TFEU. 
They comprise the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital, all of 
which may not be discriminated by domestic law. But besides the prohibition of dis-
crimination, EU case law has, over the years, extended the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms to a prohibition of restrictions that do not constitute discrimination.
15
 Fun-
damental freedoms are seen to be restricted if domestic legislation limits access to 
them or makes them less attractive.
16
 A restriction, in this context, does not require a 
difference between a cross-border and an internal situation, but also applies to purely 
internal cases. 
Each EU citizen may proceed against domestic regulations with reference to the fun-
damental freedoms. In this context, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has decided 
on a considerable number of cases on direct taxation in the Member States.
17
 If the 
ECJ constitutes a discrimination or restriction of the fundamental freedoms, it can, 
however, be justified (Helminen (2009), p. 111). Reasons for such a justification can 
be found in the TFEU. Article 36 TFEU includes, for instance, the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants or the protection of industrial and com-
mercial property as justifications for restrictions of the free movement of goods. Jus-
tifications for the restriction of the free movement of persons or services are found in 
Articles 45 and 52 TFEU respectively and refer to public policy, public security or 
                                                 
12
 An indirect or covert discrimination prevails if a regulation does not distinguish between nationali-
ty, but between another criterion which in turn results in a discrimination based on nationality, see 
ECJ, 14.02.1995, Case C-279/93, Schumacker, ECR 1995, I-00225; ECJ , 07.05.1998, Case C-350/96, 
Car Clean Autoservice, ECR 1998, I-02521. 
13
 For an analysis of the EU concept of discrimination, see Wouters (1999). 
14
 See ECJ, 13.12.1984, Case 106/83, Sermide, ECR 1984, 04209. 
15
 See ECJ, 30.11.1995, Case C-55/94, Gebhard, ECR 1995, I-04165; Terra/Wattel (2008), p. 63-76. 
16
 See, in detail, Arndt/Fischer/Fetzer (2010). 
17
 For an overview of the cases relating to German direct taxation, see Kahler (2012).  
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public health. Similar criteria can be found in Articles 64 and 65 TFEU for the free 
movement of capital. But besides the reasons included in the treaty, restrictions – not 
discrimination – can also be justified by reasons formulated by the Court of Justice 
(rule of reason principle). In tax matters, such reasons include the prevention of tax 
avoidance
18
, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision
19
, or the coherence of the tax sys-
tem
20
, i.e. the systematic context of tax regulations. The ECJ has, however, only sel-
dom allowed a justification on these grounds (van Thiel (2008)).
 
Other reasons, e.g. 
administrative difficulties in obtaining information
21
, additional financial charges
22
 
or reciprocity
23
, i.e. the missing of a regulation in another Member State, have been 
discussed, but have never served as a justification.
24
 
If the ECJ constitutes a discrimination or restriction of the fundamental freedoms 
which cannot be justified, the concerned domestic regulation has to be abolished or 
amended. As the interpretation of domestic law must conform to EU law (Article 4 
TFEU), the decision will also affect similar regulations in other Member States 
(Helminen (2009), p. 44-45). 
Secondary Law 
Secondary law mainly comprises directives relevant for direct taxation. On 23 July 
1990, the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive (90/435/EEC) was issued which had to be 
implemented by the Member States until 1 January 1992. The purpose of this direc-
tive is to facilitate the formation of corporate groups across borders and to remove 
tax obstacles. This is done by eliminating the source taxation of profit distributions 
between corporations. In addition, the Member State where the parent resides has to 
guarantee that double taxation is eliminated through the exemption of dividends or 
an indirect tax credit. The EC Merger Directive (90/434/EEC) was also issued on 23 
                                                 
18
 See ECJ, 09.03.1999, Case C-212/97, Centros, ECR 1999, I-01459; ECJ, 21.02.2006, Case C-
255/02, Halifax, ECR 2006, I-01609. 
19
 See ECJ, 20.02.1979, Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, ECR 1979, 00649; ECJ, 15.05.1997, Case C-
250/95, Futura, ECR 1997, I-02471. 
20
 See ECJ, 28.01.1992, Case C-204/90, Bachmann, ECR 1992, I-00250; Verdoner (2009). In other 
cases, the ECJ referred to the protection of the territoriality principle or the need to preserve the ba-
lanced allocation of the power to impose taxes. These reasons are very similar and pursue the same 
concept, see Terra/Wattel (2008), p. 50-51. 
21
 See among others ECJ, 28.01.1992, Case C-204/90, Bachmann, ECR 1992, I-00250; ECJ, 
14.02.1995, Case C-279/93, Schumacker, ECR 1995, I-00225; ECJ, 26.06.2003, Case C-422/01, 
Skandia and Ramstedt, ECR 2003, I-06817. 
22
 See among others ECJ, 21.09.1999, Case C-307/97, Saint-Gobain, ECR 1999, I-06161; ECR, 
18.09.2003, Case C-168/01, Bosal, ECR 2003, I-09409; ECJ, 07.09.2004, Case C-319/02, Manninen, 
ECR 2004, I-07477. 
23
 See ECJ, 28.01.1986, Case 270/83, Avoir Fiscal, ECR 1986, 273. 
24
 For a discussion of the different justifications for restrictions see van Thiel (2008) and Helminen 
(2009), p. 111-128. 
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July 1990 and entered into force on 1 January 1992. It is intended to facilitate cross-
border reorganizations within the EU, i.e. it provides for a tax deferral in the case of 
a cross-border restructuring of businesses. In 2005, the directive was amended to also 
include reorganizations regarding the European legal forms, European Company 
(SE) and European Cooperative Society (SCE) (2005/19/EC). Finally, the EC Inter-
est-Royalty Directive (2003/49/EC) was issued on 3 June 2003 and entered into force 
on 1 January 2004. It supports the simplified cross-border payment of interest and 
royalties between associated companies and ensures the single taxation of such pay-
ments. Again, the source taxation of payments is prohibited, independent of the level 
of taxation in the residence country. 
2.2 Consequences of International Tax Competition  
2.2.1 International Tax Competition 
The nationality of tax systems, as described in the previous sections, leads to a com-
petition between jurisdictions on the grounds of taxation. Multinational companies 
are very much aware of this competition and locate their activities accordingly.
25
 
Jurisdictions, in turn, react to this behavior and try to attract investors by lowering 
corporate tax rates or granting favorable tax incentives. In both, developed and de-
veloping countries, a so called “race to the bottom” regarding corporate income tax 
rates has taken place over the past decades. Figure 1 depicts the development of the 
average corporate income tax rate in the developed and developing countries ex-
amined in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
25
 Many studies have shown the impact of taxation on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
for an overview of such studies see Feld/Heckemeyer (2011). 
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Figure 1: Average Corporate Income Tax Rates in Developed and Developing Coun-
tries  
 
Source: own illustration (Table A1, A2 in the Appendix). 
The level of corporate income tax is, in this sample, lower in developing countries. 
However, corporate income tax rates in developed and developing countries both 
followed a downward trend over the past ten years. Heinemann/Overesch/Rincke 
(2010) show for European countries that this cutting of the tax rate is mainly driven 
by the actions of other, especially geographically close, jurisdictions. 
The impact of tax competition has been widely discussed. Economists argue that a 
certain degree of tax competition improves welfare as it promotes fiscal discipline 
and implements the concept of a “market” to tax policy (McLure (1986), Schön 
(2003), p. 5-6). Nevertheless, tax competition may also impose a great burden on the 
tax system. As multinationals aim at reducing their overall effective tax rate, capital 
allocation is affected by different tax burdens in case capital import neutrality pre-
vails. If profits are only taxed in the host country and no further taxation applies 
upon repatriation, they will be allocated to low-tax countries. In contrast, under capi-
tal export neutrality, the effective tax rate is equal irrespective of the location of in-
vestment. Thus, from an efficiency perspective, tax competition leads to a distortion 
of the allocation of capital, but only where capital import neutrality prevails. Howev-
er, as Avi-Yonah (2000) points out, not all aspects of tax competition are bad, but are 
equally evened out under capital export neutrality.  
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Another obstacle of tax competition is that the reduction of corporate tax rates and 
the granting of incentives decrease tax revenues from corporate income significantly. 
Most countries react to this development by increasing the tax burden on less mobile 
factors, e.g. labor (Miller/Oats (2009), p. 393), or by reducing social security benefits 
which are, however, - due to demographic factors, but also income inequality and job 
insecurity - even more needed under globalization (Avi-Yonah (2000), p. 1578, 
1618-1622). Thus, jurisdictions face a dilemma caused by the globalization of busi-
nesses which imposes a downward pressure on corporate tax rates, but at the same 
time an increasing need for social security benefits which can both be hardly satisfied 
simultaneously. Tax competition is, therefore, sometimes even regarded as a vicious 
circle (Eicke (2009), p.135-136). 
Keen/Simone (2004) show that the effects of tax competition have been more signif-
icant for developing countries than for developed countries as they have not managed 
to broaden the tax base relative to the reduction of the income tax rate. This effect is 
even reinforced by the introduction of more favorable tax incentives by developing 
countries, especially in the poorest regions. Keen/Simone (2004) try to find explana-
tions for this development and argue that political and institutional structures in de-
veloping countries are influenced more by the pressure of certain groups, e.g. multi-
national companies. Developing countries may also have less immobile factors that 
can be taxed, so they try to attract more foreign investments in order to outweigh the 
loss in corporate tax from resident companies.  
A concept which is often discussed as the opposite of tax competition is tax harmo-
nization. If tax systems were harmonized across countries, not only compliance costs 
would decrease, but also tax neutrality would be guaranteed which would promote 
internation equity (Musgrave/Musgrave (1990), p. 72-75). A concept on tax harmo-
nization developed by the European Commission will be discussed in Chapter 
3.3.1.2. 
2.2.2 Tax Planning, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion 
As outlined in the previous section, multinational companies react to international 
tax competition and pursue a reduction of the overall effective tax rate. Tax reducing 
activities can generally be divided into tax planning, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. 
The following sections provide a distinction of the three concepts.  
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2.2.2.1 Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is considered illegal, i.e. the taxpayer‟s behavior is in conflict with the 
tax law and has the purpose of escaping the payment of taxes. A definition of tax 
evasion used by Uckmar (1983) and Merks (2006) is: “the taxpayer avoids the pay-
ment without avoiding the tax liability and consequently escapes the payment of tax – 
which is unquestionable due according to the law of the taxing jurisdiction – and 
even breaks the letter of the law.” Tax evading behavior, therefore, includes the non- 
or wrong declaration of income as well as the conduction of illegal activities (e.g. 
money laundering). It is questionable, however, whether only deliberate actions are 
considered tax evasion or also acts of omission. In many countries, a distinction is 
made and higher penalties are imposed on purposeful tax evasion, which is also 
called tax fraud.
26
 The penalties and criminal sanctions on tax evasion vary widely 
across countries.
27
 
As tax evasion always involves the concealment of income from tax authorities in a 
given country, there is no such thing as an internationally illegal transaction (see 
Russo (2007)). Nevertheless, the means taken to conceal income may be domestic or 
international, i.e. in a domestic setting, taxes may be evaded by not reporting income 
(shadow economy) while in an international setting, assets or profits could be trans-
ferred abroad in order to hide income from domestic tax authorities.
28
 
2.2.2.2 Tax Planning 
Tax planning is a legal and fully accepted way of minimizing taxes. There are gener-
ally different dimensions of (international) tax planning, based on the pursued objec-
tives, the timely impact and the implementation strategies (based on Russo (2007)). 
In the following, these three dimensions will be outlined.  
 
 
                                                 
26
 For an overview of the different definitions of tax evasion across countries see Uckmar (1983), p. 
21-23. 
27
 Economists have examined whether, depending on the probability and cost of being detected, tax 
evasion can be favorable from the perspective of the taxpayer (Allingham/Sandmo (1972), Yitzakhi 
(1974)). The model shows that, applying a realistic probability of being audited as well as the applica-
ble penalty rates, the amount of tax evaded should be significantly higher than it actually is. For an 
overview of tax penalties on wrong transfer prices, see Chapter 4.1.6. 
28
 A distinction of a domestic and an international component of tax evasion is also made by Fu-
est/Riedel (2009). 
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Objectives 
Tax planning can either pursue the elimination or minimization of double taxation, of 
single taxation or the realization of negative taxation. The elimination and minimiza-
tion of double taxation is not only an objective of corporate tax planning, but is also 
pursued by the national tax legislation, the European Union, and the OECD. As is 
stated in the Introduction of the OECD Model 2010, “[the] harmful effects [of double 
taxation] on the exchange of goods and services and movements of capital, technolo-
gy and persons are so well known that it is scarcely necessary to stress the impor-
tance of removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to the development of 
economic relations between countries”.  
The elimination or minimization of single taxation denotes that the taxation of corpo-
rate profits is either reduced or fully avoided (i.e. double non-taxation). The reduc-
tion of corporate taxation is a main goal of corporate tax planning which is also pur-
sued by the profit shifting strategies examined in this study.
29
 In turn, the full avoid-
ance of corporate tax can usually only be achieved by exploiting tax legislation loo-
pholes, such as qualification conflicts, in connection with cross-border investments.
30
 
Finally, the case of negative taxation is very rare and comprises arrangements where 
in the end a tax refund results although profits were generated. 
Timely Impact 
The minimization of taxes can generally be achieved by realizing temporary or per-
manent tax savings. Temporary tax savings only defer tax payments to a later point 
in time, which is favorable due to interest and liquidity effects. Permanent tax sav-
ings, on the other hand, will not reverse in the future. A deferral of tax payments 
usually results from a deferral of income recognition, e.g. transactions within a con-
solidated group, favorable depreciation schemes, or retaining instead of distributing 
profits. Permanent tax savings can, for example, be achieved by utilizing tax losses 
that would otherwise expire, by treaty-shopping strategies, or by transferring taxable 
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 See Chapter 2.3. 
30
 On 29 February 2012, the European Commission has released a consultation to tackle double non-
taxation cases 
(http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/2012_double_non_taxation_en.htm). 
All stakeholders (e.g. citizens, tax administrations, tax practitioners and academia) are asked to pro-
vide their views on this topic. 
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income to low-tax jurisdictions (e.g. through profit shifting or the relocation of busi-
ness activities).
31
  
Implementation 
Different strategies can be pursued in order to realize tax savings. On the one hand, 
the economic activity itself can be adapted to tax circumstances, which is also called 
substantive tax planning. This can involve a relocation of entire companies or assets 
or a rerouting of flows of goods. On the other hand, formal tax planning has no influ-
ence on the economic activity, but exploits the tax saving potential of existing busi-
ness structures. This can be done by using tax favorable elements of income determi-
nation (e.g. declining balance depreciation) or by shifting taxable profits from high- 
to low-tax jurisdictions through contractual arrangements. 
2.2.2.3 Tax Avoidance 
Governments generally accept that taxpayers organize their business as they prefer 
within the boundaries of the law, therefore it is also accepted that multinationals pur-
sue tax-efficient arrangements.
32
 Additionally, according to the principle of legal 
certainty, taxpayers should be able to rely on legal options (Russo (2007), p. 52). 
But, nevertheless, such tax-optimizing behavior is of great concern to governments 
as it has a significant effect on national tax revenues. Therefore, tax avoidance is 
distinguished from tax planning as being a legal, but not accepted way of saving tax-
es which is tried to be prevented through national tax legislation. The distinction of 
accepted and unaccepted arrangements is, however, rather difficult.  
The description of tax avoidance stated by the OECD (1987a) claims that tax avoid-
ing arrangements generally do not have business or economic goals, they are often 
kept secret and they apply legal provisions in a way they were not intended to be 
used. At the same time, the OECD argues that a reduction of tax payments is not 
necessary for strategies to be tax avoiding since they may not always succeed. 
Within the European Union, case law also provides hints to the distinction of tax 
avoidance and tax planning. The ECJ has ruled in several tax cases that the location 
                                                 
31
 An example for a permanent tax savings strategy are multinationals which moved production to 
low-cost countries that also grant tax incentives, e.g. China or India (Endres/Fuest/Spengel (2010), p. 
33, Timberlake et al. (2009), for empirical evidence see Klemm/van Parys (2012)). 
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 This principle has also been approved in a number of court cases in various jurisdictions, for a short 
overview see Russo (2007), p. 51. 
2 Conceptual Basics of International Tax Avoidance  
21 
 
of group companies in low-tax countries is not in itself tax avoidance since the com-
panies will be subject to tax legislation in their state of residence.
33
 However, it is 
also stated that it is legitimate to prevent “wholly artificial arrangements” through 
national legislation.
34
 Nevertheless, it is not clear under what circumstances an ar-
rangement is wholly artificial. The ECJ provides some answers to this question in its 
case law. In the ICI case, it was stated that it is accepted that multinationals arrange 
any economic activity as tax efficient as possible including the establishment of a 
subsidiary abroad.
35
 Simply the fact that the activity could also be pursued in the 
home country of the taxpayer does not constitute a characteristic of artificiality. Fur-
thermore, it is legitimate to take tax circumstances into consideration when deciding 
on a location for an establishment as the minimization of the tax burden is a valid 
objective.
36
 In the Eurowings case, the ECJ held that only because of lower levels of 
taxation in other Member States, Member States cannot impose anti-avoidance regu-
lations.
37
 This is even the case if Member States grant special tax favorable regimes 
that may or may not constitute state aid.
38
 
The different definitions and approaches show that there is no clear outline for tax 
avoidance, much rather it is located in a gray zone between tax planning and tax eva-
sion.
39
 The fact that the OECD has not commented on its definition in 25 years, al-
though many countries have entered the OECD during that time period, underlines 
this observation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the distinction of tax avoidance 
and tax planning depends on the circumstances of each single case and the countries 
involved. In the course of this study, the different understandings of tax avoidance 
across countries will be described and analyzed, as they are reflected in national anti-
avoidance measures. 
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 See ECJ , 16.07.1998, Case C-264/96, ICI, ECR 1998, I-4695, para. 26; ECJ, 08.03.2001, Case C-
397/98, Hoechst and Metallgesellschaft, ECR 2001, I-1727, para. 57. 
34
 This principle has been repeated by two cases in 2006, in both of which the ECJ has stated that no 
tax avoidance prevails if real economic activity is taking place, see ECJ, 21.02.2006, Cases C-255/02, 
C-419/02, C-233/03, Halifax, BUPA Hospitals, and University of Huddersfield Higher Education 
Corporation, ECR 2006, I-1609; ECJ, 12.09.2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, ECR 2006, I-7995. 
35
 See ECJ, 16.07.1998, Case C-264/96, ICI, ECR 1998, I-04695. 
36
 See ECJ, 12.09.2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, ECR 2006, I-07995. 
37
 See ECJ, 26.10.1999, Case C-294/97, Eurowings, ECR 1999, I-07447. 
38
 See Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger in Cadbury Schweppes, ECR 2006, I-07995.  
39
 The terms tax avoidance and tax evasion are sometimes even used interchangeably which is primar-
ily confusing, but also resembles the uncertainty of tax legislators and judicature (see Merks (2006), p. 
280-281). 
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2.2.3 Magnitude of Tax Avoidance and Evasion in Developed and Devel-
oping Countries 
From an economic perspective, tax avoidance and tax evasion may be used inter-
changeably since tax revenue lost from either one has the same impact. The differ-
ence between the potential tax revenue and the actual tax revenue is, in the literature, 
called the “tax gap”. Many studies have so far tried to measure the tax gap, but all 
face difficulties due to lacking information. Generally, two different approaches for 
the measurement of the tax gap have to be distinguished. On the one hand, the addi-
tional tax revenue can be measured which would be raised if all economic activity 
was taxed that is escaping taxation and, on the other hand, only the tax revenue that 
could be raised by applying anti-avoidance regulations can be measured. Existing 
studies have mainly focused on the first type of the tax gap and are based on esti-
mates of the shadow economy. The latter approach is, however, more relevant for tax 
policy, but also requires information about the expected reactions to policy changes 
(Fuest/Riedel (2009)).  
As this study analyses the impact of anti-avoidance legislation on corporate behavior, 
studies examining the business sector will be focused on in the following.
40
 As, due 
to the data used, the approaches employed to estimate the tax gap differ in the pre-
sented studies, the subsequent sections will be organized accordingly. 
Tax Administration Data 
The most reliable source of information on tax evasion is provided by the US Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) which has, until 1988, pursued a Taxpayer‟s Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) that comprised intensive audits on a large sample of 
tax returns every three years. Information on tax compliance of large corporations is, 
in addition, gained from actual examination results as the audit coverage is extensive. 
The IRS regularly publishes studies on new estimates of the tax gap which are main-
ly based on an extrapolation of the TCMP data. The most recent study was published 
in 2012 and provides estimates on the fiscal year 2006 (Internal Revenue Service 
(2012)). According to the study, the overall net tax gap, i.e. after late payments of 
tax, amounted to USD 385 billion which equals a net compliance rate of 85.5% and 
2.8% of GDP. The tax gap can be divided into the non-filing of income, the underre-
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 For a discussion of tax evasion and avoidance in the private sector see Slemrod/Yitzhaki (2002). 
2 Conceptual Basics of International Tax Avoidance  
23 
 
porting of income and the underpayment of taxes out of which the underreporting 
constitutes the largest part. Regarding corporate taxation, the underreporting gap is 
estimated to be USD 67 billion, where USD 19 billion can be attributed to small cor-
porations and USD 48 billion to large corporations. While the non-filing component 
could not be measured for corporations, the underpayment of taxes amounted to 
USD 4 billion. These estimates do altogether not include legal actions taken to avoid 
taxation, much rather they describe tax evasion.  
Comparable information is only rarely available for other countries.
41
 In 2004, the 
Swedish Tax Agency has published estimates of the tax gap accounting to undec-
lared income and underreported income for the fiscal year 2000 (see Swedish Tax 
Agency (2004)). The estimates are based on the experience from random audits of 
individuals and small firms and from coordinated audits of large firms. The tax gap 
was estimated to amount to SEK 84.2 billion (appr. USD 12.8 billion) which equals 
4% of Swedish GDP. This number cannot be broken down to individual and business 
income. 
Although the presented studies probably have the most reliable data base, i.e. data 
collected by tax administrations, there are also some drawbacks. As Slemrod (2007) 
points out, the tax liability stated on the initial tax return may only serve as an “open-
ing bid” for the following negotiations - especially with regard to companies. In ad-
dition, the long-term effects of non-compliance are unclear since an income adjust-
ment may reverse in the future. 
Other Micro and Macro Data 
Several economists have also undertaken studies in this field, but have mainly fo-
cused on the measurement of the shadow economy.
42
 They usually use approaches 
that can be divided into micro and macro methods (sometimes also called direct and 
indirect methods).
43
 While micro methods use surveys, interviews or tax audit infor-
mation of randomly selected taxpayers, macro methods use information publicly 
available to derive estimates. The estimates presented by the IRS or the Swedish Tax 
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 For a comparison of the tax gap in the United States and other developed countries, see Slemrod 
(2007). 
42
 As noted earlier, in many studies the tax gap is linked to the shadow economy. But this has to be 
interpreted with caution as not all income from the shadow economy would be taxed if it was reported 
- partly because the activities are illegal, and partly because they would simply not take place in the 
official sector. 
43
 For an overview of the different methods and corresponding studies see Schneider/Enste (2000), 
Fuest/Riedel (2009). 
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Agency are examples of micro approaches as they use individual audit information. 
Other studies using micro methods include Mogensen et al. (1995) who use taxpayer 
surveys to estimate the size of the shadow economy in Denmark. They find an extent 
of the shadow economy of 3.1% of GDP in 1994 with a slightly decreasing trend. A 
publication of the US General Accounting Office (GAO) (US General Accounting 
Office (2003), p. 13) also relies on surveys of IRS field offices and includes calcula-
tions on the amount of foregone tax through tax avoidance. It is estimated to be be-
tween USD 14.5 and USD 18.4 billion in 1999. La Porta/Shleifer (2008) used three 
sets of surveys conducted by the World Bank to conclude on the productivity of offi-
cial and unofficial firms and find for developing countries that informal firms 
amount to 30-40% of total economic activity in the years 2002-2007. 
Macro methods make use of different macroeconomic indicators that the develop-
ment of the shadow economy can be inferred from. An often used approach is the 
currency demand method which is based on the assumption that a lot of underground 
activities involve cash payments. Cagan (1958) was first to use this approach which 
was further developed by Tanzi (1983). Tanzi estimated a currency demand function 
which controlled for several factors generally driving the currency demand. The 
“excess” demand is then attributed to the shadow economy and used as a proxy for 
the development of the unofficial sector over time. He estimates the shadow econo-
my in the United States to be between 4.5-6.1% of GNP in 1980. Another possibility 
is to use physical input, i.e. electricity consumption, to measure overall GDP. This is 
based on the finding that the elasticity of GDP and electricity consumption is close to 
one. The difference between the growth rate of official GDP and electricity con-
sumption can then be attributed to the unofficial GDP. In this context, Kauff-
man/Kaliberda (1996) find that in post-socialist countries, up to 50% of economic 
activity in 1994 is unofficial. Finally, Schneider/Buehn (2007) have used a “multiple 
indicator multiple cause” (MIMIC) approach to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy. They identify several causal variables, e.g. the tax burden, state regulation, 
unemployment rate and GDP per capita, which explain the size of the shadow econ-
omy. From the changes in those variables over time, they infer the development of 
the shadow economy. The study includes estimates for 120 countries worldwide with 
the size of the shadow economy ranging between appr. 14% in developed countries 
and appr. 35% in developing countries.  
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All of the above methods have in common that they have to use a base year or num-
ber in order to provide absolute figures for the shadow economy. This is either done 
by determining a year where the shadow economy was extremely low or not existent 
or by identifying a variable, usually the tax burden, that is the reason for the shadow 
economy. In that way, the reference point can be the indicator at a tax level of zero 
(see Tanzi (1983)). 
Another possibility to measure the tax gap using macro data is to determine the gap 
between the income and expenditure sides of the National or Financial Accounts. 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the national statistics office of the US, 
calculates this discrepancy each year to adjust the National Income and Product Ac-
counts (NIPA).
44
 Regarding corporate profits, for the year 2006, it is estimated that 
they were disclosed USD 300 billion too low, which equals 13.6% of the amount that 
should have been declared.
45
  
Both, macro and micro, methods have their drawbacks, but micro methods are gener-
ally preferred over macro methods because they are also able to explain the elements 
of the tax gap while macro methods can only provide aggregate information. The 
disadvantages of micro methods, however, are twofold: in the case of surveys, they 
face all weaknesses associated with surveys, especially the dependency on the res-
pondents‟ willingness to cooperate; in the case of audit information, the randomness 
of the sample is questionable as tax authorities apply a certain selection process for 
audits. Additionally, micro methods are not able to provide insights into the devel-
opment and growth of the shadow economy or the tax gap (Schneider/Enste (2000), 
Swedish Tax Agency (2008)). Macro methods, however, also face several problems. 
On the one hand, it is questionable whether the chosen indicators and underlying 
assumptions are really a good measure for the shadow economy. Especially the re-
quirement of a base year is critical. On the other hand, numbers contained in the Na-
tional Accounts contain measurement errors which influence the estimates of the 
unofficial economy. 
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 For the methodology used see Petrick (2002). 
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 National Income and Product Accounts, Table 7.16. For a comparison of the IRS and BEA meas-
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Data Available for Specific Channels of Tax Evasion and Avoidance 
A different approach to measure the tax gap is taken by Baker (2005) who tried to 
identify the tax gap resulting from deliberate income shifting. He examines the gen-
eral mispricing of trade between developed and developing countries using a survey 
of multinationals. He finds evidence that multinational companies withdraw money 
from developing countries by underpricing exports and overpricing imports and in 
return receive or pay bribe money. He estimates capital outflows from developing 
countries through these channels to be as high as USD 200 billion in the year 2003. 
Pak (2007), Christian Aid (2009) and Global Financial Integrity (2011) confirm these 
findings by comparing international trade statistics of different countries. A different 
approach is taken by Oxfam (2000) which estimates that tax revenues of at least 
USD 35 billion are lost in developing countries per year through income shifting by 
multinational companies. This estimate is based on the comparison of the tax burden 
on the average return on FDI stock and the actual tax revenue from foreign corpora-
tions. 
A Comparison of Developed and Developing Countries 
The studies presented above show that there is a great range of estimates of the sha-
dow economy and the tax gap. Depending on the underlying method, there can be 
rather significant discrepancies. The only study applying the same method to devel-
oped and developing countries is the one by Schneider/Buehn (2007). Their results 
show that the shadow economy is essentially larger in developing countries, but there 
also exist differences between regions. Table 2 depicts the size of the shadow econ-
omy in six different regions. It shows that the unofficial sector is smallest in devel-
oped OECD countries. The highest shadow economy can, in contrast, be found in 
South America or Africa.
46
 However, the spread between different countries is great-
er in South America compared to Africa, i.e. while in Africa in 50% of the countries 
the size of the shadow economy is 5 percentage points below or above the average, 
that is only the case in 25% of the countries in South America. Moreover, all num-
bers show an increasing trend over time. 
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 Studies have analyzed the reasons for the larger tax gaps in developing countries. Friedman et al. 
(2000) find that more bureaucracy, greater corruption and a weaker legal environment increase the 
shadow economy in a given country. 
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Table 2: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Different Regions 
 
Average Size of 
the Shadow 
Economy in 1999 
(% of GDP) 
Average Size of 
the Shadow 
Economy in 2005 
(% of GDP) 
Minimum Size of 
the Shadow 
Economy in 2005 
(% of GDP) 
Maximum Size of 
the Shadow 
Economy in 2005 
(% of GDP) 
OECD 14.7
a
 15.8 7.9 (USA) 31.7  (Mexico) 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
35.8 36.9 
18.2 (Slovak 
Republic) 
68.0 (Georgia) 
South America 40.9 41.2 20.4 (Chile) 67.6 (Bolivia) 
Africa 39.5 40.2 23.0 (Mauritius) 58.8 (Tanzania) 
Middle East 23.0 23.7 
19.3 (Saudi    
Arabia) 
35.3 (Egypt) 
East Asia 28.8 29.0 
13.8 (China, 
Singapore) 
44.8 (Sri Lanka) 
Source: Schneider/Buehn (2007); 
a
 number for 1998. 
As Fuest/Riedel (2009) point out, all of the mentioned studies on capital or income 
shifting do not provide reasons for such behavior. In the following section, we will 
describe the tax drivers of income shifting which may partly explain the findings of 
these studies. 
2.3 Profit Shifting Strategies of Multinational Companies 
For a long-term increase of profitability, permanent tax savings are crucial. They can 
be achieved by two different strategies, as described in Chapter 2.2.2.2: substantive 
or formal tax planning. This study focuses on the shifting of book tax income to ju-
risdictions where more favorable tax attributes can be used, e.g. a lower income tax 
rate, tax incentives, or existing tax losses (Kobetsky (2008)). As this income shifting 
does not include a transfer of real economic activity, it is an element of formal tax 
planning. It is, therefore, easier to implement which causes tax authorities to be par-
ticularly attentive in this respect. 
In the following sections, the three most common channels of income shifting will be 
analyzed. All these actions take advantage of the fact that tax systems treat corpora-
tions as separate entities
47
 and allow for a deduction of expenses in one jurisdiction 
and accordingly a receipt of payments in another jurisdiction. These basic principles 
of worldwide tax systems especially encourage arrangements purely based on the 
intention to save taxes (Eden (1998)). 
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 Note that the OECD also recommends a separate entity approach for permanent establishments, 
OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, 22 July 2010. 
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2.3.1 Intercompany Financing Structures   
Multinational corporations can generally choose how to arrange their cross-border 
financing structures. The two main options for intercompany financing are debt and 
equity financing.
48
 In the case of equity financing, the parent injects equity capital 
into the subsidiary and in return receives dividends. The subsidiary is subject to un-
limited taxation in its residence country and is not allowed to deduct costs of equity 
financing from taxable profits in most countries.
49
 If after-tax profits are retained, no 
further taxation occurs. In the case of a profit distribution, the parent company is 
subject to limited taxation in the source country of the dividend and can be liable to 
withholding tax. In the residence country of the parent, the parent is subject to unli-
mited taxation. In order to avoid double taxation, two possibilities for the treatment 
of dividends exist. The dividends may either be fully exempt of taxation (exemption 
method) or they are subject to tax, but underlying corporate income tax (indirect tax 
credit) and/or withholding tax (direct tax credit) are creditable against domestic cor-
porate income tax (credit method). The credit is usually limited to the amount of do-
mestic tax, i.e. no tax repayment results. Overall, equity financing bears the tax bur-
den of the residence country of the subsidiary (in case of the exemption method) or 
the higher tax burden of both countries (credit method). 
In case of debt financing, a loan is granted to an affiliate which in return pays interest 
to the creditor. Interest payments are usually deductible from the taxable income of 
the debtor. The debtor is subject to withholding tax in the source country of the inter-
est payments, according to his limited tax liability. Received interest payments are, 
furthermore, subject to unlimited taxation in the residence country of the debtor and 
are fully taxed with corporate income tax. Underlying withholding tax can usually be 
credited. The resulting overall tax burden, therefore, amounts to the tax level of the 
debtor‟s home country.  
Comparing the tax consequences of the two financing options shows that through the 
choice of cross-border financing, different tax levels can be achieved. Financing ar-
rangements are, therefore, often used by multinational corporations in order to de-
crease the overall tax burden. If profits occur in a high-tax country, a loan given to 
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 Financing instruments which show elements of debt and equity financing, so called hybrid financ-
ing instruments, will not be considered in this study. For a detailed study of the tax treatment of hybr-
id instruments see Baersch (2012). 
49
 An exception exists e.g. in Belgium, where a notional interest deduction on equity capital is al-
lowed. 
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the respective affiliate from a low-tax country results in deductible interest payments 
at the high tax level, while the interest income is low taxed. This arrangement signif-
icantly decreases tax payments and the overall tax level of the corporate group is 
reduced (Tax Justice Network (2007), p. 50-51). If the subsidiary, on the other hand, 
is located in the low-tax country, equity financing can be favorable, especially if the 
exemption method applies, because profits are fully taxed in the residence country of 
the subsidiary and the distribution to the parent is only liable to withholding tax. 
2.3.2 Transfer Pricing  
In 2002, the OECD has reported that more than 60% of world trade account for in-
tercompany trade (OECD (2002)). But in contrast to the globalizing business world, 
tax systems stay local. Each jurisdiction requests to tax all profits earned within its 
borders. It is, therefore, necessary to charge prices (transfer prices) for goods trans-
ferred or services conducted between affiliates in order to allocate profits between 
countries. The transfer prices paid to affiliates by the recipient of the goods or servic-
es are deductible from taxable income, while they are fully taxed at the level of the 
supplier of the goods or services. Due to the tax treatment of intercompany transac-
tions, the price setting may be influenced by the tax circumstances of the respective 
affiliates.  
If goods are imported by a high-tax country from a low-tax country, an incentive 
exists to overprice such imports. Higher costs are then deductible from the taxable 
income of the highly-taxed affiliate, while the corresponding receipts are low-taxed. 
In the reverse case, when goods are exported from a high- to a low-tax country, ex-
ports should be underpriced, so that only a minimum amount of receipts has to be 
taxed in the high-tax country (Pak (2007)). 
2.3.3 Relocation of Intangible Assets 
Intangible assets are generally located where they were created or commissioned 
(e.g. patents) or where they were acquired. The use of such intangible assets is usual-
ly connected with the charge of royalties or license fees. Similar to interest payments, 
they are deductible from taxable income. If paid cross-border, a withholding tax may 
be levied. The recipient, on the other hand, includes the royalty payments in his taxa-
ble income and credits the underlying withholding tax. Due to such a tax treatment of 
royalties, it is, from a tax perspective, favorable to locate intangibles in low-tax 
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countries where receipts are only subject to a low tax burden. And since intangible 
assets are highly mobile, this strategy is often employed by multinational enterprises.    
The transfer of an intangible asset, however, may be subject to exit taxation on the 
fair value of the asset which can cause a significant tax burden. The advantage of the 
low profit taxation in the future has, therefore, to be compared with the disadvantage 
of the exit taxation. Nevertheless, the fair value of an intangible asset is rather diffi-
cult to assess, especially directly after its creation when it has not proven to have 
commercial worth (Tax Justice Network (2007), p. 51). That‟s why there exists cer-
tain latitude regarding the extent of the exit taxation which increases the favorability 
of a transfer.  
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3 Qualitative Analysis of Existing Anti-Avoidance Measures 
The previous chapter has given an overview of the principles of international busi-
ness taxation and the difficulties that arise from the interaction of different tax sys-
tems in a cross-border setting. At the same time, the number of cross-border transac-
tions and multinational enterprises has been constantly rising over the past decades, 
which drives an increasing tax competition between jurisdictions. Multinational en-
terprises, however, make use of this complexity and exploit different strategies to 
reduce the effective tax burden. Jurisdictions are aware of this behavior which im-
poses a threat to their tax revenues. For that reason, different measures are taken by 
jurisdictions to prevent the tax avoiding strategies pursued by multinational enter-
prises. 
Since this study focuses on profit shifting strategies of multinational enterprises, dif-
ferent measures will, in the following, be presented that aim at reducing tax avoid-
ance through profit shifting. It can generally be distinguished between measures im-
plemented in the domestic tax law of jurisdictions, i.e. unilateral measures, measures 
agreed on by two jurisdictions through a contract, i.e. bilateral measures, and meas-
ures developed multilaterally.  
3.1 Unilateral Measures 
3.1.1 General Anti-Avoidance Regulations (GAAR) 
In order to prevent tax avoidance, most countries execute a general anti-avoidance 
rule which is either established in the domestic tax law or through case law. General-
ly, countries following a common law or a civil law system can be distinguished. An 
overview of general anti-avoidance legislation under those systems will be provided 
in the following. 
Under a common law system, i.e. a system following the principle of case law, two 
main principles are followed: the “business purpose” rule and the “substance over 
form” rule. The “business purpose” rule differentiates between transactions follow-
ing a predominant business purpose and transactions whose main purpose it is to 
avoid tax payments. There is no general definition of a business purpose, but case 
law has, in several decisions, provided for specifying criteria
50
. Generally wider is 
the “substance over form” test which determines the tax treatment of a transaction 
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according to its economic substance and not to the legal form. There are different 
variations to this doctrine. Firstly, it may be applied in case of “sham” transactions, 
where the parties purposely pretend to carry out a transaction that is not actually tak-
ing place. According to case law, a sham does not necessarily require a deliberate 
attempt to deceive third parties, much rather also an “honest” sham may exist (Ward 
(1995)). Secondly, the parties may also use an incorrect “label” for a transaction 
which is connected with a specific tax consequence. In that case, the label will not 
change the nature of the transaction and will be disregarded. Furthermore, several 
countries have implemented a step transaction doctrine which allows for a series of 
transactions to be treated as a single transaction under the “substance over form” 
principle.  
As Banoun (2002) points out, among the common law countries two groups can be 
distinguished. While in the first one, a great number of court decisions on anti-tax-
avoidance exists which developed a sophisticated approach to combat tax avoidance, 
in the second group, courts were rather inactive, so that a general anti-avoidance reg-
ulation was introduced into domestic tax law. The United States, the United King-
dom, and Norway are good examples for the first group, while Australia, Canada, 
and Sweden represent the second group. 
In contrast, in civil law countries statutes are followed which are interpreted by the 
courts. The application of the legal statutes generally acts upon three different inter-
pretations, i.e. the “abuse of right”, the “abuse of law” and the “simulation” ap-
proach. Under the “abuse of right” principle, the use of legal rights is limited to the 
purpose they initially intended to answer. In the tax context, this means that where 
the sole reason of a certain transaction is to avoid tax payments, the transaction may 
be recharacterized or disregarded (Uckmar (1983)). This principle is applied, for in-
stance, in Argentina, Austria, France, Germany, and Spain. In France and Germany, 
there is an additional requirement for a certain extent of artificiality of the transac-
tion. The Netherlands, in particular, apply the “abuse of law” or “fraus legis” prin-
ciple which is a counterpart to the “business purpose” rule. Where a transaction does 
not pursue a real, practical intention and the only or prior goal is tax avoidance, it 
may be disregarded and substituted by a different transaction (van Weeghel (2010)). 
Finally, the “simulation” principle, as applied by Belgium and France, provides for a 
replacement of the simulated transaction with the real transaction in order to ensure 
“substance over form” (Rohatgi (2002), p. 352). 
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All of the above principles aim at preventing tax avoidance, but at the same time they 
have to ensure legal certainty. Thus, it is important to provide for a solid framework 
for the interpretation of transactions (Uckmar (1983)) which is in many cases better 
provided for by statutory regulations rather than through case law. This exactly is the 
reason why the introduction of a statutory GAAR is currently discussed in the United 
Kingdom (Freedman (2012), Lethaby (2012)). 
3.1.2 Transfer Pricing Regulations 
As previously outlined, transfer prices are prices paid on transactions or services be-
tween associated entities. In order to ensure that the allocation of tax revenues is not 
affected by a miscalculation of such prices, jurisdictions have implemented transfer 
pricing regulations in their domestic tax law. Transfer pricing legislation may either 
be based on general anti-avoidance regulations or on specific statutory regulations. In 
many cases, tax law is complemented with administrative guidelines published by 
the tax authorities. 
Transfer pricing regulations account for different aspects of the price setting between 
associated enterprises. Firstly, they provide for rules on the applicability of the legis-
lation, such as a definition of related entities. Secondly, they establish methods for 
the calculation of transfer prices and indicate how the best method shall be deter-
mined. Generally, the methods that relate to comparable transactions between unre-
lated parties are preferred, but as comparable transactions are often difficult to identi-
fy, also other methods have been introduced. A third aspect is the documentation that 
is required to be prepared by businesses, e.g. an overview of all concerned transac-
tions or a description of the price calculations including all underlying information. 
This aspect has especially increased in importance over the past ten years and now 
constitutes a major compliance burden on businesses. In addition, some countries 
also introduce special transfer pricing penalties in case an adjustment has to be made 
or documentation is missing. Finally, the possibility to enter into advance pricing 
agreements may be implemented. Advance pricing agreements (APA) allow a tax-
payer to negotiate a certain transfer price with the tax authorities of one or both con-
cerned jurisdictions. They, thus, provide certainty for taxpayers and avoid double 
taxation. 
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Chapter 4.1 provides a very detailed discussion of the outlined aspects of transfer 
pricing regulations. It, furthermore, analyzes and compares transfer pricing regula-
tions introduced by 44 jurisdictions. 
3.1.3 Thin/Fat Capitalization Rules 
The cross-border use of debt financing is a common vehicle for profit shifting.
51
 
Many jurisdictions, thus, try to avoid excessive debt financing by imposing unilateral 
thin capitalization rules which limit the deductibility of interest payments. Originally, 
thin capitalization rules were aimed at cross-border debt financing between related 
entities, but some jurisdictions have introduced rules that apply to all debt, i.e. be-
tween related and unrelated entities.
52
 In that case, the regulations are also called fat 
capitalization rules. 
However, all regulations have in common that they are based on the distinction of an 
acceptable and unacceptable extent of debt financing. The determination of that ex-
tent differs between jurisdictions. Furthermore, the regulations apply different tax 
consequences for the non-deductible amount of interest.  
The different options for the design of thin or fat capitalization rules will be analyzed 
in Chapter 4.2. In addition, the regulations of 53 different countries worldwide will 
be presented and discussed.  
3.1.4 Disclosure Requirements 
Having access to the relevant information is a key element of fighting tax avoidance 
and evasion. In order to obtain information, some countries, e.g. the United States or 
Canada, apply a self-assessment system which obliges the taxpayers to provide all 
necessary information and to calculate the tax burden themselves. Upon disclosure of 
the tax statement, they are required to pay the self-assessed taxes. In other countries, 
taxes are, in contrast, assessed by the tax authorities. The taxpayers are then only 
obliged to provide the relevant information, usually by using standardized forms, to 
the authorities that, on this basis, calculate the tax burden. Advocates of the self-
assessment system argue that the tax burden is assessed considerably faster which 
leads to a faster collection or refund of taxes. In addition, it reduces costs for the tax 
authorities as not all tax returns have to be examined upon disclosure (Hessisches 
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Finanzministerium (1972)) and information is easily accessible (Uckmar (1983), p. 
31). On the other hand, a self-assessment of taxes is only possible if the complexity 
of the tax law allows for a calculation of the tax burden by the taxpayer. It has to be 
guaranteed that the self-assessment is practicable and that taxpayers do not run the 
risk of undeliberately evading taxes (DStV (2008)). In addition, the usefulness of the 
information provided in a self-assessment system may vary considerably (Uckmar 
(1983), p. 31). 
For certain types of income or activities, especially the ones that can be more easily 
concealed, special reporting requirements may exist in addition. This is, for instance, 
the case for offshore subcontractors in Norway, for remittances abroad in Brazil, or 
foreign direct investment in Germany.
53
 
Also, the cross-border assistance in the collection of information and taxes may be 
implemented into the domestic tax law. Such a provision is usually the basis for bi- 
or multilateral agreements which can usually not constitute rights themselves. In 
some cases, the provision may only contain a reference to such bilateral or multila-
teral measures, as further explained in the following sections, but it may also include 
requirements for requesting assistance or for answering requests by other jurisdic-
tions. However, if no bilateral or multilateral instrument exists, on which assistance 
may be based, the exchange of information or the assistance in the collection of taxes 
is rather limited (Rätke (2012), § 117, para. 2). 
3.2 Bilateral Measures 
3.2.1 Bilateral Model Tax Conventions 
3.2.1.1 The OECD Model Tax Convention 
Due to the increasing cooperation of OECD countries after the Second World War, 
the need for a uniform double tax convention which would serve as a non-legally 
binding format used for bilateral negotiations regarding the avoidance of double 
taxation, had become evident.
54
 The OECD Fiscal Committee, therefore, began to 
work on a Model Convention in 1956 which resulted in the first OECD Model Tax 
Convention (OECD Model) published in 1963 (OECD (1963)). Besides the elimina-
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tion of double taxation, the main goals of the Model were to prevent discriminatory 
taxation and to support the tax authorities in combating tax evasion (Baker (1994)). 
In order to take account of the changes in the tax systems, organizational structures 
and increasing cross-border transactions, revisions of the OECD Model have, how-
ever, been necessary. After a full revision in 1977 (OECD (1977)), it was recognized 
that the work on the OECD Model is an ongoing process and changes should be 
adapted more timely. Thus, modifications have, since then, not been made through 
full revisions of the Model, but rather through periodic amendments. Furthermore, as 
the OECD Model was increasingly used by non-member countries, the Committee 
decided to include non-member countries in the decision making process.   
A Commentary to the OECD Model has always been published together with the 
Model. It interprets the provisions of the OECD Model and provides current opinions 
on their application. It is also non-binding, but OECD member countries have 
adopted it as the main source for the interpretation of tax treaties (Rohatgi (2002), p. 
24). It is, however, uncertain whether amendments to the Commentary are relevant 
for already existing tax treaties (Lang (1997)).  
Over the years, the OECD Model has become the basis of negotiations regarding the 
administrative tax co-operation between, mostly developed, countries. It is incorpo-
rated in the majority of bilateral treaties and thereby contributes to a facilitation of 
international taxation. Especially as the treaty network expands constantly, the im-
portance of a generally accepted guidance increases accordingly (OECD (2010d), 
para. 15). 
In the following sections, the Articles of the OECD Model that serve as anti-
avoidance measures regarding profit shifting are presented and analyzed.
55
 
3.2.1.1.1 Associated Enterprises (Article 9) 
Since the first version of the OECD Model in 1963, the arm‟s length principle has 
been included in Article 9.
56
 It states that where profits between associated enterpris-
es resident in the Contracting States differ from those between independent enter-
prises, such profits may be adjusted and taxed in the state where they would have 
accrued between independent enterprises (para. 1). Furthermore, it arranges for a 
corresponding adjustment in the other state in order to avoid double taxation (para. 
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2). While paragraph 1 has undergone only minor changes in the wording over time, 
paragraph 2 was first added in the course of the 1977 revision. 
Associated enterprises are defined in Article 9 para. 1 and include cases where either 
one enterprise or the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the manage-
ment, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State. This definition is re-
peated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (para. 11), but both provisions do 
not provide a minimum or maximum participation requirement. Thus, it is left to 
domestic tax law to substantiate the definition.  
If profits are adjusted in one Contracting State, paragraph 2 promotes a correspond-
ing adjustment in the other Contracting State. According to the OECD Commentary 
on Article 9, para. 6, the other Contracting State is, however, not automatically ob-
liged to allow for a corresponding adjustment. The corresponding adjustment should, 
rather, only be granted if the other Contracting State agrees that profits have been 
adjusted according to the arm‟s length principle. Nevertheless, several countries (i.e. 
Australia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia) have expressed res-
ervations to paragraph 2 and have reserved the right to exclude it from their tax trea-
ties. 
As a bilateral treaty only limits but not constitutes taxing rights, an according provi-
sion has to be included in national tax law in order for Article 9 to be applicable. It 
then sets a limit to the adjustment according to the arm‟s length price. The OECD‟s 
understanding of the identification of the arm‟s length price is, in turn, content of the 
OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing.  
3.2.1.1.2 Interest and Royalty Payments (Articles 11, 12) 
Both Articles 11 and 12 comprise a paragraph (para. 6 of Article 11 and para. 4 of 
Article 12) which deals with interest or royalty payments where payer and beneficial 
owner have a “special relationship”. They both aim at limiting the benefits provided 
by the respective Article to arm‟s length amounts because it is assumed that exces-
sive payments are made in order to shift profits from one jurisdiction to the other. 
The amount exceeding the arm‟s length payment is, therefore, treated under the do-
mestic law of each Contracting State depending on the exact nature of the payment 
which has to be identified (Commentary on Article 11, para. 35). In case that, upon 
the determination of the nature of the income, the Contracting States apply different 
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Articles of the Convention, the mutual agreement procedure may be used to resolve 
the conflict. 
A definition of a “special relationship” is provided in the Commentary on Article 11 
and 12 and shows that the concept is generally wider than that of “associated enter-
prises” in Article 9. It, in addition, includes a “relationship by blood or marriage and 
[…] any community of interests as distinct from the legal relationship”.  
3.2.1.1.3 Mutual Agreement Procedures (Article 25) 
Article 25 OECD Model provides a mutual agreement procedure for cases where a 
person resident in one of the Contracting States believes that taxation has not been in 
accordance with the Convention. As a first step, the person must present the case to 
the competent authority in his state of residence within three years from the first noti-
fication of the action (para. 1). If that authority agrees that the objection is justified, it 
may then find itself a solution. If that is not possible, the authority should, in the next 
step, resolve the issue through a mutual agreement procedure with the other Con-
tracting State (para. 2). In addition, general difficulties with the interpretation or the 
application of the Convention or the elimination of double taxation not regulated in 
the Convention should be resolved by mutual agreement by the competent authorities 
(para. 3). The procedures outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 may, generally, overlap if 
the special taxpayer‟s case is also relevant for a greater number of cases. The only 
procedural advice is given in paragraph 4 which states that the competent authorities 
shall communicate directly, possibly through a joint commission.  
The mutual agreement procedure provided for in Article 25 can generally be ac-
cessed irrespective of unilateral measures, i.e. it is not required to exhaust all domes-
tic remedies before starting the procedure. The States may, however, include a provi-
sion in the treaty that the three year time limit is suspended as long as domestic legal 
proceedings are ongoing because otherwise resources may not be used efficiently 
(Commentary on Article 25, para. 25).  
Article 25 has been included in the OECD Model since its first version in 1963, but 
in 2008, a fifth paragraph was added which comprises the possibility to enter into an 
arbitration procedure if no agreement can be reached by the two Contracting States 
within two years. The need for an arbitration procedure had been discussed for a long 
time (Lindencrona/Mattson (1981), p. 71, Guttentag/Misback (1986), Tillinghast 
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(1993)), but only when transfer pricing issues became more prominent and the EU 
adopted an Arbitration Convention in 1990
57
, the OECD stated in the 1995 Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for the first time that an introduction of such a procedure in the 
OECD Model is being studied. Mainly, the fact that under the mutual agreement pro-
cedure the competent authorities were not obliged to reach an agreement, but only to 
endeavor to do so was criticized (Ribes Ribes (2002)). From the viewpoint of the 
taxpayers, the procedure could, therefore, not be satisfactory, especially as they had 
no formal right to participate in the negotiations (Bricker (1998)). Only in 2004, the 
OECD issued a report on how to improve the resolution of tax disputes which not 
only dealt with changes of the mutual agreement procedures, but also discussed addi-
tional measures such as an arbitration procedure (OECD (2004b)). The OECD de-
cided to evaluate different alternatives and to develop a proposal for the resolution of 
unresolved mutual agreement procedures. Finally, on 1 February 2006, a proposal 
was published which included the introduction of a mandatory arbitration procedure 
in Article 25 (OECD (2006a)). After extensive discussions of this proposal, a number 
of modifications have been made (OECD (2007)) and paragraph 5 has been added to 
the OECD Model in 2008. This inclusion has been perceived positively. 
Ault/Sasseville (2009) even see it as the most important change to the OECD Model 
since 1963. The main advantages of the provision are that it is an integral part of the 
mutual agreement procedure and only supplements it instead of being an alternative 
path. Moreover, the new paragraph leaves enough flexibility to the Contracting 
States in how to shape it (de Ruiter (2008)). 
The Commentary on Article 25 has grown over the years and now includes an exten-
sive set of comments on the use of the procedures. Especially, it provides a discus-
sion of different procedural aspects of the arbitration process stated in paragraph 5. 
Furthermore, it includes the reservations of several countries on the Article. Mostly 
they relate to differences in the time limits provided for in the Article and in domes-
tic tax law. The respective countries prefer to apply the domestic time limits also for 
bilateral mutual agreement procedures. 
3.2.1.1.4 Exchange of Information (Article 26) 
Article 26 on the exchange of information in tax matters was already included in the 
1963 OECD Model. It provides for the exchange of information regarding the en-
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forcement of the Convention as well as the enforcement of domestic tax law relating 
to persons and taxes covered by the Convention. The obtained information is to be 
kept secret and may only be made accessible to persons or authorities engaged in tax 
matters. However, the Contracting States are not obliged to conduct measures which 
are in conflict with domestic law or to obtain information which is not accessible 
under domestic law. Furthermore, information that reveals a trade, business, industri-
al, commercial or professional secret or trade process shall not be exchanged. In the 
course of the 1977 revision, the scope of the provision was extended to cover all per-
sons, regardless of their residence or nationality, and concerning the secrecy re-
quirements a reference to the respective domestic provisions was included. In 2000, 
the scope was further extended to all taxes. 
A major change to Article 26 was undertaken in 2005, when the content of Article 26 
and the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters
58
 were 
partly harmonized. This change included the introduction of two new paragraphs 
(para. 4 and 5). While paragraph 4 states that a Contracting State may not reject to 
obtain information only because it has no domestic interest in them, paragraph 5 pro-
vides that a Contracting State may not decline to exchange information due to bank 
secrecy provisions. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland had reservations 
against the new paragraph 5, but due to the financial crisis and the increasing pres-
sure exerted by other OECD member countries, they withdrew their reservations in 
2009 (Gahleitner/Hristov (2010), Heuberger/Oesterhelt (2010)). 
The scope of Article 26 provides for an exchange of information not only on request, 
but also automatically or spontaneously. The automatic exchange of information 
stands for a systematic transmission of information of certain categories of income 
between the two Contracting States. Several OECD Council Recommendations have 
dealt with this issue, whereupon a memorandum was published in 2001 which serves 
as a basis for an agreement of an automatic exchange of information between tax 
authorities (OECD (2001b)). The spontaneous exchange of information, on the other 
hand, comprises the transfer of information which was obtained through other inves-
tigations and which is assumed to be of interest to the other Contracting State. 
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3.2.1.1.5 Assistance in the Collection of Taxes (Article 27) 
Only in 2003, Article 27 was introduced to the OECD Model. It supplements Article 
26 and provides for assistance in the collection of revenue claims with respect to all 
taxes levied in either Contracting State. In addition, paragraph 4 arranges for assis-
tance in taking conservancy measures connected with revenue claims such as a freez-
ing of assets (Commentary on Article 27, para. 20). In order to request assistance, the 
revenue claim has to be enforceable under domestic law in the requesting state and 
the taxpayer must not have administrative or legal rights to prevent the collection. 
The requested state then treats the request as if it were its own revenue claim, i.e. 
where the domestic law of the requested state restricts the collection of taxes, it is not 
obliged to assist. However, time limits and priority rules under the domestic law of 
the requested state are not applicable (para. 5). In the case that the underlying situa-
tion has changed and the requirements for a request on assistance are no longer met, 
the requesting state has to notify the requested state immediately (para. 7) (Gyöngyi 
Végh (2003)). 
The Commentary on Article 27 illustrates how the Contracting States may restrict the 
scope and the applicability of the Article. This flexibility is meeting the concerns of 
several jurisdictions which are afraid to give up national sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
as Ismer/Sailer (2003) point out, it is important to ensure the collection of taxes in a 
globalized world where taxable income or assets could otherwise be easily shifted to 
other jurisdictions. But, when concluding a tax treaty, the level of collection efficien-
cy in the Contracting States also has to be considered because otherwise Article 27 
may not result in an equal assistance outcome (Ismer/Sailer (2003)). 
3.2.1.2 The United Nations Model Tax Convention 
Many developing countries felt that the OECD Model did not sufficiently address 
their issues as net capital importers. The United Nations, therefore, published a Mod-
el Convention especially for developing countries in 1980 (UN (1980)). The main 
difference between the OECD and the UN Model is the allocation of taxing rights. 
While the OECD Model prefers the allocation of taxing rights to the residence coun-
try, the UN Model allows for a more extensive taxation at source in order to generate 
sufficient tax revenue for developing countries.
59
 The Model is voluntary for UN 
                                                 
59
 For a discussion of source vs. residence taxation and a comparison of the allocation of taxing rights 
under the OECD and UN Model, see Chapters 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.1.1. 
3 Qualitative Analysis of Existing Anti-Avoidance Measures 
42 
 
member countries, but has gained great importance over the years and has even 
shaped the treaty policy of developed countries (Rohatgi (2002), p. 60). Revised ver-
sions of the UN Model were issued in 2001 and 2011 (UN (2001), UN (2011a)) 
which mainly incorporated changes to the OECD Model. 
The UN Model generally follows the OECD format which is also pointed out in the 
introduction of the UN Model: “[…] the Group of Experts had decided to use the 
OECD Model Convention as its main reference text in order to take advantage of the 
accumulated technical expertise embodied in that Convention and Commentary 
thereon, and also for reasons of practical convenience […]” (UN (2001), para. 9). 
Therefore, in the following, only the main differences between the OECD and the 
UN Model regarding the articles relevant for the avoidance of profit shifting will be 
analyzed. 
Article 9: Associated Enterprises 
Article 9 UN Model was identical to that of the OECD Model, but in the course of 
the 2001 revision, a new paragraph 3 was added. It states that a corresponding ad-
justment as described in paragraph 2 is not to be made where one of the associated 
enterprises is liable to a penalty with respect to fraud, gross negligence or willful 
default. Thereby it imposes an additional penalty on the enterprise by not eliminating 
double taxation. This new paragraph has been received critically and even the Com-
mentary states that member countries might consider two penalties to be too harsh. 
But it is also argued that this paragraph will only apply to very exceptional cases and 
will not be part of routine procedures. As Kosters (2004) argues, it is, nevertheless, 
questionable whether the situation is that exceptional considering that extensive 
transfer pricing legislations are introduced in many countries. Van der Bruggen 
(2002) agrees and argues that “the UN Model 2001 connects the “guilt” of one en-
terprise to the tax base of the second taxpayer” which is a rather debatable approach. 
Articles 11, 12: Interest and Royalty Payments 
The provisions in Article 11 and 12 regarding non-arm‟s length payments of interest 
and royalties are identical in the OECD and the UN Model. 
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Article 25: Mutual Agreement Procedure 
Ever since its publication in 1980, paragraph 4 of Article 25 of the UN Model has 
been slightly different from that of the OECD Model. Two sentences were added 
which request the competent authorities to adopt bilateral procedures which imple-
ment the mutual agreement procedure in domestic tax law as well as to supplement 
such procedures by unilateral measures. Recently, in the course of the 2011 update, 
the introduction of the mandatory arbitration procedure as included in the OECD 
Model has been discussed. After opinions were divided, the Committee finally 
agreed to incorporate two alternative versions of Article 25 in the UN Model. Ver-
sion A does not contain the new paragraph 5, while Version B contains the arbitra-
tion procedure as introduced in the OECD Model. The Commentary on Article 25 
explains the reasons for this course of action and especially points out that the very 
small number of mutual agreement procedures in the past and the lack of expertise in 
developing countries do not support the need for an arbitration procedure. On the 
other hand, the advantages of a mandatory arbitration procedure are outlined and it is 
recommended that countries shall balance such arguments when concluding a double 
tax treaty (Lennard (2012)). 
Article 26: Exchange of Information 
Article 26 of the UN Model has also always been to some extent different from that 
of the OECD Model. In its 1980 version, it was more restrictive regarding who could 
be recipient of secret information. It also promoted that authorities shall develop 
conditions, methods and techniques for the exchange of information (García Prats 
(1999)). But during the 2011 update, several changes were made to the Article which 
is now almost identical to the OECD Model. However, developing countries were 
concerned that developed countries may be able to exercise pressure on developing 
countries in order to receive information, but may, on the other hand, not be that co-
operative in obtaining information themselves. As Lennard (2012) points out, the 
issue of double standards will be important for the future of international tax cooper-
ation. 
Article 27: Collection of Taxes 
After Article 27 was introduced to the OECD Model, the UN Committee decided in 
2006 to incorporate an almost identical version in the next update of the UN Model. 
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The only difference exists in the Commentary where the UN especially highlighted 
that developing countries should not be overburdened by this Article (Lennard 
(2009)). 
3.2.1.3 Evaluation of Anti-Avoidance Measures in Model Tax Con-
ventions 
In the previous sections, the anti-avoidance measures implemented in the OECD and 
UN Model Tax Conventions were presented. Regarding the three different channels 
of profit shifting laid out in Chapter 2, they are all addressed by the discussed Ar-
ticles. Article 9 OECD/UN Model includes the arm‟s length principle and is, thus, 
the basis for transfer pricing adjustments. Articles 11 and 12 OECD/UN Model addi-
tionally address the cases of intercompany debt financing and royalties. It has to, 
however, be kept in mind that bilateral tax treaties cannot constitute taxing rights, but 
rather impose mutually agreed limits on taxing rights implemented in the domestic 
tax laws. It is, therefore, important to consider the compatibility of unilateral anti-
avoidance measures and tax treaties (De Broe et al. (2011)).
60
 
The Model Tax Conventions also include measures for mutual agreement procedures 
as well as for the mutual assistance in the exchange of information and the collection 
of taxes. They altogether employ the currently highest standard of cross-border co-
operation which includes a mandatory arbitration procedure and the exchange of in-
formation despite bank secrecy provisions. However, not all of these provisions are 
currently implemented in bilateral tax treaties, but as new treaties will be negotiated 
over time, it is expected that cooperation between jurisdictions will increase which 
will further prevent tax avoidance (Baker et al. (2011)). 
3.2.2 The OECD Model Agreement on the Exchange of Information on 
Tax Matters 
In the course of the project on Harmful Tax Competition
61
, the OECD established a 
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices in 2000. A subgroup of this Forum, which con-
sisted of all OECD member countries as well as representatives of Aruba, Bermuda, 
Bahrain, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, Seychelles, and San Marino, 
elaborated a Model Agreement on the Exchange of Information on Tax Matters in 
2002 which, upon its publication, was perceived to represent a new standard for the 
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exchange of information between countries. It was even seen as a turning point in 
this field (Oberson (2003)).  
The Model Agreement applies to all persons, regardless of their residence and natio-
nality, and to all direct taxes, i.e. taxes on income, capital, net wealth, inheritance or 
gift taxes.  Furthermore, it allows for an exchange of information upon request and 
for tax examinations abroad. Other forms of information exchange may be included 
in the agreement by the contracting states. The most important innovation of the 
Model Agreement was, however, that it also provided for an exchange of information 
which is held by banks or other financial institutions which also included the re-
quirement to change domestic tax law accordingly (Gyöngyi Végh (2002)). This re-
laxation of bank secrecy was received critically by those jurisdictions having bank 
secrecy provisions in place. Due to such reservations, the Model Agreement was not 
as successful as expected. Moreover, as mentioned above, when Article 26 of the 
OECD Model was revised and the provision on bank secrecy was included, Switzer-
land, Luxembourg, Austria, and Belgium expressed reservations which they finally 
withdrew in 2009 (Fehling (2012)). Since then, the number of agreements in place 
has increased by more than 800 worldwide (OECD (2012a)).
62
 The Forum now safe-
guards the implementation of the OECD standard by its members in bilateral agree-
ments – double tax conventions as well as Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEA) – but also in the domestic tax law.  
3.3 Multilateral Measures 
3.3.1 International Coordination against Tax Avoidance 
3.3.1.1 Projects on Harmful Tax Competition 
3.3.1.1.1 The OECD’s Harmful Tax Practice Project 
In 1996, the OECD launched a project on harmful tax competition as requested by 
the G7-Ministers
63
. In 1998, the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition (herei-
nafter: OECD Report, OECD (1998)) was published. In the report, it is examined 
“how harmful tax practices affect the location of financial and other service activi-
ties, erode the tax bases of other countries, distort trade and investment patterns and 
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undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems gener-
ally” (p.8). It, furthermore, distinguishes between tax havens and countries with 
harmful tax regimes and elaborates a list of factors identifying both categories. Last-
ly, it examines different measures taken to counteract the consequences of harmful 
tax regimes and formulates recommendations for the prevention of tax avoidance 
through domestic legislation, tax treaties or the intensification of international coop-
eration. The guidelines formulated at the end of the report suggest that member coun-
tries identify harmful tax practices within two years and remove them within five 
years of the report. One main goal is to, additionally, get as many non-member coun-
tries as possible to abstain from harmful tax practices and to establish a “level play-
ing field” regarding international taxation. A Forum on harmful tax competition 
within the OECD was to be established which would promote the work in this area. 
All member countries, with the exception of Luxembourg and Switzerland, sup-
ported the project and over the following years, harmful tax practices in the member 
countries were started to be identified and eliminated. In the Forum‟s first Progress 
Report (OECD (2000)), a list of 47 harmful tax practices in the member countries 
was published. Those practices were supposed to be abolished by April 2003. Fur-
thermore, the report contained a list of 35 tax havens with the intention of convincing 
them to commit to transparency and the exchange of information and to eliminate 
harmful tax regimes. If those countries did not commit, they would be stated on a list 
of uncooperative tax havens and the OECD member countries would be requested to 
conduct defensive measures against those regimes. The Report caused extensive dis-
cussions, in the course of which the US withdrew their support for the initiative. The-
reupon, the 2001 Progress Report (OECD (2001a)) relaxed some statements, ex-
tended deadlines and shifted the focus of the project to a greater extent towards an 
increased exchange of information. But that Report was still, besides Switzerland and 
Luxembourg, not approved by Belgium and Portugal - both countries were subject to 
examination as they applied supposedly harmful tax practices.  
When the list of uncooperative tax havens was finally published in 2002 it only com-
prised seven jurisdictions (i.e. Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, 
Monaco, Nauru, and Vanuatu), two of which (Nauru and Vanuatu) committed to 
cooperating in 2003. In addition, an Application Note, which was supposed to help 
countries to determine harmful tax practices, and a Model Agreement on Exchange 
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of Information on Tax Matters, which promotes international cooperation through the 
provision of information
64
, were developed over the following two years.  
The 2004 Progress Report (OECD (2004a)) evaluated the abolishment of harmful tax 
practices in the member countries and pointed out that three regimes, which were 
offered in Luxembourg and Switzerland, were still not amended or eliminated. Swit-
zerland, however, abolished the considered regulations in 2005 and Luxembourg 
amended the concerned regime, so that in the 2006 Progress Report all harmful re-
gimes were eliminated (OECD (2006b)). 
As the initial goal, the elimination of harmful tax practices in member countries and 
the commitment of tax havens
65
, was successfully met
66
, the work of the Forum has, 
since 2005, primarily focused on transparency and the exchange of information in tax 
matters. Not only negotiations on the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information 
on Tax Matters, but also the implementation of the new standards in the member 
countries of the Forum
67
 and other important financial centers was promoted, with 
the goal of reaching a “level playing field”. All member countries of the Forum en-
dorsed the new principles, with other countries following. In 2009, the Global Forum 
was restructured and currently includes 110 jurisdictions which all participate on 
equal footing. Also, a peer review process was established to monitor the implemen-
tation of the standards in the member countries. The progress is closely supervised 
and documented by annual reports which state the number of exchange of informa-
tion agreements, information on existing domestic regulations, and the results of the 
peer reviews (OECD (2010c)). 
3.3.1.1.2 The European Union Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation 
After a report on the development of tax systems in the European Union was pub-
lished in 1996 (European Commission (1996)), the Ministers for Economic Affairs 
and Finance in the European Union decided to launch a project on a comprehensive 
approach for business taxation in order to reduce the distortions in the single market. 
The report had outlined the challenges of tax policies in Europe and their impact on 
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economic growth, employment, and tax revenues. Thereupon, a tax package should 
be developed consisting of three parts: the elimination of distortions to the taxation 
of capital income, the facilitation of intercompany payments of interest and royalties, 
and a Code of Conduct for business taxation. 
The Code of Conduct was developed over the following year and was adopted by the 
Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) on 1 December 1997 
(ECOFIN (1998)). The Code of Conduct promotes, on the one hand, the amendment 
or abolishment of existing measures that constitute harmful tax competition (“roll-
back”), and, on the other hand, the renouncement of the introduction of such meas-
ures (“standstill”). Consequently, it identifies criteria to determine harmful tax meas-
ures, such as a significantly lower tax level, tax benefits only applicable to non-
residents or the lack of transparency. The Code of Conduct is not legally binding, but 
constitutes a political commitment which the Member States, furthermore, agreed on 
promoting in other countries. 
On 9 March 1998 a Code of Conduct Group was established in order to assess the 
harmful tax measures existing within the European Union. In 1999, a report, also 
called the “Primarolo-Report”68, was published by the Group (Code of Conduct 
Group (1999)) which evaluated possibly harmful tax measures and concluded that 66 
tax measures existing within the European Union and dependent or associated territo-
ries are harmful. It was expected that such measures were amended or abolished until 
31 December 2002 including grandfathering rules until 31 December 2005. Over the 
following years, all countries have followed their commitment and amended or ab-
olished existing tax practices.
69
 In 2004 and 2007, tax practices in the accession 
countries were included in the process. Now, the Code of Conduct Group is mainly 
ensuring the “standstill”, but has also established several sub-groups pursuing work 
on anti-abuse or administrative practices.  
As harmful tax practices may also affect competition between Member States, they 
may be incompatible with the fiscal state aid rules according to Articles 107-109 
TFEU which state that “any aid granted by a Member State […] in any form what-
soever which distorts or threatens to distort competition […] in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market”.70 On 11 
                                                 
68
 Dawn Primarolo, Paymaster General (UK), was the Chairwoman of the Code of Conduct Group. 
69
 The last two regimes were abolished/amended by Malta with effect from 1 January 2007. 
70
 For a discussion of State aid and tax incentives see Pinto (1999), Nijkamp (2002). 
3 Qualitative Analysis of Existing Anti-Avoidance Measures 
49 
 
July 2001, the European Commission, therefore, declared four tax regimes to violate 
state aid rules
71
 and, additionally, challenged eleven national tax schemes located in 
eight EU Member States
72
 under the state aid rules (see Wilkie/O‟Grady (2001)). Out 
of the fifteen targeted regimes, thirteen were also characterized as harmful under the 
Code of Conduct (Kalloe (2011)). All measures have been amended or abolished 
over the past years. 
3.3.1.1.3 A Comparison of the OECD and the EU Project 
As outlined in the previous sections, the OECD and the EU project were both 
launched in the mid 1990s and aimed at tackling harmful tax competition. As the 
OECD Report points out “each Organization is responsible independently for the 
interpretation and application of its respective instruments” (OECD (1998), p. 11). 
Therefore, both projects coexist and it cannot be expected that both organizations 
will work jointly on this issue (Pinto (1998), p. 409). In the following, the two 
projects will be compared and similarities and differences will be identified.  
While the OECD project focused on financial and other service activities, the EU 
Code of Conduct goes further and refers to business activity as a whole. The OECD, 
however, also aims specifically at tax havens, i.e. countries which are not OECD 
members. The Code of Conduct, on the other hand, only applies to EU Member 
States. The conceptual scope is, thus, wider under the Code of Conduct, while the 
geographic scope is wider under the OECD project. Furthermore, both projects only 
focus on the direct taxation of businesses, not the taxation of individuals which may, 
however, also be subject to harmful tax practices (Pinto (1998)) or the indirect taxa-
tion of businesses. 
The key element of both projects is the identification of harmful tax practices. While 
both, the Code of Conduct and the OECD Report, did not define harmful tax compe-
tition as such, they determined a list of factors which refer to harmful tax measures. 
In this regard, both projects have in common that they name a low tax burden as the 
starting point for the evaluation of harmful tax regulations. Moreover, the ring-
fencing of regimes, i.e. measures only available for foreign investors, is tackled in 
both projects. As such regimes lead to a tax base erosion in other countries, but have 
no impact on tax revenues in the own country, they are considered especially harmful 
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and play an important role in both projects (Jacobs (2005), p. 274). The following 
table depicts the factors outlined by the OECD and the EU. 
Table 3: Comparison of the Factors Identifying Harmful Tax Practices 
OECD Report EU Code of Conduct 
Key factors for harmful preferential tax re-
gimes: 
 
 No or low effective tax rates 
 “Ring-Fencing” of Regimes 
 Lack of transparency 
 Lack of effective exchange of information 
 
Other factors: 
 
 An artificial definition of the tax base 
 Failure to adhere to international transfer 
pricing principles 
 Foreign source income exempt from resi-
dence country tax 
 Negotiable tax rate or tax base 
 Existence of secrecy provisions 
 Access to a wide network of treaties 
 Regimes which are prompted as tax mini-
mization vehicles 
 The regime encourages purely tax-driven 
operations or arrangements 
 
Key factors in identifying tax havens: 
 
 No or only nominal taxes 
 Lack of effective exchange of information 
 Lack of transparency 
 No substantial activities 
Within the scope specified in paragraph A, tax 
measures which provide for a significantly 
lower effective level of taxation, including 
zero taxation, than those levels which generally 
apply in the Member State in question are to be 
regarded as potentially harmful and therefore 
covered by this code. 
 
Such a level of taxation may operate by virtue 
of the nominal tax rate, the tax base or any 
other relevant factor. 
 
When assessing whether such measures are 
harmful, account should be taken of, inter alia: 
 
 Whether advantages are accorded only to 
non-residents or in respect of transactions 
carried out with non-residents 
 Whether advantages are ring-fenced from 
the domestic market, so they do not affect 
the national tax base 
 Whether advantages are granted even with-
out any real economic activity and substan-
tial economic presence within the Member 
State offering such tax advantages 
 Whether the rules for profit determination 
in respect of activities within a multination-
al group of companies departs from interna-
tionally accepted principles, notably the 
rules agreed upon within the OECD 
 Whether the tax measures lack transparen-
cy, including where legal provisions are re-
laxed at administrative level in a non-
transparent way 
Source: OECD (1998), ECOFIN (1998) 
This overview shows that there are only slight differences between the definitions of 
harmful tax practices.
73
 The main difference is that in the OECD Report, a lack of 
effective exchange of information is mentioned which is not included in the Code of 
Conduct. The OECD Report argues that the efficiency of information exchange is 
especially limited in case of banking secrecy legislation which the OECD considers 
as “facilitating tax evasion and money laundering” (OECD (1998), p. 24). This dif-
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ference may be the reason why Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained from the 
OECD Report while approving the EU Code of Conduct.
74
 
Regarding the implementation of the findings, both projects established groups of 
representatives that accompanied the process. In both cases, a list of existing prefe-
rential tax regimes was published. The Code of Conduct Group identified 66 harmful 
tax practices while the OECD found 47 measures. A comparison of the regimes lo-
cated in the European Union shows that the difference results from the wider concep-
tual scope, i.e. measures on non-mobile factors (Easson (2004), p. 1047). Both re-
ports promoted the “rollback” of such measures within a certain timeframe. In the 
Code of Conduct, the timeframe originally expired by the end of 2000 with the pos-
sibility of an extension until the end of 2003 – which was later extended to the end of 
2005, and in the OECD Report, it ended by mid-2003 with an extension until the end 
of 2005. With only very few exceptions, the deadlines were met in both cases. 
In addition, the OECD Report includes a list of recommendations for the member 
countries which comprises the introduction of certain unilateral anti-avoidance 
measures, the adjusted design of bilateral treaties, or increased international coopera-
tion. The Code of Conduct, in turn, only highlights the importance of anti-abuse pro-
visions and cooperation without formulating distinct recommendations. 
Probably the most important difference between the two projects is, however, the 
availability of legal remedies in the European Union.  Harmful tax measures may be 
tackled under state aid provisions (Articles 107-109 TFEU) which may force a legal-
ly binding decision on the abolishment of the respective regulations (see above). The 
OECD, on the other hand, has no such instrument to legally enforce their guidelines.    
3.3.1.2 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
In the 2001 report “Company Taxation in the Internal Market” (European Commis-
sion (2001)), approaches to overcome tax obstacles within the European Union are 
presented, including different concepts for a common consolidated tax base in 
Europe. All concepts have in common that the tax base is determined uniformly 
within the European Union and is subsequently consolidated over all Member States. 
The allocation of taxable profits to the Member States is then done by a formula ap-
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portionment using input factors such as payroll, assets or sales. Tax rates are, accord-
ing to the subsidiarity principle, still provided for by national tax law. 
From the perspective of the internal market, such an approach has several advan-
tages. Not only would compliance costs decrease significantly, but also double taxa-
tion could be eliminated, cross-border loss compensation could be granted, cross-
border reorganizations could be facilitated, and transfer pricing between European 
affiliates would be invalid. Therefore, it also functions as an anti-avoidance measure 
as the incentives for profit shifting activities within Europe would be eliminated. 
In 2004, a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB 
WG) was established which has set up a comprehensive work programme in order to 
be able to formulate a Community legislative measure. After several years of discus-
sion, a proposal for a Council Directive was published on 16 March 2011 (European 
Commission (2011c)). It includes detailed regulations for the determination of the 
tax base, but also for the consolidation mechanism and the design of the formula ap-
portionment. To this day, the chances of the Proposal being adopted are rather low 
since many Member States hesitate to give up sovereignty. However, in February 
2012, Germany and France have agreed on a Green Paper which deals with the con-
vergence of company taxation in these countries. This was perceived as an important 
step towards the harmonization of company taxation in Europe (Aymé/Ehlermann 
(2012), Dorenkamp (2012)). 
3.3.1.3 Evaluation of International Cooperation Efforts 
The projects to multilaterally tackle harmful tax competition have been widely dis-
cussed and have been both criticized and supported. As outlined in Chapter 2.2.1, the 
increasing mobility of capital leads to increasing tax competition between jurisdic-
tions which implicates advantages as well as disadvantages. In this context, the 
projects on harmful tax competition can be seen as an approach that retains the posi-
tive effects, but limits the negative effects by introducing a framework for interna-
tional cooperation that guarantees fairness and transparency (Francke (1998), Hen-
dricks (2000)). Avi-Yonah (2000) supports this view and argues that by countering 
harmful tax competition, on the one hand, the problems of inefficiency, inequity, and 
tax-base erosion are dealt with, but, on the other hand, it is left enough leeway to the 
jurisdictions to decide on their size of the public sector. Nevertheless, the impact of 
both projects is geographically limited and, for those supporting the projects, exactly 
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that is seen as a major restriction because as long as jurisdictions still offer preferen-
tial tax regimes, harmful tax competition will never be fully curbed (Avi-Yonah 
(2000), p. 1656). 
Both projects, but particularly the OECD project, focus, in a first step, on the coordi-
nation of tax systems in the respective member countries, but aim at extending their 
efforts to other, non-member countries, especially tax havens. In this context, studies 
that have examined the impact of tax competition on small and large countries should 
be mentioned. It was found that, unless tax policies are fully harmonized, smaller 
countries will always prefer to undercut the tax rate on foreign income of the large 
country as the small country perceives higher capital elasticity (Razin/Sadka (1991), 
Kanbur/Keen (1993)). For this reason, it was argued that the abolishment of harmful 
tax regimes may deteriorate the relative position of small countries compared to large 
countries which already have a natural advantage due to their size (Ellis (2000), 
Klaver/Timmermans (1999), p. 187). Reality shows, however, that many tax havens 
have committed to abolishing harmful tax practices, i.e. out of an original OECD list 
of 35 tax havens, there are now none left. Critics have, however, argued that this de-
velopment is purely based on the pressure that large OECD countries imposed on tax 
havens (Gaffney (1999)). In the European Union, it can be observed that smaller 
countries have agreed to the Code of Conduct, too. But also in this context, commen-
tators stated that the Code of Conduct serves primarily as a means to protect the tax 
bases of the large, high-tax countries (Troup/Hale (1998)). 
Wright (1998) has also taken a rather critical perspective in his review of the OECD 
Report and questions the orientation of the approach. He argues that “tax havens and 
other international tax preferences are but a symptom of national tax policies that 
themselves cause global economic efficiency”. He, therefore, promotes a redesign of 
national tax systems, precisely a change from income taxes to consumption taxes. 
Yet, a general change from income taxes to consumption taxes has to be considered 
carefully, as it may be in conflict with the equity principle. Since rich individuals 
generally save more than poor individuals and the income from saved capital is only 
taxed under income taxes, they provide a greater progressivity than consumption 
taxes (Avi-Yonah (2000), p. 1576). Poorer individuals are, thus, relatively advan-
taged under income taxes. 
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Regarding the regulations addressed by the projects, the missing or imprecise defini-
tion of harmful tax competition has been repeatedly criticized (Wright (1998), Pinto 
(1999)). Although it has also been defended as being too much to ask (Osterweil 
(1998)), there remains critique about a certain degree of inaccuracy in the reports 
(Easson (1999), p. 383, Avi-Yonah (2000), p. 1662). Nevertheless, the factors for 
identifying harmful tax practices were widely accepted. Surprise was expressed, 
though, that the OECD claimed the access to a great number of tax treaties as a factor 
as they have been, very successfully, promoting such treaties over the past decades 
(Easson (1999)). In addition, the restriction to mobile activities in the OECD Report 
has been criticized since important aspects of tax competition are, thus, not covered 
(Avi-Yonah (2000), p. 1663). 
The introduction of an OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices was perceived ambi-
guously. Wright (1998) considered it an “international tax crimes tribunal”. Wein-
er/Ault (1998), on the other hand, called it “the first broadly mandated international 
institutional structure directly responsible for the evaluation and coordination of 
existing and proposed tax measures”. Certainly, it serves as an environment to dis-
cuss and develop tax principles. Francke (1998) argues that this kind of cooperation 
is a lot more successful than imposing strict rules, which has been proven by prior 
experience of the OECD or the EU. Without doubt, the work it has done over the 
past decade has justified its existence.
75
 
In the European Union, however, a step further towards the coordination of tax sys-
tems, i.e. a harmonization of the tax base, is currently discussed. The CCCTB project 
as outlined in Chapter 3.3.1.2 proposes to introduce a common consolidated tax base, 
but to leave the decision on corporate income tax rates to the national governments. 
On the one hand, this approach would abolish many aspects of harmful tax competi-
tion as the tax base would be consolidated and a shifting of book profits would not be 
favorable within the EU (Klaver/Timmermans (1999)), but on the other hand, other 
aspects would gain in importance. Firstly, tax competition would still prevail regard-
ing third countries outside the EU. Secondly, as reallocating business structures and 
thereby changing the factors of the formula apportionment within the EU can reduce 
the tax burden, the downward pressure on corporate income tax rates may even in-
crease since it is the only decisive measure. It is, therefore, argued that a minimum 
tax rate should be introduced in addition, so that the “race to the bottom” of tax rates 
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can be prevented (Spengel/Zöllkau (2012), p. 14). Additionally, the factors used un-
der formula apportionment – assets, labor, and sales – serve as a proxy for real eco-
nomic activity. Therefore, such factors might be influenced by tax planning strategies 
which, in turn, increases distortions of real economic activity (Fuest (2008)). 
Concluding, in my judgment, the projects against harmful tax competition are a very 
reasonable approach against the undermining of tax systems and the erosion of tax 
revenues. They may not be broad enough, conceptually, but especially geographical-
ly, to fully limit the obstacles of tax competition, but they constitute a common de-
nominator of different jurisdictional interests. Furthermore, they still guarantee a 
certain degree of tax competition which is important for the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. Considering the discussions that especially the OECD project initiated, it 
cannot be assumed that its scope will be extended in the near future.  
The CCCTB, as discussed in the EU, would reduce many tax obstacles relevant for 
cross-border business activities. Therefore, it constitutes an important step towards 
the internal market pursued by the EU. But the impact of a common tax base on tax 
competition within the EU would be considerable and jurisdictions fear to give up 
national sovereignty.
76
 In line with that, the reactions of the Member States are very 
hesitant and let assume that the introduction of a CCCTB is out of reach in the near 
future, especially considering the unanimity rule for direct tax matters (Art. 115 
TFEU).
77
  
3.3.2 Transfer Pricing Measures 
3.3.2.1 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines  
As an extension to Article 9 OECD Model, which comprises the arm‟s length prin-
ciple
78
, a first report purely on transfer pricing matters was published in 1979 (OECD 
(1979)). The main focus of the report was the determination of acceptable transfer 
prices which also comprised the introduction of several relevant methods. It did, 
however, neither include a definition of multinational companies or control nor did it 
address burden of proof issues (Verlage (1982)).  
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The OECD decided to revise the 1979 report in the early 1990s for several reasons. 
On the one hand, further work that was conducted on transfer pricing should be taken 
into account
79
 and on the other hand, the report should be updated regarding technol-
ogical developments as well as changing legislation in the member countries. The 
new report was divided into two parts and discussion drafts of either one were pub-
lished for public comment (OECD (1994), OECD (1995a)). After vital discussions, 
which lead to amendments regarding the applicability of transactional profit methods 
and the imposition of penalties, the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines were published 
(OECD (1995b)). Compared to the 1979 report, they offer a more detailed guidance 
for both, multinational companies and tax administrations, on the application of the 
arm‟s length principle, including several methods for the determination of arm‟s 
length prices and their appropriateness with regard to the comparability of transac-
tions. In addition, they provide assistance on administrative issues as well as recom-
mendations on the documentation of transfer pricing.
80
 In 1996, two chapters dealing 
with special problems regarding intangibles and intra-group services were added. A 
chapter on cost contribution arrangements was included in 1997. In 2003, two new 
projects were launched by a Working Party of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Af-
fairs which covered comparability problems and the applicability of transactional 
profit methods. After public comments were invited from businesses and non-
governmental organizations, discussion drafts were published which were again 
amended and finally resulted in a revision of Chapters I-III in 2010. Also in 2010, the 
last chapter so far was added which comprises aspects of business restructuring.  
New projects for the adjustment of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines were launched in 
2011 which deal with intangibles
81
 and administrative issues. Just recently, on 6 June 
2012, a discussion draft on a revised Chapter VI regarding intangibles was, in this 
context, released for public comment (OECD (2012c)). 
3.3.2.2 The United Nations Transfer Pricing Manual 
During an Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting on transfer pricing organized by the UN in 
2008, the project to develop a Transfer Pricing Manual especially for developing 
countries was initiated. Transfer pricing issues constitute a particular challenge for 
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developing countries as such countries do not have effective domestic rules or skilled 
personnel available. A Manual could, therefore, provide guidance to tax administra-
tions and policymakers in developing countries and could contribute to the under-
standing of such issues. 
In the fifth session of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters in 2009, a first draft outline of the Manual was discussed (UN (2009)) and a 
Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing was constituted. The Committee stated that it fol-
lowed some guiding principles when drafting the Manual. It should address issues 
relevant for developing countries in a very simple and practical way considering the 
deficits in knowledge and personnel that prevails in such countries. It should also 
include some practical examples and incorporate the input from developing coun-
tries. The Manual is based on the widely accepted arm‟s length principle and does 
not question its appropriateness. In fact, it “focus[es] on the most effective, efficient 
and transparent ways of applying internationally accepted transfer pricing concepts 
and rules” (UN (2009), p. 11).  
The 2009 draft only includes the outline of the Manual comprising keywords under 
the respective headlines which will be briefly outlined in the following. After provid-
ing general information on transfer pricing, its relation to model tax conventions or 
domestic tax law, and the arm‟s length principle, the Manual discusses how to im-
plement transfer pricing capability in tax administrations. As a first step, it suggests 
an assessment of existing administrative capacity, especially the legal environment, 
tax treaties or the level of education of the personnel. Subsequently, a transfer pricing 
unit should be established, the structure and staffing of which will also be discussed 
in the Manual. Furthermore, it deals with the concepts of transfer pricing such as the 
functional analysis, the comparability analysis and the different methods. In this re-
gard, the Manual seems to be, to a great extent, in line with the OECD Transfer Pric-
ing Guidelines. Finally, the Manual suggests the implementation of documentation 
requirements as well as audit and dispute resolution procedures including the possi-
bility for advance pricing agreements.  
The Subcommittee continued to work on the Manual and was supposed to present a 
complete draft at the seventh annual session in 2011. In an intermediate report (UN 
(2010)), the progress was documented and new drafts of the first five chapters were 
published for comment. But the report also revealed that it was more difficult to ob-
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tain input from developing countries than expected. The Manual is, therefore, to this 
point missing practical country examples. For those reasons, at the next annual ses-
sion in October 2011, again only a draft version of the Manual was presented, which 
incorporated comments received on the first five chapters and results of an informal 
meeting held in August 2011 (UN (2011b)). The current draft chapters were open for 
discussion until December 2011 and no further results have been published so far. 
The finalization of the Practical Manual can be expected in the following years and it 
remains to be seen how developing countries make use of the suggestions.  
3.3.2.3 The European Union Codes of Conduct for Transfer Pricing 
In 1976, the Commission proposed a directive which would eliminate double taxa-
tion occurring from transfer pricing between associated companies (European Com-
mission (1976)). It was supposed to complement the Mutual Assistance Directive
82
 
by establishing a mutual agreement and arbitration procedure which would solve 
cases of double taxation in at most three years. After discussions on the legal basis of 
this issue, the Netherlands proposed to transform the directive into a convention 
based on Article 293 EC Treaty
83
. A convention is, in contrast to a directive, not le-
gally binding, i.e. its application and interpretation is not subject to the legal practice 
of the European Court of Justice. Nevertheless, Member States had difficulties com-
mitting to the convention because they were concerned about giving up fiscal sover-
eignty (Chetcuti (2001), van Herksen (2008)). But finally, in 1990, the Member 
States of the European Union signed the Arbitration Convention (90/436/EEC), thir-
teen years after the Mutual Assistance Directive. It came into force after the ratifica-
tion process was finalized by all Member States, which was on 1 January 1995. The 
convention has, until now, been amended and renewed several times and now covers 
all 27 EU Member States.  
The Convention addresses transfer pricing cases between two associated enterprises, 
where enterprises include corporations, partnerships, and individuals, located in two 
different Member States. It is aimed at eliminating economic as well as juridical 
double taxation which may result from the lack of double tax conventions or conflict-
ing interpretations of residency or the arm‟s length principle (Chetcuti (2001)). If 
such cases cannot be solved unilaterally, i.e. one Member State does not agree to the 
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adjustment of the other Member State and conducts no corresponding adjustment, the 
taxpayer may initiate a mutual agreement procedure. In this case, both tax authorities 
negotiate on an appropriate solution, but are not obliged to reach an agreement. If no 
agreement can be reached within two years, the respective tax authorities must open 
an arbitration procedure. An advisory commission, comprising representatives of 
each tax authority and independent members has then to decide on the respective 
case and to formulate an opinion within six months. If the tax authorities cannot 
agree on a solution within the following six months of the opinion, they are obliged 
to adopt it.
84
  
In 2001, the European Commission published a report “Company Taxation in the 
Single Market” which identified the differences in the effective level of corporate 
taxation and the main tax provisions hampering cross-border activity in the Single 
Market. The issue of transfer pricing was recognized as one of the most important 
concerns of multinational companies (European Commission (2001), p. 11). The 
establishment of a transfer pricing forum that would bring together tax authorities 
and business representatives in order to discuss transfer pricing issues was, therefore, 
proposed. Such a forum, the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF), was infor-
mally set up in early 2002 and consisted of one representative from each Member 
State and 10 business representatives. The original agenda was to improve the func-
tionality of the Arbitration Convention, to discuss uniform documentation require-
ments and to consider improved APA procedures (European Commission (2002), 
Zach (2002)). In an interim report (European Commission (2004)), the JTPF pro-
vided information on its work concerning the Arbitration Convention and proposed 
to the Council to adopt a Code of Conduct that laid out the detailed guidelines that 
were elaborated. After such a Code of Conduct was adopted in December 2004, the 
JTPF focused its work on the documentation requirements regarding transfer pricing. 
Different approaches of standardized documentation were discussed under considera-
tion of the experience of other organizations (e.g. PATA
85
 or OECD). Finally, the 
Forum decided on a combination of existing approaches which includes a “master-
file” of general standardized information, on the one hand, and “country-specific 
information”, on the other hand (European Commission (2005)). This “EU Transfer 
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Pricing Documentation” concept would be beneficial for both tax administrations 
and taxpayers because it increases transparency and reduces compliance costs. The 
application of the approach is, however, optional, although if opted for it, it has to be 
employed for all group members within the EU. Again, the Forum proposed the im-
plementation of a Code of Conduct which led to an adoption by the Council in 2006 
(European Council (2006)). Both Codes of Conduct function as a guideline that all 
Member States accept, but they are not legally binding.  
With effect from 1 March 2007, the Forum was also formally set up by a decision of 
the Commission (European Commission (2007a)), which was going to expire on 31 
March 2011. The number of members of the Forum was extended to one representa-
tive of each Member State and 15 business representatives. Since then, the JTPF has 
published Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements, which provide guidance on 
APA procedures (European Commission (2007b)), guidelines on low value adding 
intra-group services, which deal with the evaluation of such transactions, and has 
made a proposal on how to treat non-EU triangular cases (European Commission 
(2011a)). In 2011, the decision on the formal set up of the Forum was renewed and 
now expires on 31 March 2015 (European Commission (2011b)). The number of 
business representatives has, in this course, been extended to sixteen. In its work 
program for the years 2011-2015, the Forum has planned to address the issues of cost 
contribution arrangements, risk assessment, yearend adjustments, and secondary ad-
justments as well as monitor the previous achievements (European Commission 
(2011d)). 
3.3.2.4 PATA Guidance on Transfer Pricing 
The Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) is an inter-governmental 
organization that comprises Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States. In 2003, 
it published a documentation package that allows taxpayers to file only one set of 
documentation which is accepted in all four member countries (Anderson (2003), 
Markham (2004)). The application of the package is voluntary, but the member 
countries guarantee that documentation based on the package will satisfy all re-
quirements and will not lead to penalties. The PATA documentation package follows 
three principles: transfer prices must be established according to the arm‟s length 
principle, taxpayers must keep contemporaneous documentation, and they must pro-
duce the documentation in a timely manner (Rienstra (2003)).  
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In 2004, the PATA issued, in addition, guidance on the use of mutual agreement pro-
cedures and bilateral advance pricing agreements. Both documents are aimed at faci-
litating existing procedures and ensuring a consistent and timely treatment of the 
respective cases (Internal Revenue Service (2004)). The tax administrations also 
agreed on a two year time frame for the completion of both, APA and mutual agree-
ment procedures (Sawyer (2004)).   
3.3.2.5 Evaluation of Multilateral Transfer Pricing Measures 
Undoubtedly, the regulation of transfer pricing issues is necessary in order to sustain 
internation equity and neutrality (Eden (1998), p. 107). In this context, the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines have, by now, established themselves as a main guidance 
for transfer pricing issues in member as well as non-member countries. They also 
serve as the basis of the other measures outlined above, which supports this finding. 
In the following, several aspects of the different measures will be briefly analyzed 
and discussed. 
Arm’s Length Principle vs. Formula Apportionment 
It can be argued whether the main principle of transfer pricing, i.e. the arm‟s length 
principle, which is also the basis of the OECD Guidelines, is appropriate. The arm‟s 
length principle has been introduced to the first model treaties as early as in the 
1930s, but has since then been widely discussed. The alternative concept, a formu-
lary apportionment stands for an allocation of consolidated group income according 
to a formula rather than a determination of prices for intercompany transactions. The 
formula may either, at different weights, incorporate macro factors, e.g. GDP or 
VAT sales on national level, or micro factors such as payroll, assets or sales.
86
 It be-
came prominent in the United States in the early 1990s when California was unsuc-
cessfully challenged before the Supreme Court because it used formula apportion-
ment to allocate income of multinationals doing business in the state. The OECD 
reacted to the debate by introducing two transactional methods (TNMM, profit split) 
which do not rely on comparable transactions between related and unrelated entities 
– the core of the arm‟s length principle. This amendment of the Guidelines was per-
ceived as a step towards accepting formula apportionment (Avi-Yonah (2010)).  
                                                 
86
 For a discussion of the different formula options and their advantages and disadvantages, see 
Agúndez García (2006). 
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When drafting the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the OECD expressed its opi-
nion on the arm‟s length principle and its predominance over formula apportionment 
(OECD (1994), para. 24-31, 179-195).
87
 As the arm‟s length principle promotes the 
equal treatment of associated and independent enterprises, it was argued that it pre-
vents distortions of the respective relative competitive positions. The determination 
of the appropriate price is, additionally, based on specific facts and circumstances. 
Formula apportionment, on the other hand, does not provide an underlying principle 
as to what allocation is appropriate, i.e. which factors used at which weight lead to a 
fair apportionment of the tax base. Therefore, different jurisdictions may have differ-
ent standpoints on this issue which accordingly leads to disagreement.
88
 In addition, 
for the calculation of the formula, information of the entire worldwide business is 
necessary which may be difficult to assess (see also Wilkins/Gideon (1994)). The 
formula, moreover, assumes that the rate of return for each factor is identical for each 
affiliate and in each jurisdiction. This is a very far-reaching assumption which may 
potentially lead to a misallocation of taxable income (Willson/Coffill (1993), p. 
1115). 
Nevertheless, the arm‟s length principle also has its drawbacks. As Avi-Yonah 
(2010) points out, it treats transactions between associated enterprises equal to those 
between independent enterprises, which is simply unrealistic (see also Bird (1988)). 
In fact, multinationals often exist in order to overcome the inefficiencies of indepen-
dent enterprises. The incentive structure emanating from this principle leads to prof-
its shifted to low-tax jurisdictions which results in a significant amount of foregone 
tax revenues. In addition, the determination of an arm‟s length price and its docu-
mentation requires considerable efforts and imposes high compliance costs on tax-
payers. But, regardless of such efforts, there still remains great uncertainty regarding 
the determined price as tax authorities may have a different view on the respective 
transaction.  Avi-Yonah (2010) also takes a stand on the disadvantages of formula 
apportionment and tries to put them into perspective. He argues that even if no inter-
national agreement on a formula can be reached, the consequences will be managea-
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 These explanations are still included in the current 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The fact that 
no changes were made under the amendments of Chapters I-III in 2010 was perceived as interesting 
regarding the effort of the European Union to introduce a common consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCTB), see Förster (2009). 
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 Eden (1998), p. 313-319, however, finds that if all countries were to use the same tax base and the 
same tax rates and the weights used in the formula were to reflect economic activity of the affiliates, 
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ing as the necessary level of coordination is extremely high and the requirements for the formula are 
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ble. In his opinion, it is questionable whether the number of double (non-) taxation 
disputes would even increase as “a notorious absence of clear standards” already 
prevails under the current system. The main advantages and disadvantages of both 
concepts are outlined in Table 4.  
Table 4: Comparison of Arm‟s Length Principle and Formula Apportionment 
Arm’s Length Principle Formula Apportionment 
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages 
 Guiding principle 
 Observation of 
facts and specific 
circumstances 
 Avoids distortions 
between associated 
and independent 
enterprises 
 
 Treats transactions 
between indepen-
dent and associated 
enterprises equally  
 Comparables to 
internal transactions 
may often not exist 
 High compliance 
costs for taxpayers 
and tax administra-
tions in order to de-
termine the appro-
priate price 
 Access to data 
difficult 
 Tax planning op-
portunities  
 No international 
uniformity 
 Uses objective 
measures to allo-
cate tax base 
 Greater certainty 
for taxpayers 
 Lower compliance 
costs 
 Easy to administer 
 No guiding prin-
ciple 
 Worldwide agree-
ment on factors 
improbable  no 
uniformity  
 Choice and weight 
of factors used af-
fects allocation 
significantly 
 Rates of return are 
assumed to be 
equal for different 
factors in different 
jurisdictions 
 Data of worldwide 
business structures 
needed  
 Definition of taxa-
ble group difficult 
 Manipulation of 
factors possible 
 Exchange rate 
problems 
Source: own composition. 
Due to the discussed difficulties, especially the need for multilateral agreement on 
detailed rules, formula apportionment has never been implemented across countries 
so far. But the application of the arm‟s length principle has also proven to be com-
plex and to impose high compliance costs on taxpayers. Therefore, the two concepts 
are still discussed and advocates of each one promote their benefits and drawbacks. 
Avi-Yonah/Clausing/Durst (2009) have recently re-proposed the implementation of a 
formula apportionment in the United States. But reactions were restrained which led 
Avi-Yonah (2010) to proposing a compromise: the introduction of formula appor-
tionment within the concept of the arm‟s length principle. Precisely, he suggests us-
ing a formula under the profit split method in order to allocate the residual profit to 
different jurisdictions. This is only a very modest step which can, in my opinion, 
hardly be seen as a step towards a change of principles.  
3 Qualitative Analysis of Existing Anti-Avoidance Measures 
64 
 
However, under the CCCTB project pursued in the European Union
89
, formula ap-
portionment based on a uniform determination of the tax base is currently discussed. 
But also in this context, formula apportionment has been highly criticized (Röder 
(2012)). As Spengel/Zöllkau (2012) propose, the CCCTB could, therefore, be im-
plemented in two steps.
90
 First, national tax accounting rules could be replaced by 
harmonized rules. Later on, the consolidation and reallocation of the tax base can be 
introduced. This procedure would allow jurisdictions to become familiar with the 
concept and experience could be gained which could then influence the design of the 
consolidation and the formula apportionment. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
Since the first version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1979, they have 
been amended regularly and the OECD has made an effort to incorporate changes in 
the business, political, administrative, or technological circumstances into the Guide-
lines. Usually, this has been done very openly and has involved public discussions 
among practitioners, academics, and tax authorities. The amendments are, thus, 
based on a broad consensus and are usually perceived positively (see e.g. Katsushima 
(1995), ICC (1995), Rasch/Feistle (2009)). But they also reflect compromises made 
which may lead to a lack of precision in the guidelines (Förster (2009)). 
UN Transfer Pricing Manual 
As previously mentioned, the UN Transfer Pricing Manual must not be understood as 
an alternative to the OECD Guidelines. Much rather, it constitutes an add-on which 
aims at providing practical guidance for the application of the principles, especially 
in developing countries.  As the Manual is not yet finalized, no experiences as to its 
practicability exist so far. The Indian government, however, has only recently ex-
pressed opposition to the Manual and demands an alternative set of transfer pricing 
guidelines especially for developing countries. It is argued that the OECD Guidelines 
have been constituted solely by developed countries and, contrary to the statement 
that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines should be followed under the UN Model 
(paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Article 9 UN Model), they should not be appli-
cable to non-member countries that are not part of the decision-making process 
(Ernst & Young (2012)). Since the UN has repeatedly highlighted the importance of 
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the OECD Guidelines, it is improbable that this request will be answered – definitely 
not in the context of the currently discussed Manual. 
EU Arbitration Convention and Codes of Conduct 
The EU Arbitration Convention came into force almost at the same time as the 
OECD Guidelines. While the 1995 OECD Guidelines only included a section on 
mutual agreement procedures which referred to the relevant Article of the OECD 
Model
91
, the scope of the Arbitration Convention has been wider and also included a 
mandatory arbitration procedure which was not introduced by the OECD until 2008. 
It has, therefore, at this time been an important step towards greater fairness and cer-
tainty for taxpayers (Schelpe (1995)). Nevertheless, when the Arbitration Convention 
came into effect, there were several open questions regarding its application. Practic-
al issues were addressed in the Code of Conduct issued in 2004, but others remained 
unsolved. Especially the non-existence of definitions, e.g. of “enterprise”, “perma-
nent establishment” or the location of an entity, is a major weakness of the Conven-
tion as it may cause Member States to refuse its application (Farmer/Lyal (1994), p. 
307). 
The EU Code of Conduct on documentation requirements is also not in conflict with 
the OECD Guidelines, much rather it substantiates them. While the OECD Guide-
lines only provide general recommendations on documentation, such as helpful doc-
uments, it remains to the member countries to design precise requirements. The EU 
Code of Conduct, in contrast, functions as a common set of rules for all EU Member 
States. Since a Code of Conduct is not legally binding, the Member States are not 
obliged to adopt it. However, a study conducted by CFE shows that so far about 44% 
of the surveyed EU Member States have implemented the Code of Conduct in their 
tax legislation (Valente/Raventos-Calvo (2010)).
92
 The survey also shows that those 
EU countries that did not introduce the Code of Conduct, apply stricter rules in all 
cases. Overall, the Code of Conduct on documentation requirements contributes to 
the simplification and transparency of transfer pricing regulations. If the Member 
States support the Code, taxpayers may only prepare one set of documentation for 
affiliates in several countries, which reduces compliance costs significantly (Hum-
mer (2009)).  
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 For a comparison of the Code of Conduct and national documentation requirements in the Member 
States, see Schnorberger et al. (2006a), Schnorberger et al. (2006b), and Schnorberger et al. (2006c). 
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PATA Guidelines 
A similar approach is chosen by the member countries of the PATA. They have also 
elaborated a common set of documentation requirements as well as advance pricing 
agreement procedures. However, the respective countries have not adjusted national 
tax legislation in order to meet the rules they agreed on. Much rather, the PATA do-
cumentation package is very extensive and in most cases goes beyond the scope of 
national requirements. But, on the other hand, it also guarantees certainty regarding 
the documentation requirements of all member countries which may ultimately re-
duce compliance costs (Lebovitz et al. (2003)). In a survey conducted by Ernst & 
Young shortly after the introduction of the package, a significant number of compa-
nies was unaware of its existence (50% of parent companies, 66% of subsidiaries). 
Out of the companies knowing the package, the great majority did not plan to use it 
(66% of parent companies, 75% of subsidiaries) (Ernst & Young (2003), p. 21). 
3.3.3 Mutual Assistance Measures 
3.3.3.1 Mutual Assistance Directives 
On 15 March 1976 a Council Directive on the mutual assistance for the recovery of 
claims (76/308/EEC) was published which had to be implemented into the national 
tax law of the Member States until 1978. Originally, the Directive only applied to the 
enforcement of agricultural levies, customs duties, and value-added-tax, but in 2001 
(Directive 2001/44/EC of 15 June 2001), the Directive‟s scope was extended to in-
come taxes, capital taxes and insurance premiums. It was designed to protect the fi-
nancial interests and competitiveness of the Member States by supplying required 
information to other Member States and by recovering claims against taxpayers. 
However, the Directive was also criticized by the Member States for being too slow, 
disparate, nontransparent, and poorly coordinated (European Commission (2009a)). 
For such reasons, after consultation of the Member States, the mutual assistance for 
the recovery of claims was reorganized in 2010. A Council Directive of 16 March 
2010 (2010/24/EU) replaced the existing Directive and introduced a simplified 
process for the recovery of tax claims between the Member States. The main changes 
included a broadening of the scope, i.e. it now covers all taxes and a wider definition 
of persons, and an improvement of the efficiency of the recovery assistance by intro-
ducing uniform instruments for the enforcement of claims. This also comprised the 
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implementation of the OECD standard for the exchange of information
93
 (Vasce-
ga/van Thiel (2010)).  
On 19 December 1977 the Directive on mutual assistance in tax matters 
(77/799/EEC) was released. It ensures that all information necessary for the correct 
assessment of direct taxes is exchanged between the Member States. The Directive 
distinguishes between an exchange of information on request, an automatic or a 
spontaneous exchange of information. In 2004 (2004/56/EC), the Directive was up-
dated and the flow of information was improved. It then also permitted that Member 
States cooperate in acting against tax fraud. Similarly to the Directive on tax recov-
ery, increased taxpayer mobility and cross-border transactions necessitated a revision 
of the Directive. Therefore, in 2011, a new Directive (2011/16/EU of 15 February 
2011) was published and replaced the existing Directive. It modernized the processes 
by introducing standard forms, a central office, and binding time limits and also im-
plemented the OECD standard. The proposed changes to the automatic exchange of 
information have, however, been replaced by a step-by-step approach after several 
Member States opposed the proposal of the Directive (Gabert (2011)).  
The Savings Tax Directive (2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003)
94
 introduced an automatic 
information exchange in the case of cross-border interest payments. The Directive 
was the result of long discussions among the Member States which finally resulted in 
adopting a compromise. In a first proposal, the Member States were given the choice 
between the exchange of information and the levy of a uniform withholding tax, the 
majority of the revenue of which (75%) was to be transferred to the residence coun-
try (Vascega/van Thiel (2010)). Finally, this option was only sustained for Austria, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and several associated territories.
95
 The withholding tax rate, 
however, was increased from 15% to 35% in 2011. Furthermore, the Member States 
only agreed on the Directive under the condition that the United States, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, Andorra and all associated territories of the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands apply the same regulations on the exchange of 
information. The Directive came into force after the corresponding agreements were 
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signed which was on 1 July 2005. After the first years of its application were over, a 
report was published which revealed certain weaknesses, especially that not all rele-
vant financial instruments were covered by the Directive and that it could, thus, be 
easily circumvented (Czakert (2009)). An amending proposal was adopted by the 
European Commission on 13 November 2008 (European Commission (2008)), but 
discussions are still ongoing. 
On 26 October 2004, an anti-fraud agreement was signed between the European Un-
ion and Switzerland (European Council (2004)) which came into force on 8 April 
2009. It includes provisions on administrative assistance on indirect taxes in order to 
protect the financial interests of both parties.  
3.3.3.2 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters 
In 1978, the Council of Europe
96
 published a recommendation for a convention on 
mutual assistance (Council of Europe (1978)) which was thereupon elaborated by the 
OECD. In 1987, the Convention, which contains rules on the exchange of informa-
tion, tax examinations, and the recovery of taxes, was issued. Specifically, it allowed 
an exchange of information upon request, an automatic, and a spontaneous exchange 
of information as well as tax examinations abroad and simultaneous tax examina-
tions. Furthermore, it covered all taxes levied by the signing countries, i.e. direct 
taxes as well as indirect taxes. The scope of the Convention was, therefore, at that 
time, beyond the scope of the EU Directive on mutual assistance. As a result, in Ar-
ticle 27, the Convention regulated that, where applicable, the EU Directive has first 
priority and recourse on the Convention is not feasible (Eilers (1988)).
97
 
The Convention was opened for signature in 1988 and came into force after a mini-
mum of 5 ratifications
98
 on 1 April 1995. Upon the joining of the Convention, it 
serves as a basis for the exchange of information between all signing countries. The 
countries can, however, apply changes to their obligations in the Convention.  
In 2009, the G20
99
 called for a multilateral measure which was also open to develop-
ing countries. Therefore, the Convention was opened to all jurisdictions and the 
OECD standard for the exchange of information was introduced. Until 2012, 19 
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countries
100
 have ratified the Convention and 15 countries
101
 have signed it, but not 
yet ratified. 
3.3.3.3 Evaluation of Multilateral Mutual Assistance Measures 
Several measures for the mutual assistance in the exchange of information or the 
recovery of claims were presented in the previous sections. Generally, their scope 
and efficiency has increased over time and they now constitute an important vehicle 
in preventing tax evasion and avoidance. However, the following section will outline 
some strengths and weaknesses of these measures. 
EU Directive on the Recovery of Tax Claims 
The European Commission has published two reports which provide information on 
the use of mutual assistance for the recovery of claims (European Commission 
(2006), European Commission (2009b)). The 2006 report shows that the number of 
requests has increased between 2003 and 2004. But the main focus of the report was 
on the changes due to the accession of ten new Member Countries in 2004. Interes-
tingly, among the old and new Member States, there are certain countries which pose 
considerably more requests than other countries. According to the report, this is the 
case for two reasons. First, the mobility of persons is higher between certain coun-
tries (e.g. UK and Ireland) and therefore more mutual assistance requests exist. 
Second, the numbers only represent mutual assistance requests based on the Direc-
tive, but there may be other channels for requests, e.g. the Nordic Convention or the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters by the OECD and the Council of 
Europe. Concerning the recovered amounts through mutual assistance, a large gap 
exists between the amounts requested and those recovered, i.e. in 2004, only 1.82% 
of requested amounts could be recovered.
102
 The report lays out several explanations 
for this small number. On the one hand, it is a well known fact that the chances for 
recovery decrease over time and since mutual assistance requests only play subordi-
nated roles in the Member States, it is not surprising that recovery rates are rather 
low. Additionally, the cases where cross-border requests are used are by nature the 
more difficult ones. On the other hand, the Member States reported difficulties with 
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the resources available or the communication between Member States. Finally, sev-
eral cases exist where a recovery is not captured by the numbers, namely if outstand-
ing tax payments are paid directly to the requesting authorities or if any kind of con-
sensus regarding the payment has been reached. 
The second report confirms the trend of rising mutual assistance requests for the 
years 2005 to 2008 while the use of other mutual assistance measures decreases. In 
addition, it provides information on the type of tax concerned by these requests. The 
two major areas are VAT claims and taxes on income and capital, together account-
ing for approximately 80% of all recovery requests. Regarding the amounts recov-
ered, the report, unfortunately, only shows rising absolute numbers, but a percentage 
of all amounts requested is not available. As the report only states that a large gap 
still exists, it can be assumed that the numbers have not improved significantly com-
pared to the first report. 
The new Directive adopted in 2010 was perceived as an important step towards a 
more efficient and proper assessment of taxes. Especially as cross-border cases con-
stantly increase within the European Union, an improvement of the cooperation of 
tax authorities is a central issue (Vascega/van Thiel (2010)).  
EU Directive on the Exchange of Information  
Since the adoption of the Directive on mutual assistance in the exchange of informa-
tion its impact has been widely discussed. In a report presented by a EU Working 
Party on Tax Fraud established in 1999, the main weaknesses regarding the fight 
against tax fraud and tax evasion were identified (European Council (2000)). Besides 
the fact that Member States could refuse the exchange of information based on secre-
cy provisions, no time limits existed and received information could only be used for 
tax purposes. In addition, the provisions on the automatic exchange of information 
were not sufficient and required an additional agreement of the respective parties 
(Vascega/van Thiel (2011)). In 2004, the Directive was slightly amended and some 
weak points were improved, especially the use of information for other purposes. 
Finally, the amendment of the Directive in 2011 took account of the changing needs 
of the exchange of information and increased its efficiency and transparency. How-
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ever, in order to ensure the satisfactory functioning of the exchange of information, it 
is important to promote awareness of this issue in national tax authorities (Gabert 
(2011)).  
EU Savings Tax Directive  
As already mentioned, the EU Savings Tax Directive as adopted in 2005 showed 
some weaknesses. Firstly, the definition of interest is rather narrow so that several 
financial instruments are not covered. This leaves taxpayers the possibility to avoid 
the application of the Directive (Martín Jiménez (2006)). Secondly, the Directive did 
not install any control mechanisms. As tax authorities may, thus, not verify whether 
other jurisdictions exchange all accessible information or not, they will have an in-
centive to also exchange less information than possible (Schwarz (2006)). Lastly, 
associated territories and third countries were given the possibility to choose between 
an exchange of information and a final withholding tax. It can be assumed that oth-
erwise, they would have not agreed on committing to the Directive. Although the 
withholding tax rate was increased from 25% to 35% in 2011, this system may still 
be favorable for taxpayers compared to an exchange of information. It is, therefore, 
questionable whether a comprehensive exchange of information system will ever be 
established (Schwarz (2006)). 
Council of Europe/OECD Convention  
After the proposal was first published, the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax 
Matters was heavily criticized, mainly because it was elaborated without the consul-
tation of taxpayers. It was, therefore, argued that the Convention was only aligned 
with the interests of the tax authorities. Furthermore, it did not provide sufficient 
legal protection (ICC (1987)). On the other hand, advocates of the Convention stated 
that it offered an efficient means for the exchange of information as upon signing, it 
applies to all other signing countries. In contrast, negotiations on bilateral agreements 
are far more time-consuming and costly (Czakert (2010)). It also offers a wide scope 
of cooperation while respecting taxpayers‟ rights and is flexible enough to allow for 
adjustments based on reservations expressed by signing countries. Especially after 
the recent opening to all countries and the introduction of the OECD standard, it is 
perceived as a powerful tool for the exchange of information (Pross/Russo (2012)). 
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3.4 Interaction of Anti-Avoidance Measures 
The previous sections presented and analyzed different anti-avoidance measures em-
ployed to combat profit shifting behavior of multinational enterprises. They also 
showed that some measures are implemented on different levels, i.e. unilaterally, 
bilaterally or multilaterally. This section will, therefore, discuss the interaction of 
such measures. Precisely, it will provide guidance on the applicability and priority of 
certain measures over others. 
3.4.1 Mutual Assistance Measures 
Two aspects of mutual assistance have been examined in this chapter: the exchange 
of information and the assistance in the collection of taxes. As the unilateral meas-
ures are in most cases only a residual element if bi- or multilateral measures do not 
exist and are rather inefficient
103
, the scope and the interaction of both aspects will 
only be examined regarding the different bilateral and multilateral measures.   
Table 5 provides an overview of the scope of the different instruments for the ex-
change of information. After recent amendments of the EU Directive, the Convention 
and Article 26 OECD Model, they are now all very similar. They have in common 
that no restrictions apply regarding the personal scope, i.e. neither the nationality nor 
the residence of a person is decisive. In addition, they now all include the OECD 
standard which allows for an exchange of information held by banks or other finan-
cial institutions.  
Table 5: Scope of Different Measures for the Exchange of Information  
 
EU Directive 
2011/16/EU 
Council of Eu-
rope/ OECD 
Convention 
OECD Model 
Agreement 
Article 26 
OECD Model 
geographical scope 
all EU Member 
States 
all signing coun-
tries 
two Contracting 
States 
two Contracting 
States 
personal scope no restrictions no restrictions no restrictions no restrictions 
taxes covered 
direct taxes     
indirect taxes   a  
form of information exchange 
EOI upon request     
spontaneous EOI   a  
automatic EOI   a  
tax examinations 
abroad 
    
simultaneous tax 
examinations 
    
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information held by 
banks 
    
EOI: exchange of information; 
a 
the Contracting States may agree to include such provisions; source: 
own composition. 
The Council of Europe/OECD Convention is the widest instrument and not only in-
cludes all taxes, i.e. direct and indirect taxes, but also all forms of information ex-
change. The EU Directive is comparable, but only includes direct taxes.
104
 Regarding 
the bilateral instruments, both, the OECD Model Agreement and Article 26 OECD 
Model, do not allow for simultaneous tax examinations. Article 26 OECD Model 
also does not provide for tax examinations abroad. But besides that, Article 26 
OECD Model is wider than the Model Agreement which does not contain indirect 
taxes or a provision on the spontaneous or automatic exchange of information. The 
contracting states may, however, include such aspects in the respective agreement.  
Figure 2 displays the countries that are EU Member States, have signed the Council 
of Europe/OECD Convention and/or are members of the Global Forum which pro-
motes the conclusion of the OECD Model Agreement for the exchange of informa-
tion. In addition, the countries may also have included Article 26 OECD Model in 
their double tax treaties. As the intersections of the Figure show, the applicability of 
more than one instrument is rather likely.  
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Figure 2: Implementation of Different Instruments for the Exchange of Information 
 
 
Source: own illustration. 
As Directives are legally binding for EU Member States, the EU Directive is general-
ly prior to all other instruments, i.e. for all EU Member States the EU Directive guar-
antees a certain standard for the exchange of information. Therefore, only in case the 
Convention or a bilateral agreement is wider than the EU Directive, the applicability 
of the different instruments has to be analyzed. Regarding the interaction of the Con-
vention and the EU Directive, it was stated in Article 27 of the first version of the 
Convention that “notwithstanding the rules of the present Convention, those Parties 
which are members of the European Economic Community shall apply in their mu-
tual relations the common rules in force in that Community.” This provision was 
requested by the EU Member States because the scope of the EU Directive was orig-
inally not as wide as the Convention. It was, thus, ensured that EU Member States 
could sign the Convention in order to apply its provisions to third countries, but 
could still rely on the EU Directive for intra-community cases. However, the provi-
sion was changed when the Convention was amended in 2010 and now permits the 
application of the Convention where it allows for a wider cooperation. Thus, the 
Convention is used subsidiarily to the EU Directive (Pross/Russo (2012)). The inte-
raction of the EU Directive and a bilateral double tax treaty or a bilateral agreement 
on the exchange of information is treated similarly: the EU Directive is generally 
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applied, only where the bilateral agreement is wider, it is used (Art. 1 para. 3 EU 
Directive 2011/16/EU, Seer/Gabert (2010)). In the case that a bilateral agreement and 
the Convention apply, there is no priority of either instrument. 
For the assistance in the collection of taxes, three instruments exist which are dis-
played in Table 6. The Table gives an overview of the scope of the measures as well 
as the main differences. In contrast to the EU Directive on the exchange of informa-
tion, the EU Directive for the recovery of claims also applies to indirect taxes. Fur-
thermore, it limits the assistance to cases that are not older than five years, are higher 
than EUR 1,500 and which are not contested in the requesting state. Regarding the 
measures taken in the requesting state, the EU Directive is, however, wider than the 
other instruments and does not require to exhaust all possible unilateral measures. 
The Convention allows for a longer statute of limitations of 15 years and does not 
state a minimum amount of the claim. Furthermore, it does not take reference to the 
measures taken in the requesting state. Finally, Article 27 OECD Model is the only 
instrument that allows for assistance even in the case the claim is contested. On the 
other hand, it is stricter regarding the requirement to exhaust all possible measures in 
the requesting state before providing assistance. 
Table 6: Scope of Different Measures for the Recovery of Taxes 
 
EU Directive 
2010/24/EU 
Council of Eu-
rope/ OECD 
Convention 
Article 27 
OECD Model 
geographical scope 
all EU Member 
States 
all signing coun-
tries 
two Contracting 
States 
personal scope no restrictions no restrictions no restrictions 
taxes covered 
direct taxes    
indirect taxes    
main differences 
statute of limita-
tions for the recov-
ery of claims 
5 years 15 years n/a 
requirement for 
measures taken in 
requesting state 
possible domes-
tic measures 
n/a 
all possible do-
mestic measures 
minimum amount 
of claim 
EUR 1,500 n/a n/a 
request possible if 
claim is contested 
in requesting state 
   
Source: own composition.  
The interaction of the different measures is generally treated equally to that of the 
provisions for the exchange of information. In this context, Art. 24 para. 1 of the EU 
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Directive 2010/24/EU states that “this Directive shall be without prejudice to the 
fulfillment of any obligation to provide wider assistance ensuing from bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements, including for the notification of legal or 
extra-legal acts”. Therefore, the Convention and tax treaties are applied subsidiarily 
to the EU Directive, while between the Convention and the tax treaties no priority 
exists. 
Both aspects of mutual assistance are very important in sustaining international tax 
cooperation in order to combat tax avoidance and evasion. They allow closing the 
gap between the internationalization of the taxpayer‟s activities and the territoriality 
of the tax authorities‟ enforcement powers (Vascega/van Thiel (2011)). But while the 
exchange of information is currently on the way to be based on the OECD standard 
almost worldwide, the recovery of taxes is still at the beginning. Since Article 27 
OECD Model is rather new, it is not included in many double tax treaties, but this 
will change as more states are likely to implement it in the future (Baker et al. 
(2011)). 
3.4.2 Mutual Agreement Procedures 
A mutual agreement procedure is arranged for under the EU Arbitration Convention 
for transfer pricing purposes as well as in Article 25 OECD Model. An interaction of 
both instruments may, therefore, only occur for EU Member States and for transfer 
pricing cases. Article 15 of the Arbitration Convention states that “nothing in this 
Convention shall affect the fulfillment of wider obligations with respect to the elimi-
nation of double taxation in the case of an adjustment of profits of associated enter-
prises resulting either from other conventions to which the Contracting States are or 
will become parties or from the domestic law of the Contracting States”. Thus, it is 
clear that where Article 25 OECD Model or domestic tax law is wider than the Con-
vention, it will be applied. The opposite case, where the Convention is wider, is, 
however, not expressly mentioned. Under general principles on the priority of differ-
ent legal provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, superior law 
overrides inferior law, specific law overrides general law, and posterior law overrides 
prior law. As discussed by Hinnekens (1992), it can be argued that the Arbitration 
Convention is superior law due to its level of international law.
105
 Therefore, it is 
assumed to prevail even over more specific provisions and over posterior law. As a 
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result, the Convention sets a minimum standard for mutual agreement procedures 
within the European Union. 
3.4.3 General Anti-Avoidance Regulations 
The compatibility of domestic general anti-avoidance regulations and tax treaties is 
perceived differently by countries, depending on the interpretation of the OECD 
Commentary. Para. 22.1 of the Commentary on Article 1 OECD Model states that 
general anti-abuse rules are part of the basic domestic rules which “are not ad-
dressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them”. It is, however, ques-
tionable whether this rule is also true in cases where domestic anti-avoidance rules 
include a recharacterization of transactions. The 2010 IFA Congress revealed that 
while for some countries the applicability of domestic anti-avoidance rules under tax 
treaties is unproblematic, for other countries the interpretation of tax treaty obliga-
tions is in contradiction with the application of domestic anti-avoidance measures 
(van Weeghel (2010)). The Netherlands, for instance, which apply an “abuse of law” 
doctrine, report that the recharacterization of income provided for through the do-
mestic tax law is, according to case law, not compatible with tax treaty obligations. 
Moreover, Luxembourg and Portugal have both expressed an observation on the 
Commentary on Article 1 and both agree that a tax treaty overrides domestic anti-
avoidance rules. 
Concluding, the interaction of general anti-avoidance regulations and tax treaties 
cannot be finally answered. Much rather it depends on the specific design of such 
rules and the interpretation of tax treaties followed by the respective countries. 
3.4.4 Transfer Pricing Regulations 
Transfer pricing regulations are generally implemented in domestic tax law. In nearly 
all countries, OECD member and non-member countries, they are based on the arm‟s 
length principle which is also implemented in Article 9 OECD Model. In this regard, 
domestic tax law and double tax treaties are, thus, in conformity. Article 9 OECD 
Model, however, refers to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in order to substan-
tiate the arm‟s length principle (para. 1 Commentary on Article 9 OECD Model). 
The prevailing opinion on the binding effect of the OECD Guidelines states that 
where Article 9 OECD Model is implemented in double tax treaties, the Guidelines 
have to be considered by the Contracting States (Calderón (2007)). This impact of 
the OECD Guidelines might be also the reason why many OECD member countries 
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introduce the Guidelines into domestic tax law. But also non-member countries fol-
low this trend and rely on the Guidelines. Calderón (2007) argues that this develop-
ment can be perceived as a globalization of tax law since a certain level of tax har-
monization has been reached through an institutional process. 
3.4.5 Thin/Fat Capitalization Rules 
Thin Capitalization Rules are only applied unilaterally, but nevertheless their interac-
tion with double tax treaties is not clear. The OECD has discussed the applicability 
of Article 9 OECD Model on thin capitalization cases and argues that when adjusting 
profits under thin capitalization rules because of excessive interest payments which 
would not have been paid in an arm‟s length situation, this would be in conformity 
with Article 9 OECD Model (OECD (1987b)). Therefore, thin capitalization rules are 
generally not prevented by Article 9 OECD Model. But para. 3 of the Commentary 
on Article 9 OECD Model also states that thin capitalization rules should not in-
crease an enterprise‟s profits to more than the arm‟s length profit. Thus, Article 9 
OECD Model can be applied in order to determine whether the interest rate used is at 
arm‟s length, but also to identify loans that should be reclassified as equity. 
It is, however, questionable whether fat capitalization rules, i.e. thin capitalization 
rules that apply to all loans not only between associated enterprises, are also covered 
by Article 9 OECD Model (van Weeghel (2010)). On the one hand, it can be argued 
that, since not only associated enterprises are affected, such fat capitalization rules 
are part of the general rules for the determination of taxable income. Consequently, 
they are not in conflict with tax treaties as they do not comprise regulations for the 
determination of income (Linn (2010)). On the other hand, the intention of Article 9 
OECD Model to avoid double taxation must not only be true for associated enterpris-
es, but even more for unrelated enterprises (Eigelshoven (2008)). Thus, Article 9 
OECD Model should also be applicable to fat capitalization rules. If the latter opi-
nion is followed, then the design of fat capitalization rules has to ensure that interest 
deductibility is limited to an arm‟s length standard.  
If under thin/fat capitalization rules it is determined that not all interest payments are 
deductible, they may either be treated as non-deductible business expenses or they 
may be reclassified as dividends. The tax treatment in both cases under a double tax 
treaty is not quite clear and will be further discussed in Chapter 4.2.3. 
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3.5 Concluding Evaluation of the Qualitative Analysis 
3.5.1 Three Types of Anti-Avoidance Measures 
In the previous sections, several unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral instruments to 
combat tax avoidance and evasion through profit shifting have been described and 
analyzed. In my opinion, such instruments can be distinguished into three different 
groups. A first group of instruments directly aims at transactions or arrangements 
between associated companies. Thin capitalization rules, which target excessive debt 
financing, or transfer pricing regulations, which provide standards for the determina-
tion of arm‟s length prices, belong to this category. General anti-avoidance regula-
tions do not have such a specific focus, but they serve as a residual provision for 
transactions through which tax is avoided. This group of measures is typically im-
plemented in national tax law, although, in the case of transfer pricing regulations, 
also multilateral agreements exist (e.g. PATA).  
A second group of instruments, namely the exchange of information, the assistance 
in the recovery of taxes and the mutual agreement procedure, has a supportive cha-
racter. They facilitate the application of the domestic tax law in case of cross-border 
transactions, especially regarding the anti-avoidance measures of the first group 
(Tanzi/Zee (2000)). They are not only implemented in national tax law, but also 
through bilateral agreements and multilateral conventions where generally the widest 
standard is applicable if more than one measure is available.  
Finally, a third group of instruments follows a more general and comprehensive ap-
proach and intends to establish a “level playing field” for international taxation by 
eliminating harmful tax practices. This procedure, in turn, reduces tax competition 
and, thus, tax avoidance and evasion. The OECD “Harmful Tax Competition” 
Project and the EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation can be allocated to this 
group. The measures form a multilateral agreement which will not directly be im-
plemented in national tax law, but countries decided to abolish domestic harmful tax 
practices through their commitment.  
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Figure 3: Three Types of Instruments Against Profit Shifting 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Figure 3 shows, how, in my opinion, those three types of instruments can be de-
picted. The general instruments serve as a basis because they address the basic con-
cepts of international taxation. By eliminating harmful tax competition, the general 
framework of international tax planning is affected which, consequently, has an im-
pact on all other instruments. The supportive instruments of the second group affect 
the administrative conditions of international taxation. They are, thus, the basis for 
specific instruments and ensure the enforcement of such rules. Finally, the specific 
instruments form the top of the pyramid. They aim at combating tax avoidance by 
ensuring certain standards for specific transactions. They function within the frame-
work of the other instruments and, therefore, base on them. 
3.5.2 Anti-Avoidance Measures and the Principles of International Taxa-
tion 
In this section, the presented anti-avoidance measures will be briefly evaluated with 
respect to the principles of international taxation laid out in Chapter 2, i.e. internation 
equity, efficiency, and simplicity.  
Internation equity is based on a fair allocation of taxing rights across jurisdictions. 
As outlined, the OECD and the UN provide for recommendations regarding the allo-
cation of taxing rights with respect to different kinds of income. Where profit shift-
ing strategies are used by multinational companies, this allocation of taxing rights is 
exploited in order to decrease the overall tax burden. Thus, under profit shifting 
specific instruments:
transfer pricing, thin 
capitalization, GAAR
supportive instruments:
mutual assistance, mutual 
agreement procedures
general instruments:
elimination of harmful tax competition
3 Qualitative Analysis of Existing Anti-Avoidance Measures 
81 
 
transactions book income is accrued in a jurisdiction where it would not have ac-
crued in an arm‟s length setting. Profit shifting, therefore, takes advantage of the 
allocation of taxing rights and shifts taxable income away from the jurisdiction 
where it was earned. The result is a violation of internation equity because low tax 
countries get a proportionately greater share of tax revenues than they would accord-
ing to the arm‟s length principle (OECD (1987a)). Where anti-avoidance measures 
prevent those strategies, they, therefore, conform to internation equity. However, this 
is only true if anti-avoidance measures address the right transactions and enforce a 
fair allocation of taxing rights. As a fair allocation of taxing rights cannot be con-
cluded from the basic principles of taxation, such as the ability-to-pay or the benefits 
principle (see Chapter 2.1.2.1.1), the agreement found in the OECD or UN model tax 
conventions should be used as a standard. Furthermore, the arm‟s length principle 
may serve as an underlying standard for anti-avoidance measures, but, nevertheless, 
the drawbacks of the principle have to be kept in mind.  
Regarding the measures discussed in this study, transfer pricing regulations generally 
base on the arm‟s length principle, although it is not guaranteed that an arm‟s length 
price can always be determined. Under thin capitalization rules, however, different 
standards for the determination of acceptable debt financing are used across coun-
tries, which may not always be in accordance with the arm‟s length principle.106 The 
OECD, therefore, states that thin capitalization rules are only in conformity with Ar-
ticle 9 OECD Model if the arm‟s length standard prevails (OECD (1987b), para. 3 
Commentary on Article 9 OECD Model). Thus, the existence of comprehensive 
guidelines on the determination of arm‟s length interest rates and debt-equity ratios is 
essential. 
Two aspects of the principle of efficiency were mentioned: On the one hand, the effi-
ciency of compliance, measured as administrative costs in relation to tax revenue, 
and, on the other hand, efficiency in terms of neutrality which allows for a non-
distorted allocation of resources. Transfer pricing regulations and thin/fat capitaliza-
tion rules have a direct impact on the compliance costs of taxpayers. Especially the 
compliance effort connected with transfer pricing regulations is significant. In many 
cases, the documentation requirements impose a significant burden on taxpayers 
which is underlined by a survey on transfer pricing conducted by Ernst & Young 
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where 75% of multinational enterprises expressed the increasing importance of trans-
fer pricing documentation (Ernst & Young (2010)). From the perspective of the tax 
authorities, not only the growing compliance requirements of taxpayers increase the 
administrative burden, but also the mutual assistance and mutual agreement proce-
dures implemented have made new organizational structures necessary (OECD 
(2012b)). Especially with regard to the exchange of information and the recovery of 
tax claims, the EU and the OECD, therefore, aim at increasing efficiency by intro-
ducing uniform procedures (Vascega/van Thiel (2010)) 
Capital import and capital export neutrality concepts prevail simultaneously in many 
countries due to the implementation of both, source and residence taxation, in na-
tional tax law. Profit shifting strategies undermine these concepts by artificially un-
dertaking transactions which would not take place in the free market (OECD 
(1987a)). However, credit systems are generally less affected by tax avoidance as 
foreign and domestic income is subject to the same tax burden which reduces the 
favorability of profit shifting (Jacobs (2011), p. 33). Jurisdictions applying the ex-
emption method, on the other hand, face the risk that profits are shifted to foreign 
low-tax jurisdictions and are not subject to any further tax whether the profits are 
repatriated or not (Blanluet/Durand (2011), Kofler (2012)). Thus, anti-avoidance 
measures which prevent profit shifting behavior should have no impact on capital 
export neutrality, but sustain capital import neutrality. 
Finally, all three forms of simplicity, i.e. policy, form, and action simplicity, do not 
always prevail regarding anti-avoidance measures. The concepts of general anti-
avoidance rules, transfer pricing regulations or thin/fat capitalization rules may, in 
some cases, be rather complex and do not provide legal certainty to the taxpayer as to 
how to determine acceptable transactions. They may, thus, be in conflict with policy 
and form simplicity. The procedures implemented to administer and collect taxes 
may also impose a great compliance burden and do not conform to action simplicity. 
Concluding, when introducing anti-avoidance measures, several aspects should be 
considered and balanced against each other. While anti-avoidance measures are gen-
erally in conformity with internation equity and the neutrality principle, this is only 
true where they are not too far-reaching and enforce a fair allocation of taxing rights. 
The arm‟s length principle should, thus, be implemented and substantiated by suffi-
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cient guidelines. In addition, the compliance effort required from taxpayers has to be 
considered and kept at a minimum in order to ensure efficiency and simplicity. 
3.5.3 Practical and Political Aspects of Anti-Avoidance Measures 
The three groups of instruments vary in their scope and reach from very specific anti-
avoidance measures to very general measures. Altogether they, therefore, constitute a 
rather solid framework of anti-avoidance measures which takes account of the objec-
tions of jurisdictions to give up national sovereignty. Over the past decades, jurisdic-
tions have been willing to make concessions and to be more open to tax cooperation. 
Especially in times of the recent financial crisis, the importance of such measures has 
become evident which is also proven by Switzerland and Austria that just recently 
gave up their reservations to the exchange of information.
107
 It seems, however, ne-
cessary that especially developing countries are supported in establishing the 
processes needed for the enforcement of anti-avoidance measures. As the studies on 
foregone tax revenues in developing countries show
108
, developing countries are es-
pecially affected by cross-border profit shifting. The attempts of the UN to support 
developing countries in setting up transfer pricing legislation by providing a manual 
is, thus, an important step. This can also be underlined by a study commissioned by 
the European Commission and implemented by PwC which analyzed the impact of 
the introduction of transfer pricing regulations in developing countries. It was found, 
that the estimated benefit, even in a low-impact scenario, outweighs the costs by far 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011)). Moreover, the empirical studies in Chapter 5 will 
examine the impact of such regulations on profit shifting by using firm data. 
The CCCTB approach pursued by the European Commission goes far beyond the 
scope of all existing measures and provides for a very high level of tax coordination 
which would be unique worldwide. For that reason, the EU Member States are cur-
rently hesitant to agree to this approach, but it remains to be seen how the attempt of 
Germany and France within the scope of the Green Paper evolves.
109
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4 A Comparison of Selected Anti-Avoidance Measures Worldwide 
The previous chapter has presented several anti-avoidance measures against profit 
shifting implemented worldwide. This overview provides a framework which the 
following chapters should be put into relation to.  
In this chapter, two specific instruments, i.e. transfer pricing regulations and thin 
capitalization rules, will be presented in more detail. Information on transfer pricing 
regulations was collected for the years 2001 to 2009 and comprises 44 countries 
worldwide. As the regulations comprise many different aspects, an index is devel-
oped in Section 4.1.9 which measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. 
Moreover, the information on thin capitalization rules comprises 53 countries 
worldwide for the years 1999 to 2008. The different numbers of surveyed countries 
and years are mainly due to data constraints regarding transfer pricing regulations. 
The detailed information can be found in the appendix which also includes refer-
ences to data sources. The collected information will be further used in Chapter 5 to 
conduct an empirical analysis in order to examine the impact of such rules on profit 
shifting within multinational companies.    
4.1 Transfer Pricing Regulations110 
The following sections will, on the one hand, discuss several aspects of transfer pric-
ing regulations, i.e. their existence and applicability, applicable transfer pricing me-
thods, documentation requirements, submission deadlines, statutes of limitations, and 
advance pricing agreements. On the other hand, an index will be created which 
measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations taking different aspects into 
account. 
4.1.1 Previous Literature 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to analyze transfer pricing regulations in 
such detail for such a large number of countries and years. However, several studies 
have, so far, tried to capture the impact of transfer pricing regulations on corporate 
decisions and made use of different measures. Borkowski (2010) uses mostly survey 
data to examine whether the choice of a transfer pricing method and the transfer pric-
ing risks taken by multinational corporations are influenced by demographic, behav-
ioural, financial, or tax variables. In order to account for differences in transfer pric-
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ing legislation and tax authority attitudes, she uses a home country dummy. This 
variable can only be a very rough proxy for the considered aspects as it also captures 
a multitude of other factors connected to the home country (e.g. size, wealth, cur-
rency, development, or corruption). Jost/Pfaffermayr/Stoeckl/Winner (2011) apply a 
dummy variable capturing transfer pricing risk in their study on profit shifting within 
European multinationals. They define low and high risk depending on the existence 
of statutory transfer pricing regulations and a penalty regime where high risk is only 
imposed in case both components exist. They argue that the existence of penalties is 
usually connected with statutory documentation requirements and that, therefore, the 
documentation aspect is captured in the penalties component. In addition, a variable 
which states the time passed since the introduction of transfer pricing regulations is 
used in order to account for companies‟ and tax administrations‟ experience with the 
matter. The survey conducted in this study shows, however, that the existence of 
statutory rules alone is not a valid measure of transfer pricing risk. Some countries 
base their regulations on sophisticated guidelines which are not implemented in the 
tax law and others do not enforce statutory rules although they have existed for a 
long time. It is, therefore, necessary to include an enforcement component in addition 
which is not only based on time of existence. 
Finally, Beuselinck/Deloof/Vanstraelen (2009) examine income shifting in the Euro-
pean Union accounting for tax enforcement by defining a variable which comprises 
different features of transfer pricing regulations. Besides the availability of advance 
pricing agreements and audit risk, the strictness of documentation requirements is 
included. Each feature is expressed as a score between 0 and 1, the sum of which is 
the value of the tax enforcement variable. Although this variable comprises impor-
tant aspects of the strictness of transfer pricing regulations, it has to be interpreted 
with caution since the weights used for audit risk and documentation requirements 
are difficult to comprehend and their coverage is only limited over time.
111
 
This study adds to existing literature by defining a new variable which measures the 
strictness of transfer pricing regulations. The variable is based on a very comprehen-
sive data collection and thereby extends the data background of other measures con-
siderably. The variable consists of six categories which are, in contrast to some exist-
ing measures, precisely defined and easily comprehensible. The categories not only 
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take into account the existence of transfer pricing regulations, but also the enforce-
ment. It can, therefore, be a very useful and valuable component of future transfer 
pricing research. In the following sections, the different aspects of transfer pricing 
regulations, which are partly incorporated in the variable, will be presented. 
4.1.2 Existence and Applicability 
Almost all tax codes worldwide contain anti-avoidance regulations with respect to 
the conditions of intercompany transactions. Such anti-avoidance regulations are 
mainly based on the arm‟s length principle which the OECD member countries have 
agreed upon as an international standard for transfer pricing. It supports an equal 
treatment of independent companies and those part of a multinational enterprise 
which avoids the possibility of tax loopholes and the creation of market distortions. 
A downside of the principle is that it may not always take economies of scale or oth-
er privileges into account that prevail for associated companies (Kobetsky (2008), 
Francescucci (2004)).
112
  
In addition to a general anti-avoidance regulation, many countries have also intro-
duced specific transfer pricing regulations. However, the survey showed that the de-
finition of transfer pricing regulations and especially their distinction to general anti-
avoidance rules is not always clear. For this survey, it is assumed that transfer pricing 
regulations exist where, in addition to the arm‟s length principle, key elements, such 
as the terms related party or controlled transaction, methods or documentation re-
quirements, are additionally included in the national tax law. Where only guidelines 
published by the tax authorities supplement the anti-avoidance rule in the tax law, it 
is still defined as a general anti-avoidance rule. However, this distinction does not 
always indicate that a general anti-avoidance rule is generally more generous than 
transfer pricing regulations. This has much rather to been seen in context with the 
other aspects of the regulations outlined in the following sections. In some cases, 
guidelines in conjunction with a general anti-avoidance rule are very sophisticated 
and often enforced (e.g. Australia or China before 2008), while transfer pricing regu-
lations included in the national tax law are only rarely applied (e.g. Russia).  
Table A3 in the appendix shows that the arm‟s length principle is included in the 
national tax law of almost all considered countries in this survey which proves that it 
is the internationally accepted standard for transfer pricing. The only exception is 
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Brazil where maximum price ceilings and minimum income floors are defined. Spe-
cific transfer pricing regulations were mainly introduced in the last two decades (see 
Figure 4). The United States was the first country to focus on intercompany transac-
tions and extended the transfer pricing regulations as early as 1968. Until now it is 
seen as one of the toughest and most detailed transfer pricing systems in the world 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), p. 777). Five countries, mainly large, developed 
economies followed in the 1980s (Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan). 17 
countries introduced transfer pricing regulations between 1990 and 1999 and 14 in 
the surveyed time period (2001-2009). This development can be attributed to globa-
lization and the increasing awareness of this matter, but also to the fact that the intro-
duction of transfer pricing regulations can function as a defense against other coun-
tries. As taxpayers tend to allocate more taxable income to countries where regula-
tions are extremely aggressive in order to ensure compliance, the introduction of 
transfer pricing regulations can be a way to protect tax revenues (Calderón (2005), 
Kobetsky (2008)).  
Figure 4: Introduction of Transfer Pricing Regulations  
 
Source: own illustration. 
There are seven countries in the sample that still do not have transfer pricing regula-
tions introduced to their tax law. Those countries are Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Switzerland, and Thailand. In the case of Austria, it is ra-
ther unexpected that no detailed regulations exist, but tax authorities are aware of this 
issue and apply the OECD guidelines consequently. Ireland, Luxembourg, and Swit-
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zerland on the other hand are all European developed countries that attract a large 
amount of international investments due to their generous tax regulations 
(Grimes/Maguire (2005), Bogaerts (2002)).
113
 It may, therefore, be the case that 
those countries benefit from non-arm‟s length transactions which may explain the 
missing regulations. At last, while Malaysia and Thailand both introduced detailed 
guidelines with respect to the general anti-avoidance rule and already pay attention to 
transfer pricing issues, the Philippines are now starting to focus on the matter (Pri-
cewaterhouseCoopers (2011), p. 639). 
As follows from the arm‟s length principle, transactions under consideration are 
those between related parties. Such related parties may either be located in the same 
country or abroad. In addition, some countries treat unrelated parties in tax havens as 
related parties. The majority of countries apply transfer pricing regulations to domes-
tic and foreign related parties. Profit shifting usually only leads to a tax revenue loss 
if shifted cross-border, but as many countries offer very advantageous tax incentives 
for certain types of investment or for investments in certain regions, e.g. lower tax 
rates or tax holidays, a more favorable tax position can also be created through profit 
shifting between domestic related parties. The survey shows that most of the coun-
tries applying their rules to domestic and foreign related parties have a tax incentive 
system in place (UNCTAD (2000), p. 69, 119, 145).
114
 In turn, the countries restrict-
ing transfer pricing regulations only to foreign related entities are mainly developed, 
high-tax countries (e.g. Canada, Germany, Japan, or the USA). 
The survey also shows that seven countries apply their transfer pricing regulations 
also to unrelated parties in tax havens, the countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. All countries are located in South America 
which may be explained by their geographical proximity to the most relevant tax 
havens in the world (Owens/Sanelli (2008)).  
A definition of associated enterprises is also included in Article 9 OECD Model. It 
states that two parties are related if one party “participates directly or indirectly in 
the management, control, or capital of the other or if the same persons participate 
directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of both parties”. Such a 
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participation is stated as “de facto control” and “under common control” in Table 
A3. The OECD does neither in the Model Tax Convention nor in the Transfer Pric-
ing Guidelines define a certain minimum threshold which determines control. This 
approach is followed by 13 of the 44 considered countries (amongst others: Austral-
ia, Chile, France, Malaysia, Mexico, and the United States). All other countries de-
fine a fixed percentage of capital shareholding which identifies related parties.
115
 
Poland introduced the lowest threshold of at least 5% for the definition of a related 
party. The largest group of countries uses a 25% capital contribution (including Chi-
na and Germany) for their related party definition. A 50% shareholding is used by 
seven countries (e.g. Argentina and Japan). It is questionable, whether the threshold 
gives an indication of how strict tax authorities are with regards to the identification 
of controlled transactions. At least for the countries without a fixed threshold, a con-
clusion on their stringency cannot be drawn. 
4.1.3 Methods 
Based on the arm‟s length principle, several methods have been established in order 
to determine the appropriate transfer price for a certain transaction. In its 1979 report, 
the OECD has introduced three traditional transaction methods (the comparable un-
controlled price (CUP) method, the resale price method (RPM), and the cost plus 
method) with a clear preference for the CUP method. After the United States had 
announced additional methods based on profit comparisons in the early 1990s, the 
OECD also extended its recommendations. In the Transfer Pricing Guidelines pub-
lished in 1995, besides the traditional transactions methods, two transactional profit 
methods (transactional net margin method (TNMM) and profit split method) were 
included, which define prices based on different profit allocations. While the OECD 
expressed a clear preference for the traditional transaction methods, especially the 
CUP method (OECD (2010b), para. 2.5), the United States introduced a best method 
rule.
116
 Only in 2010, the OECD has published an amended version of the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines showing a greater openness towards the transactional profits me-
thods (OECD (2010b), para. 2.3).  
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Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Method  
Under the CUP method, the price of an uncontrolled transaction is compared with the 
price of a controlled transaction. An uncontrolled transaction implies that the parties 
involved are not affiliated and are themselves not part of a group.  
The major requirement of the CUP method is the comparability of transactions. The 
OECD outlines several characteristics which have to be comparable, i.e. among oth-
ers, product type, quality, availability, assets used and risks assumed, contractual 
terms, and economic circumstances (e.g. level of market, geography, and timing). If 
such a comparable transaction can be identified or if differences can be accounted for 
by reasonably adjusting the price, tax administrations usually prefer the CUP me-
thod.  
However, in some cases, the CUP method may not be applicable, e.g. if the market is 
not competitive or if assets are so unique that a comparable transaction cannot be 
identified. This holds especially true for transactions involving intangible assets as 
they usually base on substantial negotiations and contract terms and bargaining pow-
er can in most cases not be observed (King (2009), p. 24).  
Resale Price Method (RPM) 
Under the resale price method, in order to find an arm‟s length price, the resale price 
obtained by a distributor is reduced by an appropriate gross margin. The appropriate 
gross margin can be found with reference to transactions with unaffiliated companies 
(internal comparable). In case such a comparison is not possible, the gross margins of 
other individual distributors of similar products may be used (external comparable). 
The method is based on the assumption that gross margins are comparable for all 
products. This implies that products and circumstances of the transaction must be 
similar - under US regulations even higher standards of comparability are required 
than for the CUP method. However, it is questionable whether this assumption is true 
even if comparability prevails because it also suggests that gross margins are equal 
over firms, which does not seem a realistic assumption (King (2009), p. 19). For 
those reasons, the OECD guidelines state that adjustments are needed under several 
circumstances which increase the documentation effort and complexity of the RPM 
method. 
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Cost Plus Method 
The cost plus method is very similar to the resale price method, but takes the pers-
pective of a manufacturer selling similar products to affiliated and unaffiliated com-
panies. It adds an appropriate cost plus mark up to the costs of goods sold to find an 
arm‟s length price. 
The same critique as to the resale price method can generally be applied to the cost 
plus method. Especially whether cost plus mark ups are similar over different prod-
ucts and different firms and whether costs are even an appropriate starting point 
(OECD (2010b), para. 2.43). 
Profit Split Method 
Under the profit split method total profits accruing from controlled transactions are 
identified and split between all associated companies using ratios that would have 
been utilized in an uncontrolled transaction. The method can be applied using ex ante 
or ex post profits, i.e. projected or actual profits. The split of profits should take into 
account the circumstances of the transaction and consider assets used and risks as-
sumed by the associated companies. This can be done by using comparables or by 
applying a residual approach. The residual profit split method, in a first step, allo-
cates profits to the associated companies using one of the other methods (traditional 
transaction method or TNMM/CPM), not accounting for individual contributions. In 
a second step, the residual profit is split according to the relative value of each part-
ner‟s contribution. The comparable profit split method, on the other hand, uses com-
parable transactions between independent parties for the allocation of profits. This is 
done by defining key allocators which are based on assets/capital, costs, headcounts, 
or time spent (OECD (2010b), para. 2.135).  
The profit split method allows an analysis of transfer prices for more complex busi-
ness structures, e.g. highly integrated processes. Due to the two-sided approach, cas-
es where both parties of a transaction contribute unique and valuable components can 
be accounted for. However, the measuring of total profits may be a difficult task, 
especially if considering foreign affiliates (OECD (2010b), para. 2.114). As the resi-
dual profit split method makes use of a second method, the shortcomings of that me-
thod have to be considered as well. Furthermore, it is questionable, whether the profit 
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allocation of independent companies with reference to key allocators provides ap-
propriate ratios.  
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) and Comparable Profits Method (CPM) 
The TNMM, as outlined in the OECD guidelines, and the CPM, which is part of US 
transfer pricing regulations
117
, are both based on the comparison of the taxpayer with 
a group of similar, standalone companies. The companies in the sample have to oper-
ate in the same field, perform similar functions, and distribute comparable products. 
For each company, a profit level indicator (PLI), e.g. operating profits to sales or 
gross profits to operating expenses, is calculated, which is then applied to the respec-
tive denominator of the taxpayer‟s accounting results. While the CPM applies a “top-
down”-approach, which means that the entire operations of the company are broken 
down to transactions, the TNMM uses a “bottom-up”-approach and starts on the 
transactional level. If the profit level indicator of a controlled transaction lies within 
a range of indicators of uncontrolled transactions, the transfer price is assumed to be 
appropriate.  
The advantages of both methods are that information is more easily available and 
that the documentation effort is reduced compared to other methods. However, oper-
ating profits can be affected by several factors which are hard to identify and to 
quantify (Vögele/Borstell/Engler (2011), p. 321). Therefore it is often argued that 
transfer prices found are not at arm‟s length.118 
Selection of Method 
The OECD generally prefers the traditional transaction methods as they are a more 
direct way of identifying a transfer price. However, ultimately the facts and circums-
tances of the transaction are crucial. In cases where no or not sufficient information 
on third parties is available or where business processes are very complex and a two-
sided approach is needed, the transactional profit methods can be more appropriate. 
Other countries, including the United States, do not define a priority of methods, but 
take several factors into account in order to identify the most appropriate method 
(also called best method). The process of identifying the most appropriate method 
differs between countries, but it often includes the testing of each single method. 
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Table A4 provides an overview of the applicable transfer pricing methods and their 
priority in the considered countries. Regarding the different transfer pricing methods, 
there is only little variation across countries. With the exception of Brazil, the OECD 
transfer pricing methods are widely accepted. Since Brazil did not base transfer pric-
ing regulations on the arm‟s length principle, the available methods differ and in-
clude fixed margins applied on resale price or costs. In an international context, this 
causes large problems as the methods will vary in both countries involved in the 
transaction which may in turn lead to double taxation (Falcao (2010)). Another ex-
ceptional method which uses the market value established in transparent markets of 
certain goods on the day of their shipment was introduced by Argentina in 2005. The 
method is mandatory if certain conditions are fulfilled (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2011), p. 202).  
Only few countries (e.g. Chile, Greece, or Russia) have limited their acceptable me-
thods to the traditional transaction methods (CUP, RPM, and Cost Plus). In Russia, 
the limited number of methods comes along with a strict hierarchy of methods which 
makes the regulation very difficult and inefficient in practice (Variychuk (2011)). In 
Greece, the acceptable methods were even more limited until 2009. Only the CUP 
method could be used to determine arm‟s length prices causing great difficulties in 
identifying comparable transactions as the required data was not always available 
(Malliou/Savvaidou (2007)). 
Also with respect to the priority of methods, the great majority of countries follows 
the approach by the OECD and prefers the traditional transactions methods over the 
transactional profit methods. Some countries apply, in addition, a strict preference 
for the CUP method (e.g. Australia, Italy, or Mexico). Nine countries use a best me-
thod rule for the selection of the applicable method (e.g. Argentina, Peru, China, In-
dia, or the USA).  
Out of the OECD member countries, only Greece and Ireland do not follow the 
OECD guidelines. In Ireland only a very general anti-avoidance rule is in place 
which does not require the definition of methods. 
4.1.4 Documentation Requirements 
In order to monitor the transfer pricing policy of multinational companies, tax au-
thorities in most countries require detailed documentation. The preparation of suffi-
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cient documentation is especially important as in most countries the burden of proof 
will then rest on the tax authorities. It may, however, switch to the taxpayer if docu-
mentation is incomplete or inaccurate. 
The OECD has included a chapter on recommended documentation in its Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines which is supposed to help tax authorities when formulating do-
cumentation inquiries as well as taxpayers when preparing documentation on inter-
company transactions. It states that “information about the associated enterprises 
involved in the controlled transactions, the transactions at issue, the functions per-
formed, [and] information derived from independent enterprises engaged in similar 
transactions or businesses” is required to analyze transfer pricing policies (OECD 
(2010b), para. 5.17). The guidelines also include other factors that should be docu-
mented in certain transactions or under certain circumstances such as a business out-
line, an organizational structure, or an economic analysis (OECD (2010b), para. 
5.18). It has, however, to be noted that all explanations are only recommendations 
and do not go into much detail concerning their implementation. 
Besides the documentation that should be maintained by the taxpayer, some coun-
tries even require information to be disclosed with the annual tax return. In this re-
gard, the OECD recommends that the requested information should be limited to an 
extent that allows the tax authorities to identify taxpayers that require additional ex-
amination. 
As detailed country-specific information is not available and only hard to assess, the 
exact content of the requested documentation in each country is difficult to capture. 
Lists of required documents may exist, but it is not always clear whether such lists 
are enforced in practice. Therefore, the overview provided in Table A5 is limited to 
the existence of documentation requirements and whether taxpayers are obliged to 
disclose any information with the tax authorities. In the case that documentation re-
quirements are not implemented in the national tax law (no statutory requirement), 
documentation may still be required in practice, based on tax administration‟s guide-
lines or the fact that companies are expected to provide documentation in an audit. 
For simplification, the content of the required disclosure is stated as short or long in 
Table A5. A short content is assumed to exist if only a summary or overview of 
transactions is necessary for disclosure, while a long content is assumed if (almost) 
full documentation (also called a transfer pricing study) is required.  
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Figure 5: Introduction of Statutory Documentation Requirements 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Figure 5 shows that documentation has become an important issue in the past ten 
years. 21 out of the 27 countries applying a statutory documentation requirement 
have introduced it in the last decade. Only six countries already had documentation 
requirements in place before 2001. The introduction of a statutory documentation 
requirement was in most cases linked to the introduction of transfer pricing regula-
tions in general. Especially the Southern American and Asian countries have intro-
duced comprehensive rules in the considered time period. The only country that in-
troduced transfer pricing regulations without a documentation requirement is Bel-
gium. Interestingly, a lot of European countries have had transfer pricing regulations 
in place for a considerable time period before they extended their scope and included 
a documentation requirement. This shows the increasing awareness of transfer pric-
ing and the need for proper documentation. 
Only three out of the 17 countries that still do not have a statutory requirement, do 
not require documentation to exist in practice (Chile, Ireland, and Ukraine). The re-
maining 14 countries require documentation to exist in practice, especially in the 
course of an audit. The fact that a documentation requirement is included in the na-
tional tax law does, however, not necessarily mean that documentation is strictly 
enforced. Therefore another aspect, the required disclosure of documents, should be 
taken into account.  
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By the year 2009, 24 countries require a disclosure of documents on transfer pricing, 
eleven of which have introduced the disclosure during the considered time period. 
Remarkably, out of the 20 countries, that still do not require any disclosure in the 
annual tax return, 17 are European countries (the other three countries are Chile, the 
Philippines, and Thailand). This shows that while many European countries have 
introduced a statutory documentation requirement, they have not taken the second 
step and added a mandatory disclosure to their regulations. The survey also shows 
that the need to submit documents to the tax authorities is not always connected with 
a statutory documentation requirement in the tax law. Six countries have required or 
still require a disclosure of information although no statutory requirement exists (i.e. 
Australia, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Italy, and Malaysia). In most cases, the disclo-
sure is then based on detailed guidelines by the tax authorities. 
A distinction can also be made with respect to the content of the disclosure. While 
some countries only require a short summary or overview over controlled transac-
tions, other countries require a transfer pricing study. Out of the 24 countries where 
submitting documentation is required, 16 require a short and eight a long content. 
Interestingly, the countries requesting an extensive disclosure are, with the exception 
of Mexico, no OECD member states. The content of disclosure has generally been 
extended over the last decade, i.e. Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Peru have 
switched from a short to a long content. 
From the survey, it becomes evident that a great variety of documentation require-
ments exists. The compliance with those detailed requirements demands a high allo-
cation of resources and effort from multinational companies.  
4.1.5 Submission Deadlines 
Another aspect of transfer pricing regulations are submission deadlines for full do-
cumentation or for transfer pricing disclosure. Full documentation is in most coun-
tries only submitted upon request, but the time period available may vary. For the 
disclosure, it is usually the deadline of the annual tax return, but may in some cases 
also be a separate date. Table A6, therefore, gives an overview of applicable dead-
lines for full documentation and disclosure. It shows that great differences exist in 
the amount of days that taxpayers are granted to submit the required documentation. 
The countries requiring an extensive disclosure generally grant a longer period of 
time for the submission of the tax return, i.e. between four months from tax year end 
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in Indonesia and twelve months from tax return submission in Ecuador, resulting in 
an average of 7.6 months. In contrast, the countries requiring a short disclosure only 
allow for a shorter period of time, i.e. between two months from the tax year end in 
Japan and seven months from the tax year end in Malaysia and Italy, the average 
being 4.7 months, which shows that the disclosure dates of the transfer pricing return 
generally reflect the required content. 
The deadlines for the full documentation can be compared for the countries not re-
quiring a disclosure and those requiring a short disclosure. Overall, the deadlines are 
between three days in Hungary and three months in Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Slovenia. Where a short disclosure is required, the deadlines for the full documenta-
tion are slightly longer (average 43.1 days) than in the countries without any disclo-
sure (average 35.9 days). A possible explanation could be the fact that the tax author-
ities in the latter case do not have any information on the transfer pricing policy, 
therefore they require the necessary information in a shorter period of time. A geo-
graphical or OECD membership correlation does not exist with regard to the dead-
lines, instead the strictest and the most generous countries are both members of the 
OECD.  
4.1.6 Penalties 
In order to enforce the correct handling of tax regulations, many countries impose 
penalties. Besides penalties on the wrong determination of taxable income, regula-
tions may also include penalties on wrong or incomplete documentation. The OECD 
acknowledges the use of penalties in order to ensure compliance, but emphasizes the 
need for a fair and not too burdensome regime. It is argued that a penalty regime that 
is too hard on the taxpayers may distort the determination of taxable income between 
two jurisdictions (OECD (2010b), para. 4.25). Therefore, the OECD member states 
have agreed not to impose substantial penalties on taxpayers who have acted in good 
faith (OECD (2010b), para. 4.28). Most countries apply general tax penalties to 
transfer pricing cases, but some countries have introduced special transfer pricing 
penalties, especially with respect to documentation. 
As can be seen in Table A7, information on transfer pricing penalties is exceptionally 
difficult to gather as several available sources state conflicting information. There-
fore, the table does not provide a comprehensive list, but rather indicates the penal-
ties that could be identified for a given country in a given year. There may be addi-
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tional penalties not listed in the table and penalties may be applicable for a longer 
period of time. 
The first aspect considered in this overview is whether special transfer pricing penal-
ties exist or if the general tax penalties are applicable for transfer pricing matters. It 
can be found that the great majority of countries (32 out of 44 countries) do not im-
pose special transfer pricing penalties. Out of the remaining twelve countries, eight 
countries have introduced special transfer pricing penalties in the considered time 
period. The introduction of transfer pricing penalties is in most cases connected with 
the introduction of statutory documentation requirements (e.g. in China, Ecuador, 
Germany, India, Romania, and in Spain). It is, therefore, not surprising that the spe-
cial penalties typically refer to the transfer pricing documentation requirements, 
while penalties on transfer pricing adjustments are usually the same as for other tax-
able income adjustments. 
Penalties on Transfer Pricing Adjustments 
The penalties on adjustments of transfer prices follow a similar pattern but lie in a 
broad range regarding their severity. In most cases, the penalties on a transfer pricing 
adjustment are expressed as a percentage of unpaid tax or of the transfer pricing ad-
justment itself. About half of the countries apply a percentage of less than 100% of 
additional tax with Austria (2%), Denmark (surcharge of about 6%), and Vietnam 
(10%) being the countries with the lowest rates. The other half imposes penalties of 
at least 100%, Argentina of even 400%. Five countries (Canada, Finland, Greece, 
Poland, and Spain) use the transfer pricing adjustment as the base of the penalty, 
thereby applying a special tax rate on the additional income. The rates range from 
10% in Canada and Greece to 50% in Poland. In many countries, a higher percentage 
applies to cases where transfer prices were fraudulently manipulated. Some countries 
even limit the imposition of penalties to cases of fraud (e.g. Russia or Switzerland). 
The applicable percentages are at least doubled, ranging between 20% in Russia and 
1,000% in Argentina. However, it has to be mentioned that many countries allow for 
a reduction in penalties on the adjustment if sufficient documentation exists. The 
reduction usually depends on the quality of the documentation and is therefore diffi-
cult to quantify (for that reason, it is not included in Table A5). Overall, no trend as 
to the application of stricter or milder penalties over time can be observed, while 
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some countries increase the percentages (Argentina), others decrease them (Malay-
sia, Mexico, and Vietnam).  
Another aspect of penalties on transfer pricing adjustments is interest on the late 
payment of taxes. It is imposed in almost all countries. While some countries only 
apply a federal or market rate in order to account for the time value of the payments, 
others impose interest rates that include a penalty component. In particular this 
means that interest rates may be as high as 3% per month or 0.1% per day which 
amounts to approximately 36% per year (Argentina and Vietnam). 
Penalties on Documentation 
Penalties on documentation also vary significantly. For 14 out of the 44 considered 
countries, it is known that no documentation penalties exist (e.g. Australia, Japan, 
and the United States). But many countries impose penalties on wrong, late or miss-
ing documentation. The penalties either amount to a fixed monetary amount, to a 
percentage of unpaid tax or to another specific factor as defined in the national tax 
code. 16 countries impose a fixed fine which lies between RON 14,000 (~USD 
3,900) in Romania and ARS 450,000 (~USD 150,000) in Argentina. The Latin 
American countries tend to express monetary fines in tax units (e.g. Peru, up to 30TU 
with 1TU=~USD 1,000). The value of a tax unit is defined in the tax law and is ad-
justed according to inflation.  
Eight countries (e.g. Belgium, Brazil, and the United Kingdom) impose a penalty on 
the transfer pricing adjustment only if no documentation exists. The percentage 
ranges between 45% in Malaysia and 225% in Brazil. The distinction between do-
cumentation and adjustment penalties is rather difficult in this case, but generally, 
adjustment penalties are also applicable if full documentation exists. There may be a 
reduction regarding the quality of the provided information, but it is not only im-
posed if no documentation exists. 
Some countries define other specific measurements for documentation penalties, for 
example, a percentage of the transaction value for which the information is wrong or 
missing (e.g. Brazil and Colombia). A very interesting approach is chosen by Den-
mark where the penalty amounts to 200% of costs saved by not preparing documen-
tation. It is questionable how saved costs should be calculated and so far - although 
introduced in 2006 - no guidance exists on that behalf. 
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4.1.7 Statute of Limitations  
The statute of limitations defines the time period during which tax authorities can 
undertake reassessments of the tax liability. It is, therefore, also part of transfer pric-
ing regulations as it prescribes how long documentation has to be kept or how long 
changes can be made to transfer prices applied in intercompany transactions. Table 
A8 provides an overview of national regulations on statutes of limitations. It shows 
that most countries (28 out of 44 countries) use the tax year end or the end of the 
year in which the tax return has been filed to determine the beginning of the statute 
of limitations. The remaining countries apply the date of the filing of the return.  
In order to compare the duration of the statute of limitations, it is assumed that the 
end of the filing year is one year after the end of the tax year. The survey then shows 
that the great majority of countries applies a duration of up to five years (34 coun-
tries), the shortest time period being two years (e.g. Colombia, India, France, or Rus-
sia). The longest statutes of limitations are prescribed by Australia (unlimited), the 
Czech Republic, Switzerland (both 15 years), and Austria (10 years). It has to be 
noted that the four countries that have amended their regulations on the statute of 
limitations have reduced the duration (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, and Indo-
nesia). 
13 countries apply a longer duration of the statute of limitations for cases of fraud. 
The interval is usually at least doubled, with four countries even applying an unli-
mited time period (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Ukraine, and the United States). The 
Netherlands are the only country which prescribes a specified statute of limitations 
for foreign income (i.e. 12 years, compared to 5 years for other income). 
4.1.8 Advance Pricing Agreements 
In the course of the application of transfer pricing regulations, disputes may arise 
between taxpayers and tax authorities. Besides the instruments outlined in Chapter 3 
to solve such transfer pricing disputes, i.e. the corresponding adjustment provided for 
in Article 9 para. 3 OECD Model and the  mutual agreement procedure (Article 25 
OECD Model), taxpayers may also have the possibility to enter into an advance pric-
ing agreement. In an advance pricing arrangement (APA), a set of characteristics for 
controlled transactions is determined in advance and for a fixed period of time. Some 
countries offer unilateral APAs that are concluded between the taxpayer and the tax 
administration in the same jurisdiction and do not take other parties into account. But 
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since unilateral APAs also affect the tax liability of the related party, there may still 
be a need for an agreement procedure. Therefore, bilateral or multilateral APAs are 
more favorable (OECD (2010b), para. 4.147). In those cases, taxpayers of at least 
two jurisdictions negotiate with the responsible tax administrations and identify a 
transfer pricing strategy that is more equitable to all participants in the agreement. 
Such arrangements reduce the risk of double taxation and lead to a greater certainty 
in international trade, which is supported by the result of a survey conducted by Ernst 
& Young, where 90% of multinationals that have entered into advance pricing 
agreements indicated that they would use them again (Ernst & Young (2010)). 
Some countries offer sophisticated procedures for the set-up of an APA, others do 
not allow for binding agreements between the tax administration and the taxpayer. In 
such cases, an APA can only be concluded between tax authorities through a mutual 
agreement procedure on a case-by-case basis.  
Figure 6: Advance Pricing Agreements 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Figure 6 (based on Table A9) shows that APAs are common in the considered coun-
tries. Only ten countries do still not allow for such agreements. Unilateral agreements 
are generally easier to administer as they only consider one country and can be dealt 
with in an existing rulings process. Bilateral agreements, on the other hand, require 
an extensive procedure that has to be set up in most tax administrations. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that most countries start with the availability of unilateral agree-
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ments and later extend the procedure to bilateral agreements. By the end of the con-
sidered time period, more countries offer uni- and bilateral agreements than only 
unilateral agreements.  
Where advance pricing agreements were introduced for the first time in the consi-
dered time period, three countries have introduced the possibility for unilateral 
agreements (i.e. Czech Republic, Ecuador, and Peru), while six countries have intro-
duced an agreements procedure offering uni- and bilateral agreements (i.e. Hungary, 
Malaysia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Venezuela). For most of those countries, 
the introduction took place after transfer pricing regulations and documentation re-
quirements were in place. An exception is Malaysia, where no transfer pricing rules 
exist and Venezuela where all aspects were introduced at once. Besides Malaysia, 
there are only few countries where the possibility for a bilateral agreement existed 
before transfer pricing rules were introduced (i.e. China, the Netherlands, and Thail-
and). Another seven countries have extended the scope of their agreements procedure 
to uni- and bilateral agreements. As an exception, Germany only allows for bilateral 
agreements.  
Surprisingly, there are still a number of countries that have comprehensive transfer 
pricing regulations in place, but do not offer the possibility to enter into an advance 
pricing agreement. Those countries are Argentina, Greece, India, Indonesia, Norway, 
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden.  
Nevertheless, the overview shows that countries are increasingly offering advance 
pricing agreements. This may be an answer to the need of multinational companies to 
reduce their risk in transfer pricing matters as awareness is rising. But it can also be 
argued that the introduction of APAs functions as a tax incentive, giving the tax au-
thorities a possibility to agree on rather flexible terms and thereby attracting invest-
ment (Calderón (2005), Kamphuis/Oosterhoff (2003)). 
4.1.9 Categorization of Transfer Pricing Regulations  
The previous sections provide a comprehensive overview of different aspects of 
transfer pricing regulations. As the scope of regulations was continuously extended, 
it becomes obvious that transfer pricing is increasingly important, to governments 
and to multinational corporations. A survey conducted by Ernst & Young in 2010, in 
which multinationals across 25 countries were interviewed on their perception on 
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transfer pricing, underlines this result. About 75% of the respondents stated that 
transfer pricing will be “absolutely critical” or “very important” in the following two 
years (Ernst & Young (2010), p. 3, 7). 
This section, thus, aims at providing a measure for the strictness of transfer pricing 
regulations. As a first step, it is crucial to define strictness. On the one hand, the de-
sign and scope of implemented rules have to be taken into account. The applicability 
to a broader range of taxpayers, the availability of stricter methods, the requirement 
of an extensive documentation in a rather short period of time and high material pe-
nalties are elements of a strict regulation. But on the other hand, also the enforcement 
and awareness of such rules has to be considered. As one element of enforcement, it 
is considered whether or not regulations are introduced in national tax law since sta-
tutory rules generally have a wider range and importance than guidelines published 
by the tax authorities. Concerning available methods, the survey revealed that, on the 
one hand, most countries refer to the methods laid out in the OECD Guidelines and, 
thus, almost no variation exists. On the other hand, the strictness of one method, i.e. 
the leeway it offers in setting a transfer price, depends on the circumstances and de-
tails of the transaction. Therefore, it is not possible to rank methods according to 
their generosity. Furthermore, the survey shows that especially the introduction of 
documentation requirements into national tax law plays an important role for the 
awareness of the issue in a given jurisdiction. However, there may also be exceptions 
where the administrative procedures are very sophisticated and based purely on 
guidelines. To bring these aspects together, the need for disclosure is defined as a 
valid measure for the enforcement of documentation requirements and, in turn, trans-
fer pricing regulations in general, because it stands for a requirement of documenta-
tion connected with a definite annual deadline for submission. It thereby encourages 
taxpayers to comply with transfer pricing regulations. 
Based on this reasoning, six categories are defined in order to evaluate the strictness 
of transfer pricing regulations in a given country. The categories are depicted in Ta-
ble 7. 
Table 7: Categories of Transfer Pricing Regulations 
Category Description 
Category 0 No general anti-avoidance rule/no transfer pricing regulations or 
documentation requirements exist 
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Category 1 Arm‟s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or gener-
al anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, but no docu-
mentation requirement 
Category 2 Arm‟s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or gener-
al anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, documentation 
requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but required to 
exist in practice (audit) 
Category 3 Arm‟s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or gener-
al anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, documenta-
tion requirement is introduced in national tax law, but full docu-
mentation must only be available upon request 
Category 4 Arm‟s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or gener-
al anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, (documentation 
requirement is introduced in national tax law), a short disclosure of 
documentation is required 
Category 5 Arm‟s length principle (through transfer pricing regulations or gener-
al anti-avoidance rule) introduced in national tax law, (documentation 
requirement is introduced in national tax law), a long disclosure of 
documentation is required 
Source: own composition. 
The categories defined in Table 7 account for the existence of transfer pricing regula-
tions, the introduction of documentation requirements into the national tax law as 
well as the required disclosure. As mentioned in Chapter 4.1.4, the content of the 
required documentation is extremely difficult to identify, therefore it is not consi-
dered.  
Other elements of transfer pricing regulations that could also be used for this meas-
ure are the definition of related parties, the deadlines for documentation, the statute 
of limitations, and penalties. Clearly, the lower the applicable threshold, the shorter 
the deadlines, the longer the statute of limitations, and the higher the penalties, the 
stricter are the regulations. But as the weight of each single element is very difficult 
to assess, it is assumed that they should not be accounted for by additional catego-
ries. Much rather, they could be used as separate variables. 
For the countries considered in this study, the distribution over the categories is giv-
en in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Allocation of Transfer Pricing Categories
119
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Brazil 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Canada 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Colombia 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 
Mexico 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Peru n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 5 5 5 5 
United 
States 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Venezuela 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
China 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
India 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Indonesia 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Japan 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Malaysia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Philip-
pines 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 
Thailand 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Vietnam 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
EUROPE 
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Czech 
Republic 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Denmark 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Finland n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 
Hungary 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Luxem-
bourg 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 2 
Nether-
lands 
1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Norway n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 4 4 
Poland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Portugal 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Romania n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Russia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Slovak 
Republic 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 3 
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 4 4 
Spain 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
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 There are few countries where a disclosure of documentation is necessary, but no statutory docu-
mentation requirement exists (e.g. Australia and Brazil). The documentation is then based on compre-
hensive guidelines. The disclosure is assumed to outweigh the missing statutory regulation and such 
countries are chosen to fall under Category 4 or 5. 
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Switzer-
land 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Source: own illustration. 
The categorization in Table 8 shows that 26 out of the 44 considered countries did 
not change the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. They are allocated to the 
same category over the considered time period. For 13 out of the 26 countries this is 
due to the fact, that they were already allocated to categories 4 or 5 in 2001 (e.g. Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Canada, India, or the United States). However, 18 countries changed 
transfer pricing regulations and, in all cases, increased their strictness. Most countries 
increased the strictness with regard to 1 or 2 category steps, by introducing documen-
tation or disclosure requirements (e.g. China, Germany, Spain, or Sweden). But few 
countries (i.e. Ecuador, Indonesia, and the Netherlands) show a more significant in-
crease. Ecuador, for instance, has not applied any anti-avoidance rule until it intro-
duced comprehensive transfer pricing rules in 2005. Therefore, it increases from Cat-
egory 0 to Category 5 over the considered time period.  
When comparing the categories for each country in the first year that information is 
available and in the last year (2009), the distribution displayed in Figure 7  is found. 
Figure 7: Development of Transfer Pricing Categories over Time 
 
Source: own illustration.  
Considering the development over time, Figure 7 also shows that transfer pricing 
regulations became stricter. While in the first year of available information, 28 coun-
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tries were attributed to categories 0, 1, and 2, in the last year, it was only 12 coun-
tries. The greatest decrease over time was recognized by category 2, while category 3 
denotes the highest increase. This means that many countries introduced a statutory 
documentation requirement. 
The same diagram can be plotted for geographical areas (due to the different size of 
the areas, numbers are expressed in percent). Figure 8 displays the results for North 
and South America, Asia, and Australia, Figure 9 the results for Europe. 
Figure 8: Transfer Pricing Categories in North and South America, Asia, and Aus-
tralia 
 
Source: own illustration. 
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Figure 9: Transfer Pricing Categories in Europe 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show again that the development in North America, South 
America, Asia, and Australia is different from the development in Europe. In the first 
group of countries, more than 80% of countries require disclosure of documentation, 
while in Europe it is only 32%. The increase of Category 3 can only be accounted to 
European countries since in American and Asian countries, a statutory requirement is 
in all cases connected with a disclosure. The findings are generally in line with the 
results found in the survey conducted by Ernst & Young where multinationals from 
the United States, Mexico, India, and Argentina stated that they spend a lot of re-
sources on preparing documentation (Ernst & Young (2010), p. 4). 
4.2 Thin/Fat Capitalization Rules 
As previously outlined, thin capitalization rules are unilateral measures that are im-
plemented to prevent excessive debt financing. The following sections will discuss 
the design of such rules in 53 countries worldwide and over a time period of ten 
years (1999-2008). 
4.2.1 Existence and Applicability 
The regulations for the avoidance of excessive debt financing can be distinguished 
into thin and fat capitalization rules. While thin capitalization rules usually aim at 
preventing disproportionate debt financing between related entities, fat capitalization 
rules apply to debt financing between all entities, related and unrelated.  
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Figure 10 provides an overview of the different types of rules implemented in the 
surveyed countries. 16 out of 53 countries still do not apply any thin or fat capitaliza-
tion rules. Developed, OECD member states like Finland, Norway, or Sweden are 
among those countries as well as developing countries. However, the majority of 
countries have regulations in place. 21 countries have introduced thin/fat capitaliza-
tion rules before 1999, only two of which applied fat capitalization rules. But Figure 
10 also shows that over the past decade, several countries have switched from thin to 
fat capitalization (i.e. Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, and Italy) or have intro-
duced fat capitalization rules (i.e. Chile, Latvia, Mexico, and Romania). Only 
Ukraine has switched from fat to thin capitalization rules. 
Figure 10: Introduction of Thin/Fat Capitalization Rules 
 
Source: own illustration. 
The Slovak Republic is not displayed in the Figure as it was the only country that, in 
2004, abolished thin capitalization rules. This abolishment has been an exception to 
the trend of introducing or tightening thin/fat capitalization rules.  
Table A10 in the appendix also shows that several European countries adjusted their 
thin capitalization rules during the considered time period. This is due to a decision 
by the ECJ in the German Lankhorst-Hohorst case (C-324/00 of 12 December 2002) 
in which it was decided that if under thin capitalization rules foreign related entities 
are treated differently from domestic related entities, it constitutes an unjustifiable 
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violation of the freedom of establishment (Cordewener (2003), Körner (2003)).
120
 
This decision had an effect not only on German thin capitalization rules, but also on 
several other European jurisdictions (Kessler/Obser (2004)). In the following years, 
such jurisdictions, therefore, amended their regulations. Where thin capitalization 
rules were applicable only to foreign related entities, there were two options for 
amendment in line with EU law: either the regulations could be extended to all re-
lated entities, domestic and foreign, or they could be narrowed only to non-EU for-
eign related entities. Four out of the eight countries where an amendment was re-
quired extended the scope to all related entities (i.e. Czech Republic, Denmark, Ger-
many, and Poland) and four countries reduced the scope to only non-EU foreign re-
lated entities (i.e. France, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain).  
Overall, it can be concluded that thin capitalization rules are a very common anti-
avoidance measure employed in the wide majority of countries. Over the past dec-
ade, a slight trend towards fat capitalization rules, and accordingly an increase in 
strictness, can, however, be observed. 
4.2.2 Determination of Deductible Interest  
Both, thin and fat capitalization rules, base on a distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable debt financing. In order to determine the extent of debt financing that is 
considered acceptable, different approaches exist. A very common approach is the 
use of a debt-to-equity ratio up to which interest is fully deductible. Such a ratio is 
also called a safe haven. The calculation of the debt-to-equity may differ between 
jurisdictions, especially regarding the use of all debt or only of debt to related entities 
in the ratio. An alternative approach is to use an income parameter to calculate de-
ductible interest. This may be a certain percentage of total income or of earnings be-
fore interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Furthermore, the ac-
ceptable amount of debt financing can also be calculated applying a certain percen-
tage on certain groups of assets that may not be exceeded. Finally, some countries 
also allow for an absolute amount of interest deduction which is usually applied in 
addition to one of the other approaches. Figure 11 provides an overview of the ap-
proaches used in the considered countries over the years 1999 to 2008.  
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Figure 11: Determination of Deductible Interest 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Out of the 37 countries applying thin/fat capitalization rules, 32 countries applied a 
safe haven approach and eight countries an income related measure at some point in 
the considered time period. Countries that are displayed in more than one category 
either apply a combination of approaches or they have switched regulations over 
time (i.e. Argentina, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Romania, and the United 
States). A combination of approaches is applied by Argentina, Bulgaria, and Roma-
nia which use a debt-to-equity ratio as a first test. If that is not met an income related 
measure is applied (Argentina and Romania have both abolished the income related 
measures and switched to only a safe haven approach in 2004 and 2005 respective-
ly). France, on the other hand, has introduced a combined approach in 2007 and add-
ed an income-related measure to the debt-to-equity ratio. Germany and Italy, in con-
trast, have both fully abolished the safe haven approach and introduced an income 
related measure in 2008 (30% of EBITDA in both cases). The United States have 
always applied two different measures. Under thin capitalization rules, the excessive 
usage of debt financing is limited, but no guideline is provided as to how to deter-
mine excessive debt financing. In practice, it is, however, assumed that a 3:1 debt-to-
equity ratio is sufficient. In addition, under earnings stripping rules interest to foreign 
related entities is limited to a stricter debt-to-equity ratio (1,5:1) and to 50% of ad-
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justable taxable income. The absolute amount used by Denmark, Germany, and Italy 
applies in addition to another approach, it, thus, serves as a tax threshold. 
Switzerland is the only country that applies an asset ratio to determine acceptable 
debt financing. It is, thus, not included in the Figure. Moreover, Austria, Ireland, and 
Turkey apply only rather general guidelines and do not provide for levels of accepta-
ble debt or interest. 
Regarding the safe haven approach, the applicable debt-to-equity ratio differs be-
tween the respective jurisdictions. Many countries have also changed the ratio over 
the considered time period. Figure 12, therefore, shows the debt-to-equity ratios im-
plemented in the domestic tax law of the surveyed countries. 
Figure 12: Safe Haven Approach 
 
Source: own illustration. 
The Figure shows that the great majority of countries apply a 3:1 or stricter debt-to-
equity ratio. Again several countries (i.e. nine countries) are allocated to more than 
one safe haven category because they changed it over time or because they apply 
different ratios for different transactions. Out of the ten times that the debt-to-equity 
ratio was adjusted in the surveyed countries and time period, six times it was tigh-
tened (i.e. Argentina, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia) and four 
times it was loosened (i.e. Bulgaria (2x), Australia, and Romania). A split debt-to-
equity ratio is used by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Until the end of 2007, the 
Czech Republic applied a 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio which in 2008 changed to a 2:1 
ratio for debt from related entities and to 6:1 for debt from unrelated entities. A simi-
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lar approach is used by Slovakia where a 4:1 ratio applies to related parties while a 
35:1 ratio applies to all other debt. 
The explanations show that it is most common to implement a safe haven approach 
to determine deductible interest payments. Where the regulations were changed over 
the considered time period no general trend towards a specific approach can be 
found. Two developed, European countries, Italy and Germany, have, in 2008, 
switched from a safe haven approach to an income-related measure. In Germany, the 
new approach has been heavily criticized by practitioners as well as academics. Not 
only is it questionable whether the regulations are compatible with European tax law 
and constitutional law (Führich (2007), Lenz/Dörfler (2010), Prinz (2012)), but espe-
cially during the financial crisis, the limitations on the deductibility of interest pay-
ments also imposed a great strain on debt financed companies (Spengel/Zinn (2011). 
The latter aspect led to significant relaxations of the regulations in 2010 (Stad-
ler/Bindl (2010)). However, several countries have discussed introducing similar 
rules (see e.g. van den Berg van Saparoea (2009)) and it remains to be seen, whether 
a trend towards income measures evolves.  
Regarding the applicable debt-to-equity ratio, only slightly more countries have tigh-
tened the ratio than have loosened it. Also, no regional trend for the application of 
certain approaches can be found, much rather the different approaches are distributed 
equally across regions. 
4.2.3 Tax Consequences of Thin/Fat Capitalization Rules 
If the previously outlined rules come to the result that debt financing is excessive and 
that interest payments should not be deductible, it is questionable, how such interest 
payments are treated for tax purposes. Generally, two different concepts can be dis-
tinguished. Firstly, the excessive interest may be treated as non-deductible business 
expenses or, secondly, it may be reclassified as dividends
121
. Both concepts lead to 
an increase of taxable income for the borrower. Under the first approach, several 
jurisdictions provide for a possibility to carry forward the excessive payments. In 
subsequent years, the interest is, thus, deductible if debt financing is no longer exces-
sive and allows for an additional deduction. If the recipient of non-deductible interest 
payments is located in the same jurisdiction, double taxation can be prevented by 
allowing for a corresponding reduction of received interest. Regarding a foreign re-
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cipient of the interest payments, withholding taxes on interest will only be levied on 
the deductible amount. For the treatment of non-deductible interest at the level of the 
recipient, two cases have to be distinguished. If no tax treaty exists, the full payments 
are treated as interest at the level of the recipient and double taxation results. If a tax 
treaty exists, Article 11 OECD Model applies and allocates the taxing rights of inter-
est to the recipient, which can also possibly result in international double taxation. 
However, if Article 9 OECD Model includes a provision on corresponding adjust-
ments as outlined in para. 2, this can be applicable to the non-deductible amount of 
interest. The Contracting State is, thus, obliged to adjust the received interest. 
Under the second approach, if the recipient of reclassified interest payments is lo-
cated in the same jurisdiction, the payments will also be treated as dividends and 
taxed accordingly. However, if the recipient is located in a different jurisdiction, the 
tax treatment of the payments is more difficult. Regarding the source taxation of the 
payments, the withholding tax rate on dividends will be applied, according to domes-
tic law or a double tax treaty. Where payments are between subsidiaries and parent 
companies within the European Union, it is questionable whether the Parent-
Subsidiary-Directive, which exempts cross-border dividends from withholding tax, is 
applicable. An answer is provided by the Advocate General in the Lankhorst-
Hohorst case (C-324/00 of 12 December 2002) who pointed out that the Directive is 
valid in this case since the characteristics of a withholding tax as defined in the Di-
rective are satisfied.  
Nevertheless, for the treatment of the payments in the country of the recipient, sever-
al possible options exist. Regarding EU cases, the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive does 
not include a provision for the requalification of interest. It can, thus, not be assumed 
that countries will apply the Directive to such cases (Brosens (2004), p. 204). Where 
no tax treaty between the two concerned countries exists, the received payments will 
be treated as interest and will be fully included in domestic taxable income. Further-
more, the country of the recipient will apply the unilateral relief for double taxation 
by most likely crediting withholding tax on interest, not on dividends. If, on the other 
hand, a double tax treaty exists, a provision on the reclassification of interest into 
dividends under thin capitalization rules may be implemented. The OECD has in 
1992 included a paragraph in the Commentary on Article 23 OECD Model which 
allows for a reclassification under certain conditions. Mainly, the OECD Model re-
quires that the lender in fact assumes the risks taken by the borrower, i.e. the loan has 
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to show some characteristics of equity capital. If that is the case, the payments may 
be recharacterized and both Contracting States apply the dividend article.  
Zielke (2010) provides an overview of the treatment of non-deductible interest or of 
interest requalified as dividends by all OECD member states. In this context, he ana-
lyzed 870 relations between OECD member countries and finds that in exactly half 
the cases, double taxation will not be prevented because the country of the recipient 
will not provide for a corresponding adjustment or treatment of the excessive interest 
payments. Regarding this impressive number of cases where double taxation pre-
vails, it has to be considered that it may reduce the attractiveness of a country for 
inward investment (Hinny (2008), p. 27). It is, thus, crucial to guarantee a corres-
ponding treatment of interest payments. 
Figure 13 provides an overview of the tax treatment of excessive interest payments in 
the surveyed countries. Again, the Figure displays the tax treatment applicable in the 
considered time period, i.e. where the tax treatment was changed, countries are allo-
cated to both alternatives (that is the case for four countries: Argentina, France, Ger-
many, and Italy). While Germany and Italy switched from a reclassification of inter-
est as dividends, to non-deductible business expenses including a carry forward, Ar-
gentina conducted the opposite change. France, in turn, only introduced a carry for-
ward of excessive interest payments. The USA are also assigned to two categories 
because of the two different sets of rules they apply. For six countries (i.e. Japan, 
Austria, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), the information on the tax treat-
ment could not be observed, therefore, they cannot be found in the Figure. 
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Figure 13: Tax Treatment of Non-Deductible Interest 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Fifteen countries reclassify interest as dividends, irrespective of the difficulties con-
nected with this approach. Twenty countries treat interest as a non-deductible busi-
ness expense, nine of which allow for a carry forward of excessive interest payments. 
Again, the different concepts are spread equally across regions and across developed 
and developing countries. Also, when looking at the changes made, no trend towards 
a certain concept can be observed. 
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5 Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Anti-Avoidance Measures on Profit 
Shifting 
The previous chapter has outlined transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization 
rules in more detail over several years for 44 and 53 countries respectively. Moreo-
ver, an index for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations was introduced. This 
information constitutes the basis of the following two studies which examine the 
impact of both anti-avoidance measures on profit shifting in multinational compa-
nies.  
5.1 The Impact of Transfer Pricing Regulations on Profit Shifting within 
European Multinationals
122
 
5.1.1 Scope of the Study 
As outlined in the previous chapters, profit shifting strategies significantly reduce 
corporate tax revenues in high-tax countries. Huizinga/Laeven (2008) estimate that in 
1999 the corporate tax base of Germany, which was the country with the highest cor-
porate tax rate in Europe at that time, would have been by 14% larger in the absence 
of tax rate differentials between European countries. 
Especially in Europe, this and related evidence on tax competition behavior in the 
setting of corporate tax rates has fueled debates about an international coordination 
of company taxation. In addition, several countries have introduced anti-profit shift-
ing legislations on a unilateral basis which are designed to reduce the incentive for 
income relocations from their borders. In order to restrict profit outflow through 
transfer price distortions, a rising number of countries implemented transfer pricing 
regulations during the last decade, which require multinational enterprises (MNEs) to 
document their intra-firm transfer prices for tax purposes. The strictness of these reg-
ulations varies across countries, ranging from a mere acknowledgement that price 
setting must adhere to the arm's length principle (i.e. intra-firm prices must corres-
pond to prices that would have been set between third parties) up to strict legal re-
quirements for transfer price documentation that have to be submitted with the tax 
return on an obligatory basis. A major shortcoming of the stricter versions of transfer 
pricing rules is that they imply considerable administrative costs for both, firms and 
tax authorities. Whether their use is beneficial from a social perspective thus largely 
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depends on whether they are indeed instrumental in dampening earnings stripping 
from high-tax countries. 
In the course of this project, detailed information on the transfer pricing requirements 
in 26 European countries over the past decade was collected.
123
 This data was then 
merged with information on corporate tax rates and rich accounting and ownership 
data on European MNEs between 1999 and 2009. 
In a first step, this data is exploited to replicate existing evidence on multinational 
profit shifting behavior. Precisely, previous studies are followed and the impact of 
corporate tax rate changes on the reported profitability of multinational affiliates is 
determined using panel data estimations that control for unobserved affiliate hetero-
geneity and for time-varying firm, industry and host-country characteristics.  
Using these estimates as a starting point, the relation between tax-motivated income 
relocations and the implementation of transfer pricing legislations is, in a second 
step, assessed. For this purpose, three transfer pricing categories are defined that re-
flect the existence and strictness of a country's transfer pricing legislations: the first 
category comprises countries without transfer pricing legislations or with very gener-
al anti-avoidance rules only; the second category comprises countries in which trans-
fer pricing regulations do exist in practice and where tax authorities may require 
some form of transfer price documentation while the transfer price legislations are 
not implemented in national tax law; the third category comprises countries in which 
documentation requirements are introduced into national tax law and imply that firms 
must disclose their transfer pricing choices to the tax authorities upon request or di-
rectly with the annual tax return.
124
 
The results are robust against a number of robustness checks. Not only alternative 
measures of profitability are used as the dependent variable, but also different meas-
ures for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. Also another transfer pricing 
aspect is assed to the estimations, which is the possibility to enter into advance pric-
ing agreements (APA). It is assumed that such procedures can proxy for a good or-
ganizational structure of the tax administration.  
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 See Chapter 4.1. 
124
 These categories are based on the categorization laid out in Chapter 4.1.9. 
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Finally, an alternative tax measure is employed, i.e. a tax differential measuring the 
difference between the firm's host country's corporate tax rate and an unweighted 
average tax rate of the entire corporate group.  
5.1.2 Literature Overview 
This study contributes to several strands of the recent public finance literature. First, 
it adds to the large and growing literature on international profit shifting (see e.g. 
Hines (1999) and Devereux/Maffini (2007) for surveys on the existing literature) 
which provides compelling evidence that multinational entities strategically relocate 
income from high-tax to low-tax countries. To do so, they pursue different strategies, 
the most important ones being distortions of intra-firm transfer prices and the MNE's 
debt-equity structure.
125
 Recent empirical papers suggest that it is especially transfer 
price distortions which are quantitatively important instruments to transfer income to 
low-tax economies (see e.g. Clausing (2003) and Buettner/Wamser (2012)). 
Similar to the approach used in this study, most papers provide indirect evidence on 
multinational shifting behavior by establishing a significantly negative effect of the 
affiliates' host country tax on the reported pre-tax profitability of firms (see e.g. Gru-
bert/Mutti (1991), Hines/Rice (1994), Huizinga/Laeven (2008), and Weichenrieder 
(2009)). Some studies, moreover, assess the importance of individual income shifting 
channels. Clausing (2003) provides evidence in favor of tax-motivated transfer price 
distortions using data on intra-firm trade prices of US multinationals (see also Swen-
son (2001) and Bartelsman/Beetsma (2003) on related studies). Several papers, fur-
thermore, show that intangible assets play an important role in profit shifting strate-
gies as for them arm's length prices from third-party trade are hardly available due to 
their firm-specific nature (see e.g. Grubert (1998), Grubert (2003), and Disching-
er/Riedel (2011)). Huizinga/Laeven/Nicodeme (2008), Altshuler/Grubert (2003), and 
Buettner/Wamser (2012), moreover, determine the effect of corporate taxation on the 
multinational's debt-equity structure providing evidence in favor of tax-motivated 
debt shifting. The evolution of profit shifting behavior over time has, in turn, re-
ceived less attention. The only study found which tackles that issue is Altshu-
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 Debt shifting strategies imply that affiliates in low-tax countries provide loans to high-tax entities 
within the multinational group. The associated interest payment is deductible from the corporate tax 
base at the high-tax entity and accrues with the low-tax affiliate. Transfer pricing strategies, in turn, 
involve a distortion of the transfer price from its true value, i.e. the underpricing (overpricing) of 
goods traded from high-tax to low-tax entities (from low-tax to high-tax entities). Buettner/Wamser 
(2007) find evidence for significant debt shifting activities which are quantitatively small in size 
though. 
5 Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Anti-Avoidance Measures on Profit Shifting 
120 
 
ler/Grubert/Newlon (2001) who show that between 1984 and 1992 US multinationals 
have increased their outward profit shifting.  
While profit shifting strategies are in general well-documented, the literature is large-
ly silent on the effectiveness of legislations which aim to restrict international in-
come shifting to low-tax countries. Exceptions are Buettner/Overesch/Schreiber/ 
Wamser (2012) and Ruf/Weichenrieder (2012). Buettner/Overesch/Schreiber/ 
Wamser (2012) provide evidence that thin capitalization rules which restrict the de-
ductibility of interest payments (for intra-firm debt) from the corporate tax base in-
deed dampen multinational debt shifting behavior. Similarly, Ruf/Weichenrieder 
(2012) report evidence that controlled foreign company (CFC)-regulations are effec-
tive in reducing the attractiveness of passive investment in low-tax jurisdictions. This 
study complements these studies by showing that transfer pricing legislations equally 
hamper the relocation of multinational income towards low-tax countries. 
5.1.3 A Simple Theoretical Model 
Consider a representative multinational group with two affiliates in countries A and 
B. Both firms produce an output 𝑠𝑖  with 𝑖 ∈   𝐴, 𝐵 . For simplicity reasons, the price 
for the final output good is normalized to 1. Moreover, it is presumed that affiliate A 
produces an input good that is required for production by both affiliates and is sold to 
affiliate B. The true price for this input good is 𝑞 . Following previous papers, it is 
assumed that the true transfer price is unobservable to the tax authorities and the 
MNE can thus choose a transfer price which deviates from the true price. 
Distorting the transfer price from its true price is, however, not costless. Following 
Haufler/Schjelderup (2000), it is assumed that the MNE accrues positive costs de-
noted by 𝐶 if the transfer price is deviated from 𝑞 , whereas the costs convexly in-
crease in the absolute deviation. This may either reflect that the probability for the 
tax authorities to detect price distortions convexly increases in the deviation from the 
true price. Alternatively, the MNE may incur convex concealment costs as it may 
find it increasingly difficult to cover transfer pricing activities from the tax authori-
ties the further the price is deviated from its true price. Plausibly, transfer pricing 
costs are, moreover, determined by the country's level of transfer price documenta-
tion requirements. If tax authorities, for example, require firms to document and jus-
tify transfer prices in their common tax returns, the firm's ability to deviate the trans-
fer price from the true price is presumed to be significantly restricted. Formally, the 
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transfer pricing costs are thus modeled as a u-shaped cost function with a local min-
imum at 𝑞 : 𝐶 = 𝛾 𝐾 𝑞 −  𝑞  , whereas 𝛾 > 0 and 𝐾 𝑞  = 0, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐾′ = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑞 −
𝑞 ), and 𝐾′′ > 0.126 The strictness of the country's transfer pricing requirements are 
reflected by the parameter 𝛾 which increases the absolute and marginal shifting costs 
for all 𝑞.127  
The MNE's after-tax profit reads  
𝜋 =  1 − 𝑡𝐴  𝑠𝐴 − 𝑞 +  1 − 𝑡𝐵  𝑠𝑏 + 𝑞 − 𝐶                               (1) 
The MNE maximizes the after-tax profit in (1) by choosing the optimal transfer price 
𝑞. The first order condition reads 
𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝐵 = 𝛾 𝐾′ 𝑞 − 𝑞                                                      (2) 
The optimal transfer pricing choice thus equates marginal shifting costs (right hand 
side of equation (2)) and marginal benefits from shifting activities (left hand side of 
equation (2)). Thus, if 𝑡𝐴 > 𝑡𝐵, the MNE chooses a transfer price 𝑞 > 𝑞  and thus 
relocates income from country A to country B by overpricing the input good deli-
vered from affiliate A to affiliate B. Analogously, if 𝑡𝐵 > 𝑡𝐴, the MNE chooses a 
transfer price 𝑞 < 𝑞  and thus relocates income from country B to country A by un-
derpricing the input good delivered from affiliate A to affiliate B. 
Comparative statics read 
 
𝜕  𝑞
𝜕   𝑡𝐴−𝑡𝐵 
=
1
𝛾𝐾′′
,    
𝜕  𝑞
𝜕  𝛾
= −
𝐾 ′
𝛾𝐾 ′′
,   
𝜕2𝑞
𝜕 𝑡𝐴−𝑡𝐵 𝜕𝛾
= −
1
𝛾2𝐾′′
. 
Thus, profit shifting incentives imply that the optimal transfer price 𝑞 increases in the 
tax rate differential between countries A and B. Moreover, transfer price distortions 
are reduced if transfer price documentation requirements, as modeled by the parame-
ter 𝛾, rise. For the same reason, the marginal effect of changes in the tax rate differ-
ence on the transfer price choice is dampened with rising documentation require-
ments 𝛾. 
                                                 
126
 It is assumed that the parent is located in a country which fully exempts foreign profits. 
127
 Note that a simple modeling strategy is assumed for the implementation of transfer pricing legisla-
tion into the cost function, which essentially assumes that the regulations increase the firm's detection 
risk and hence proportionally shift up the MNE's cost function. Note that the results are, however, 
robust to more complex formulations of the cost function. 
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The model, thus, predicts that transfer price documentation lowers the MNE's incen-
tive to engage in income shifting behavior and dampens the sensitivity of transfer 
prices (and in consequence reported pre-tax profits) to changes in the corporate tax 
rate. 
5.1.4 Data 
This hypothesis is assessed using firm level data on multinational affiliates in the 
EU. The data is taken from the firm database AMADEUS (version February 2011) 
provided by the Bureau van Dijk. It includes rich information on accounting and fi-
nancial data which comprises balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and several 
financial indicators. Data is available in panel format for the years 1999 to 2009 and 
includes firms in 26 European countries.
128
 The firms included in the analysis belong 
to a multinational group in the sense that either their parent company or one of their 
wholly owned subsidiaries is located in a foreign economy. As Bureau von Dijk 
draws on different sources of information across countries, sample coverage varies 
and, thus, some caution is warranted when drawing conclusions from the results for 
the population of firms. A country distribution of the sample affiliates is presented in 
Table 9. 
Table 9: Country Statistics I 
Country Firm Number 
Austria 300 
Belgium 2,187 
Bulgaria 633 
Croatia 365 
Czech Republic 551 
Denmark 1,771 
Estonia 282 
Finland 544 
France 3,001 
Germany 1,510 
Hungary 34 
Ireland 33 
Italy 2,348 
Latvia 8 
Luxembourg 18 
Netherlands 2,196 
Norway 1,101 
Poland 934 
Portugal 337 
Romania 4,735 
Slovak Republic 78 
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 The countries comprise the EU-27, with the exception of Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, and 
Slovenia, and in addition Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine. 
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Spain 2,803 
Sweden 2,127 
Switzerland 136 
Ukraine 133 
United Kingdom 4,343 
Sum 32,508 
Source: own composition. 
The observational unit in the analysis is the multinational affiliate per year. In total, 
the sample comprises 151,716 observations from 32,508 affiliates for the years 1999 
to 2009. Hence, each affiliate is observed for 4.7 years on average. Besides the rich 
set of accounting information available in AMADEUS, the dataset is enlarged by 
merging information on the country's tax system, i.e. the statutory corporate tax rates 
and information on transfer pricing legislation. The corporate tax information is tak-
en from Ernst & Young's worldwide corporate tax guide, while the information on 
transfer pricing regulations was collected from various sources, mainly transfer pric-
ing guides published by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC.
129
 In the follow-
ing, the development of corporate tax rates and transfer pricing rules in the sample 
countries over time will be briefly sketched and it will be described how this infor-
mation is classified and exploited for the empirical analysis. 
Development of Corporate Income Tax Measures 
In Europe increasing tax competition has led to a race to the bottom of corporate in-
come tax rates. The driving forces behind this downward trend have been extensively 
discussed in the literature. Just recently, Heinemann/Overesch/Rincke (2010) pro-
vided evidence suggesting that the decrease in corporate tax rates in Europe is related 
to international tax competition. They find that high-tax countries experienced pres-
sure to decrease their corporate tax rates which was even larger if low-tax countries 
were geographically close.  
During the considered time period, the average corporate income tax rate fell from 
32.59% to 23.98%. Except for Norway and Hungary, every single country lowered 
its tax rate, Bulgaria and Germany by even more than 20%.  
Figure 14 shows that while maximum tax rates in Europe dropped significantly (from 
52.3% to 34.4%), minimum tax rates were rather stable (10-12.5%). Therefore, the 
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 See Chapter 4.1. 
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spread between the maximum and minimum tax rate has decreased from 42.3% in 
1999 to 24.4% in 2009.
130
 
Figure 14: Development of Corporate Tax Rates between 1999 and 2009 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Besides the corporate tax rate, an alternative tax measure is also employed. A tax 
differential is calculated which measures the difference between the firm's host coun-
try's tax rate and the unweighted average tax rate of the entire corporate group. The 
data shows that the tax differential was rather stable over time, the average always 
being very close to zero. However, whenever the observed firm had a lower tax bur-
den than the average of the corporate group, the absolute value of that tax differential 
increased over time. I.e. while in 1999, the firm's host country's tax rate was at most 
20 percentage points below the average, it was 31 percentage points lower in 2009. 
This is also proof for the development of corporate tax rates in Europe and the exis-
tence of several low-tax locations. 
Quantifying Transfer Pricing Regulations 
In general, transfer pricing regulations vary across countries and may differ in a 
number of characteristics, most importantly in their applicability and scope, in the 
allowed methods for transfer price calculation, in the documentation requirements, or 
penalties for non-compliance with the rules. 
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 See Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix for additional information. The statutory tax rates consi-
dered include local income taxes and tax surcharges. In case of progressive tax rates, the highest in-
come level was assumed. 
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In the following, countries will be classified in three categories reflecting the strict-
ness of their transfer pricing legislations. A first natural step is to assess whether a 
country has enacted any form of transfer price legislation at all. Transfer pricing 
rules are commonly based on the so called arm's length principle which requires that 
prices for intercompany transactions have to correspond to the price that would have 
been chosen between two unrelated parties. While most European countries have 
implemented arm's length principles in their national tax law, the legislation is often 
imprecise and does not include further details as to its applicability, the determina-
tion of transfer prices, or the required documentation and hence lacks in scope to 
restrict transfer pricing behavior. Countries without or with only limited transfer 
pricing legislations are hence assigned to the first transfer pricing category. 
In the next step, differences in the strictness of existing transfer pricing legislation 
are identified. The major instrument to limit transfer pricing opportunities is the in-
troduction of documentation requirements for controlled transactions and prices as 
the increased level of transparency reduces the scope for deviations of the transfer 
pricing choice from the 'true' price. The importance of transfer pricing requirements 
is underpinned by the fact that in most jurisdictions the burden of proof as to the ap-
propriateness of a transfer price switches from the tax authorities to the taxpayer if 
only insufficient documentation is available. Furthermore, the introduction of docu-
mentation requirements into national tax law is in general accompanied by special 
transfer pricing penalties on missing or wrong documentation. Jurisdictions, howev-
er, differ in the stage at which the transfer price documentation must be made availa-
ble to the tax authorities. While some jurisdictions require the documentation only in 
case of a formal audit, others require the documentation to be available upfront to 
answer requests by the tax authority or hand it in with the tax return. In the follow-
ing, the former countries will be classified in category 2 and the latter countries in 
category 3.
131
 An overview of the categories can be found in Table 10 (for a more 
detailed study on the different transfer pricing regulations see Chapter 4.1.9).
132
 
                                                 
131
 Note that the detection risk of transfer pricing activities likely differs across asset types. For in-
stance, the transfer of an intangible asset, where no market of comparable goods exists, are more diffi-
cult to assess and offer a greater scope for manipulation than other types of assets. This difference, 
however, is not specific to any particular country but plausibly holds for all economies within our 
sample. 
132
 Note that compared to the categories introduced in Chapter 4.1.9, categories 0 and 5 were dropped 
because they were not represented in the data. Furthermore, categories 3 and 4 were merged as a dis-
closure requirement did not make any difference compared to a statutory requirement in this sample of 
countries where disclosure is only barely required. 
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Table 10: Categorization of Transfer Pricing Regulations I 
Category  Description 
Category 1 No or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; no docu-
mentation requirements 
Category 2 Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not 
introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an 
audit 
Category 3 Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement exists 
in national tax law 
Source: own composition. 
Note that the definition of the above categories abstracts from issues related to the 
calculation methodology for intra-firm transfer prices. This can be justified along 
two lines: on the one hand, there is little variation in the allowed pricing methods 
across countries and, on the other hand, different methods are not considered to imp-
ly more or less leeway in the transfer pricing choice.
133
 In the contrary, the supervi-
sion of transfer price determination by tax authorities may be crucial for transfer 
pricing choices. Regarding penalties levied on transfer price adjustments, it has to be 
distinguished between general tax penalties and special transfer pricing penalties. 
Unfortunately, reliable information on the design of such penalties over time could 
not be found. But the research revealed that special transfer pricing penalties are in 
almost all cases introduced together with the implementation of documentation re-
quirements in national tax law. It can, therefore, be assumed that the measure for the 
strictness of transfer pricing regulations, which is based on documentation require-
ments and their enforcement, equally serves as a proxy for penalties. 
In all sample countries, transfer pricing regulations have been either introduced or 
tightened between 1999 and 2009. Not a single country has relaxed its regulations. 
While in the first year of their inclusion in the sample, the great majority of countries 
was allocated to category 2 (16 countries), and only six countries were allocated to 
category 1 and four countries to category 3, in the last year of the sample, the majori-
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 The different countries have formulated regulations on how to determine such prices depending on 
the kind of transaction taking place, which in most cases are based on the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. The available methods either follow an opportunity cost approach that determines arm's 
length prices considering prices or profit margins of comparable uncontrolled transactions or they 
make use of benchmark analyses of competitors. The methods available may lead to different ranges 
of possible transfer prices. Therefore, a certain method may increase the possibility to over- or unders-
tate the transfer price in a specific situation, but this depends on the kind of transaction and the de-
tailed circumstances and is, plausibly, not specific to any particular country. Therefore, no general 
proposition can be made as to how generous a certain method may be. 
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ty of countries moved up to category 3 (15 countries), while only two countries re-
mained in category 1 and nine in category 2.
134
 
Furthermore, in order to account for the enforcement of tax regulations another as-
pect of transfer pricing was also added which is the possibility to enter into an ad-
vance pricing agreement (APA). Such an agreement allows taxpayers and tax author-
ities to negotiate a transfer price for a certain transaction in advance and for a certain 
period of time. It, therefore, significantly reduces the risk of a transfer pricing ad-
justment. APAs are generally offered in different forms, they can either be unilateral 
or bilateral. A unilateral agreement is entered by the taxpayer and the national tax 
authority of the hosting country, while a bilateral agreement also includes the tax 
authority of a foreign country which is affected by the transaction. Therefore, bilater-
al agreements are generally more favorable for taxpayers as transfer prices are ap-
proved by both affected countries. But for tax authorities such a procedure involves a 
high level of effort and cross-border coordination. It is, for that reason, necessary to 
establish sophisticated procedures to be able to process requests. It can, therefore, be 
assumed that the possibility to enter into a bilateral advance pricing agreement can be 
seen as a proxy for a sophisticated structure and progressiveness of tax authorities 
which in turn may also be seen as a measure for enforcement.
135
 
None of the countries considered in this study offered bilateral advance pricing 
agreements in 1999, but this changed over the years with ten countries offering bila-
teral APA procedures in 2009. 
Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics and other country variables 
Moreover, information on GDP as a proxy for market size, GDP per capita as a 
proxy for a country's income and development level, the GDP growth rate as a meas-
ure for economic growth, the unemployment rate as a proxy for the state of a coun-
try's economy and the corruption index as a proxy for the state of governance institu-
tions, is added. The corruption index is obtained from Transparency International 
while other country data is retrieved from the World Development Indicator Data-
base. For an overview of the descriptive statistics see Table 11. 
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 See Table A11 in the Appendix for more details. 
135
 See Table A12 in the Appendix for information on the availability of APAs. 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics I 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT)* 
150,214 17,086.5 255,592.8 0.0011 3.54e+07 
Pre-tax Profits* 151,716 21,565.42 272,660 0.0004 3.45e+07 
Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes over Total Assets* 
150,214 0.1277 0.2075 1.41e-06 22.9051 
Pre-tax Profits over Total Assets* 151,716 0.1380 2.0007 1.62e-06 764.946 
      
Fixed Assets* 151,716 181,206.8 2,207,504 0.0014 2.36e+08 
Costs of Employees* 151,716 27,373.47 222,174.1 0.0003 2.26e+07 
      
Corporate Tax Rate 151,716 0.3019 0.0627 0.1 0.4025 
Tax Differential
◊
 87,152 0.0097 0.0626 -0.303 0.314 
      
Existence of Transfer Pricing 
Legislation 
151,716 0.9596 0.1970 0 1 
Transfer Pricing Legislation 151,716 2.3863 0.5639 1 3 
Category 1 151,716 0.0404 0.1970 0 1 
Category 2 151,716 0.5329 0.4989 0 1 
Category 3 151,716 0.4267 0.4946 0 1 
APA 146,321 0.5243 0.4994 0 1 
      
GDP per Capita
▪
 151,716 20,688.4 9,660.09 594 56,600 
GDP
▪
 151,716 7.40e+11 6.42e+11 8.19e+09 2.1e+12 
GDP growth rate
▼
 151,716 2.1978 3.0162 -18 12.1 
Corruption Index
♦
 151,716 6.947 1.9872 1.5 9.7 
Unemployment
▲
 151,716 7.3699 2.9651 2.1 20.5 
Notes: Firm data is exported from AMADEUS database offered by Bureau van Dijk, version: Febru-
ary 2011  
* taken from unconsolidated accounts, in thousand USD 
◊
 difference between the host country's corporate tax rate and the unweighted average tax rate of the 
corporate group (ownership >50%) 
▪
 in USD, constant prices, year 2000 (Source: World Development Indicator  Database, World Bank) 
▼ 
in % (Source: World Development Indicator  Database, World Bank) 
♦ 
index ranges from 1 (high level of corruption) to 10 (no corruption)  (Source: Transparency Interna-
tional) 
▲
 in % of total labor force (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank) 
 
Source: own calculations. 
5.1.5 Estimation Strategy 
A model of the following form is estimated 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝜏𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  depicts the earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate 𝑖 at time 𝑡. As 
the distribution of the variable is strongly skewed, a logarithmic transformation of 
the variable is used. 
The regressors of main interest are the corporate tax rate, denoted by 𝜏𝑖𝑡 , and the 
variable indicating the strictness of a country's transfer pricing regulations (as de-
fined in the previous section) denoted by 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 . Following previous papers, interna-
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tional profit shifting activities are tested for by regressing the affiliate's earnings be-
fore interest and taxes (EBIT) on the host country's corporate tax rate. The EBIT is 
used because it captures operational profit only which is mainly effected by transfer 
pricing regulations.
136
 If MNEs engage in significant income shifting behavior, it is 
presumed that a high corporate tax rate dampens the reported earnings and vice ver-
sa, expecting 𝛽1 < 0. But at the same time, it is supposed that profit shifting activi-
ties and, hence, the sensitivity of a company's reported pre-tax earnings with respect 
to corporate tax rate changes is influenced by transfer pricing legislation. It is, there-
fore, expected that the tax rate sensitivity of profit shifting for European multination-
als decreases with the introduction or tightening of transfer pricing regulations. 
Regarding the interaction of the corporate tax rate and 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡  a positive coefficient 
𝛽2 > 0 is expected since reported pre-tax profits are supposed to increase due to less 
profit shifting activity. The coefficient estimate 𝛽3 captures the effect of stricter 
transfer price regulations on EBIT in countries with a corporate tax rate of zero. 
Here, the sign of the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative as tax haven 
countries are, in the absence of transfer pricing legislations, expected to be at the 
receiving end of profit shifting relations implying high reported earnings. If tax ha-
ven countries in turn introduce transfer price documentation requirements (the result 
of which may in the course of disputes also become accessible to authorities in high-
tax countries), profit shifting opportunities are likely dampened, inducing the re-
ported level of the EBIT to fall. 
Furthermore, the estimations are augmented by a large set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . 
Most importantly, it is controlled for affiliate size as measured by a company's fixed 
asset stock and costs of employees. Moreover, a set of time-varying country controls 
comprising the country's GDP (to proxy for country size), GDP per capita (to proxy 
for the country's level of development), the GDP growth rate (as a measure for eco-
nomic growth), the unemployment rate (as a proxy for the economic state of the 
country) and a corruption index (to proxy for the governance situation in a country) 
is included. Additionally a full set of affiliate fixed effects to absorb any time-
constant differences between the entities is included. All specifications, furthermore, 
comprise a full set of one-digit industry-year effects which capture common shocks 
to all affiliates within the same industry over time. 
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 Note that the pre-tax profit, which also includes financial profit, will be included in robust checks 
as an alternative measure. 
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5.1.6 Results 
The results are presented in the following sections. Section 5.1.6.1 presents the basic 
results, while Section 5.1.6.2 includes a number of robustness checks. 
5.1.6.1 Basic Results 
In the basic regression, the logarithm of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) is 
used as the dependent variable (Table 12). The sample only includes firms which are 
part of a multinational group, i.e. either the parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is 
located in a foreign country. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which account 
for clustering at the firm level, the country-year level or the industry level are re-
ported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
In Specification (1), the logarithm of EBIT is regressed on the statutory corporate tax 
rate and several input factor choices. A negative and significant coefficient estimate 
for the corporate tax rate is found. The result confirms the presumption that a higher 
corporate tax rate reduces reported earnings in a given country. Quantitatively, the 
results suggest that an increase of the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point de-
creases reported profits before tax by 0.394%. 
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Table 12: Regression Results I 
Table 12: Regression Results, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009 
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.394** 
(0.166) 
-0.394 
(0.300) 
-0.394** 
(0.194) 
-2.068*** 
(0.355) 
-2.068*** 
(0.506) 
-2.068*** 
(0.259) 
-3.425*** 
(0.409) 
-3.425*** 
(0.638) 
-3.425*** 
(0.365) 
Corporate Tax Rate x 
Time 
      0.185*** 
(0.034) 
0.185*** 
(0.054) 
0.185*** 
(0.031) 
Existence of Transfer 
Pricing Legislation 
   -0.575*** 
(0.121) 
-0.575*** 
(0.209) 
-0.575*** 
(0.109) 
-0.468*** 
(0.124) 
-0.468** 
(0.221) 
-0.468*** 
(0.111) 
Existence of TP Leg. x 
Corporate Tax Rate 
   1.912*** 
(0.357) 
1.912*** 
(0.595) 
1.912*** 
(0.317) 
1.709*** 
(0.363) 
1.709*** 
(0.624) 
1.709*** 
(0.324) 
Log Cost of Employees 0.433*** 
(0.012) 
0.433*** 
(0.021) 
0.433*** 
(0.016) 
0.432*** 
(0.012) 
0.432*** 
(0.021) 
0.432*** 
(0.016) 
0.437*** 
(0.012) 
0.437*** 
(0.020) 
0.437*** 
(0.016) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.082*** 
(0.005) 
0.082*** 
(0.005) 
0.082*** 
(0.016) 
0.082*** 
(0.005) 
0.082*** 
(0.005) 
0.082*** 
(0.016) 
0.083*** 
(0.005) 
0.083*** 
(0.005) 
0.083*** 
(0.015) 
Corruption Index -0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
GDP -3.04e-13** 
(1.32e-13) 
-3.04e-13** 
(1.54e-13) 
-3.04e-13 
(2.21e-13) 
-2.43e-13* 
(1.35e-13) 
-2.43e-13 
(1.67e-13) 
-2.43e-13 
(2.20e-13) 
-9.48e-14 
(1.34e-13) 
-9.48e-14 
(1.52e-13) 
-9.48e-14 
(2.23e-13) 
GDP per Capita 0.00006*** 
(7.43e-6) 
0.00006*** 
(9.98e-6) 
0.00006*** 
(8.93e-6) 
0.00006*** 
(7.44e-6) 
0.00006*** 
(9.74e-6) 
0.00006*** 
(9.33e-6) 
0.00008*** 
(8.10e-6) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00001) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
Unemployment -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.1571 0.1571 0.1571 0.1575 0.1575 0.1575 0.1578 0.1578 0.1578 
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# Obs 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm, country-year or industry levels in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively (where the significance level differs between clustering levels, the corresponding significance is reported in parentheses). Observational unit is the multinational firm, 
i.e. either the parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
'Corporate tax rate' depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges. 'Corporate Tax Rate x Time' stands for the interaction 
term of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). 'Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation' describes an indicator variable for the existence 
of transfer pricing legislation in a given country. 'Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and the corporate tax rate. 
'Log Fixed Assets' depicts the logarithm of the fixed asset stock and 'Log Costs of Employees' stands for the logarithm of the costs of employees. 'Corruption Index' is the Transpa-
rency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 10=no corruption). 'GDP (per capita)' stands for the host country's gross domestic product (per capita). 'GDP Growth Rate' 
accounts for the growth of GDP. 'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate in % of the total labor force. Industry-year-effects are based on one-digit NACE-
codes. 
Source: own calculations. 
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In Specification (2), an additional regressor is included which indicates whether a 
country has implemented binding transfer pricing regulations (the variable takes on 
the value 1 if the country is classified in categories 2 or 3 as defined in Section 5.1.4 
in a given year), as well as its interaction term with the corporate tax rate. The results 
suggest that the implementation of binding transfer pricing regulations reduces the 
profit shifting effect significantly. While in countries without transfer pricing legisla-
tion, an increase in the corporate tax rate of 1 percentage point decreases the EBIT 
by 2.068%, we cannot find a statistically significant profit shifting effect in countries 
where transfer pricing regulations exist. Note that the coefficient estimate for the 
transfer pricing legislation dummy is negative which might appear puzzling at first 
sight. In general, one would expect that the introduction of transfer pricing legisla-
tion tends to increase the reported earnings before interest and taxes of firms in high-
tax countries as it is more difficult to shift profits to foreign low-tax entities (as indi-
cated by the positive coefficient estimate for the interaction term with the corporate 
tax variable). The effect of transfer pricing legislation on reported earnings in low-
tax countries is in turn less clear. Precisely, the introduction of transfer pricing legis-
lation in low-tax countries may also hamper profit shifting activities into these coun-
tries as transfer pricing legislations increase the transparency of price setting beha-
vior and may make profit shifting behavior more costly (transfer pricing information 
might eventually, e.g. in transfer pricing disputes, also become available to the high-
tax countries' authorities). Therefore, the effect of an introduction of transfer pricing 
regulations depends on the level of the corporate tax rate. The results show that for 
countries with a corporate tax rate larger than approximately 30% (=0.575/1.912), 
the reported earnings before interest and taxes increase with the introduction of trans-
fer pricing rules, while in countries with lower tax rates, they decrease. 
In Specification (3), a linear time trend is additionally interacted with the baseline 
corporate tax rate variable to allow the profit shifting effect to vary over time. The 
results suggest that the tax sensitivity of corporate profitability has significantly de-
creased over time as the coefficient estimate for the baseline corporate tax variable 
turns out negative and significant while the coefficient for the interaction term is pos-
itive. Quantitatively, the profit shifting effect is dampened by approximately 6% per 
year (=0.185/3.24).  
In all specifications, the control variables show the expected signs. The firm size, 
measured by the logarithm of fixed assets and the logarithm of costs of employees, 
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has a positive impact on reported EBIT. With increasing unemployment rates, the 
reported earnings before interest and taxes decrease, while they increase with an in-
creasing GDP per capita and an increasing GDP growth rate. The coefficient for the 
GDP has, however, a negative sign, which can be interpreted as a competition effect 
in the given market. Finally, the results show that they are robust to different cluster-
ing levels.  
5.1.6.2 Robustness Checks 
In the following, the sensitivity of the results to alternative model specifications will 
be further assessed. Besides using different profitability measures as the dependent 
variable, the effect of the existence of advance pricing agreements (APA) procedures 
will be included and an alternative tax measure will be used. The following estima-
tions all report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Different Profitability Measures 
In this section, different dependent variables will be used to capture profit shifting 
behavior, explicitly the logarithm of profit before taxes as well as the logarithm of 
EBIT over total assets and the logarithm of profit before tax over total assets. While 
EBIT captures operating profit, the pre-tax profit also includes financial profits. 
Transfer pricing measures, however, mainly address operational profit. Thus, EBIT 
is used as the baseline profit measure. Debt shifting activities are expected to be cap-
tured by the pre-tax profit measure only.
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Specifications (1)-(3) of Table 13 use the logarithm of earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) as the dependent variable and show that they are robust to different 
measures for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. In Specification (2), the 
categorial variable, introduced in Section 5.1.4, is used to measure the strictness of 
transfer pricing regulations. The results confirm the previous findings. Quantitative-
ly, moving from category 1 to category 2 dampens the profit shifting effect as meas-
ured by the corporate tax rate coefficient in the year 1999 by approximately 47% 
(=1.058/2.212). Finally, indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 are included in 
Specification (3) and profit shifting behavior is found which is decreasing with stric-
ter transfer pricing rules as indicated by the increasing coefficient of the interaction 
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 Note that debt shifting and hence financial profit may also be affected by transfer pricing regula-
tions as they also require arm's length interest rates between related entities, but interest rates are gen-
erally more comparable and therefore leave less leeway. 
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term across categories, i.e. while in countries with no transfer pricing regulations a 1 
percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate decreases the reported EBIT by 
2.855%, for category 2-regulations, EBIT only decreases by 1.066% and for coun-
tries with category 3-regulations, no profit shifting activity statistically different from 
zero can be found. 
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Table 13: Regression Results II 
Table 13: Robustness Checks: Different Profitability Measures, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009 
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Tax Rate -3.425*** 
(0.409) 
-3.339*** 
(0.377) 
-2.942*** 
(0.412) 
-4.018*** 
(0.397) 
-4.246*** 
(0.359) 
-3.560*** 
(0.400) 
Corporate Tax Rate x Time 0.185*** 
(0.034) 
0.069* 
(0.037) 
0.087** 
(0.037) 
0.406*** 
(0.032) 
0.291*** 
(0.035) 
0.313*** 
(0.035) 
Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation -0.468*** 
(0.124) 
  -0.219* 
(0.121) 
  
Existence of TP Leg. x Coporate Tax Rate 1.709*** 
(0.363) 
  1.155*** 
(0.354) 
  
Transfer Pricing Legislation  -0.327*** 
(0.047) 
  -0.287*** 
(0.044) 
 
Transfer Pricing Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate  1.058*** 
(0.145) 
  0.977*** 
(0.138) 
 
Category 2   -0.478*** 
(0.124) 
  -0.230* 
(0.121) 
Category 3   -0.737*** 
(0.135) 
  -0.472*** 
(0.131) 
Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate   1.789*** 
(0.366) 
  1.250*** 
(0.357) 
Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate   2.494*** 
(0.396) 
  1.886*** 
(0.383) 
Log Costs of Employees 0.437*** 
(0.012) 
0.436*** 
(0.012) 
0.437*** 
(0.012) 
0.162*** 
(0.010) 
0.160*** 
(0.010) 
0.162*** 
(0.010) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.083*** 
(0.005) 
0.083*** 
(0.005) 
0.083*** 
(0.005) 
-0.171*** 
(0.005) 
-0.171*** 
(0.005) 
-0.171*** 
(0.005) 
 137 
 
Corruption Index 0.005 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
GDP -9.48e-14 
(1.34e-13) 
-2.42e-13* 
(1.34e-13) 
-1.89e-13 
(1.35e-13) 
2.91e-13** 
(1.28e-13) 
1.06e-13 
(1.28e-13) 
1.98e-13 
(1.29e-13) 
GDP per Capita 0.00008*** 
(8.10e-6) 
0.00008*** 
(8.11e-6) 
0.00008*** 
(8.11e-6) 
0.0001*** 
(7.69e-6) 
0.00009*** 
(7.70e-6) 
0.00009*** 
(7.69e-6) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Unemployment -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.1578 0.1580 0.1582 0.0341 0.0341 0.0345 
# Obs 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observa-
tional unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's earn-
ings before interest and taxes. 'Corporate tax rate' depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges. 'Corporate Tax Rate x 
Time' stands for the interaction term of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). 'Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation' describes an 
indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country. 'Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of such an indicator 
variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Transfer Pricing Legislation' depicts the strictness of transfer pricing legislation (1= no or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Trans-
fer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation require-
ment exists in national tax law, but must only be available upon request). 'TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' describes the interaction term of the categorial transfer pricing variable and 
the corporate tax rate. 'Category 2' and 'Category 3' stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 as defined above. 'Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate' and 'Category 3 x Corpo-
rate Tax Rate' describe the interaction term of the respective category and the corporate tax rate. 'Log Fixed Assets' depicts the logarithm of the fixed asset stock and 'Log Costs of 
Employees' stands for the logarithm of the costs of employees. 'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 10=no corruption). 'GDP 
(per capita)' stands for the host country's gross domestic product (per capita). 'GDP Growth Rate' accounts for the growth of GDP. 'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unem-
ployment rate in % of the total labor force. Industry-year-effects are based on one-digit NACE-codes. 
Source: own calculations. 
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In Specifications (4)-(6) of Table 13, the logarithm of EBIT over total assets is used 
as the dependent variable. The results are very similar to those in Specifications (1)-
(3). Interestingly, the time effect on profit shifting increases relative to the transfer 
pricing effect.  
The results are confirmed when using the pre-tax profit as the dependent variable. In 
Table 14, Specifications (1)-(3) apply the profit before taxes, and Specifications (4)-
(6), the profit before taxes over total assets, as the dependent variable. 
 139 
 
Table 14: Regression Results III 
Table 14: Robustness Checks: Different Profitability Measures, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009 
Dependent Variable: Log Profit Before Tax  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Tax Rate -4.464*** 
(0.448) 
-4.705*** 
(0.410) 
-3.788*** 
(0.451) 
-5.104*** 
(0.436) 
-5.760*** 
(0.395) 
-4.430*** 
(0.440) 
Corporate Tax Rate x Time 0.354*** 
(0.038) 
0.194*** 
(0.041) 
0.211*** 
(0.041) 
0.589*** 
(0.036) 
0.427*** 
(0.039) 
0.446*** 
(0.039) 
Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation -0.355** 
(0.139) 
  -0.079 
(0.137) 
  
Existence of TP Leg. x Coporate Tax Rate 1.252*** 
(0.405) 
  0.628 
(0.398) 
  
Transfer Pricing Legislation  -0.405*** 
(0.050) 
  -0.373*** 
(0.048) 
 
Transfer Pricing Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate  1.186*** 
(0.157) 
  1.134*** 
(0.151) 
 
Category 2   -0.376*** 
(0.139) 
  -0.101 
(0.137) 
Category 3   -0.744*** 
(0.149) 
  -0.468** 
(0.146) 
Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate   1.451*** 
(0.409) 
  0.829** 
(0.401) 
Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate   2.370*** 
(0.437) 
  1.741*** 
(0.426) 
Log Costs of Employees 0.359*** 
(0.011) 
0.359*** 
(0.011) 
0.360*** 
(0.011) 
0.101*** 
(0.009) 
0.100*** 
(0.009) 
0.102*** 
(0.009) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.083*** 
(0.006) 
0.083*** 
(0.006) 
0.084*** 
(0.006) 
-0.169*** 
(0.006) 
0.168*** 
(0.006) 
-0.168*** 
(0.006) 
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Corruption Index -0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.026** 
(0.010) 
-0.020** 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
GDP -4.66e-13*** 
(1.41e-13) 
-6.84e-13*** 
(1.41e-13) 
-6.15e-13*** 
(1.42e-13) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
GDP per Capita 0.0001*** 
(8.72e-6) 
0.0001*** 
(8.72e-6) 
0.0001*** 
(8.71e-6) 
-1.81e-14 
(1.33e-13) 
-2.74e-13** 
(1.34e-13) 
-1.67e-13 
(1.35e-13) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.0001*** 
(8.30e-6) 
0.0001*** 
(8.28e-6) 
0.0001*** 
(8.29e-6) 
Unemployment -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.1425 0.1431 0.1432 0.0326 0.0330 0.0334 
# Obs 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observa-
tional unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's profit 
before taxes. 'Corporate tax rate' depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges. 'Corporate Tax Rate x Time' stands for 
the interaction term of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). 'Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation' describes an indicator variable 
for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country. 'Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and the 
corporate tax rate. 'Transfer Pricing Legislation' depicts the strictness of transfer pricing legislation (1= no or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Transfer pricing rules 
exist; documentation requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement exists in na-
tional tax law, but must only be available upon request). 'TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' describes the interaction term of the categorial transfer pricing variable and the corporate tax 
rate. 'Category 2' and 'Category 3' stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 as defined above. 'Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate' and 'Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate' 
describe the interaction term of the respective category and the corporate tax rate. 'Log Fixed Assets' depicts the logarithm of the fixed asset stock and 'Log Costs of Employees' 
stands for the logarithm of the costs of employees. 'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 10=no corruption). 'GDP (per capita)' 
stands for the host country's gross domestic product (per capita). 'GDP Growth Rate' accounts for the growth of GDP. 'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate 
in % of the total labor force. Industry-year-effects are based on one-digit NACE-codes. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Advance Pricing Agreements 
In Table 15 an indicator variable for the possibility to enter into advance pricing 
agreements is included. It is expected that the possibility to enter into an APA indi-
cates a sophisticated tax authority organizational structure which in turn is a measure 
for the enforcement of anti-avoidance legislation. The results are in line with this 
assumption. The positive coefficient of the interaction term shows that the existence 
of APA procedures also decreases profit shifting behavior. Precisely, in countries 
with transfer pricing regulations and APA procedures, no profit shifting activity sta-
tistically different from zero can be found (Specification (1)). 
The negative coefficient of the APA variable itself provides evidence that in low tax 
countries, the introduction of APA procedures reduces reported earnings before in-
terest and taxes, since profit shifting into such countries becomes more difficult. 
Specifications (3) and (4) use the logarithm of EBIT over total assets as dependent 
variable and show similar results. 
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Table 15: Regression Results IV 
Table 15: Robustness Checks: Advance Pricing Agreements, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009 
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corporate Tax Rate -2.438*** 
(0.432) 
-2.401*** 
(0.431) 
-3.294*** 
(0.420) 
-3.228*** 
(0.419) 
Corporate Tax Rate x Time 0.037 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.040) 
0.307*** 
(0.038) 
0.298*** 
(0.038) 
Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation -0.466*** 
(0.125) 
 -0.188 
(0.122) 
 
Existence of TP Leg. x Coporate Tax Rate 1.673*** 
(0.368) 
 1.087*** 
(0.358) 
 
Category 2  -0.459*** 
(0.126) 
 -0.173 
(0.122) 
Category 3  -0.528*** 
(0.142) 
 -0.304** 
(0.138) 
Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate  1.689*** 
(0.373) 
 1.081*** 
(0.363) 
Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate  1.837*** 
(0.417) 
 1.408*** 
(0.404) 
APA -0.213*** 
(0.050) 
-0.156** 
(0.073) 
-0.118** 
(0.048) 
0.016 
(0.070) 
APA x Corporate Tax Rate 0.387** 
(0.175) 
0.231 
(0.231) 
0.020 
(0.167) 
-0.264 
(0.220) 
Log Costs of Employees 0.431*** 
(0.012) 
0.431*** 
(0.012) 
0.162*** 
(0.010) 
0.163*** 
(0.010) 
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Log Fixed Assets 0.083*** 
(0.005) 
0.083*** 
(0.005) 
-0.171*** 
(0.005) 
-0.171*** 
(0.005) 
Corruption Index 0.005 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
GDP 1.41e-13 
(1.50e-13) 
1.09e-13 
(1.51e-13) 
5.42e-13*** 
(1.43e-13) 
4.92e-13*** 
(1.44e-13) 
GDP per Capita 0.00007*** 
(8.25e-6) 
0.00007*** 
(8.42e-6) 
0.00009*** 
(7.84e-6) 
0.00009*** 
(8.00e-6) 
GDP Growth 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Unemployment -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.1575 0.1575 0.0350 0.0351 
# Obs 146,321 146,321 146,321 146,321 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observa-
tional unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's earn-
ings before interest and taxes. 'Corporate tax rate' depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges. 'Corporate Tax Rate x 
Time' stands for the interaction term of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). 'Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation' describes an 
indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country. 'Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of such an indicator 
variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Category 2' and 'Category 3' stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 (1= no or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Trans-
fer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation require-
ment exists in national tax law, but must only be available upon request). 'Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate' and 'Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate' describe the interaction term of 
the respective category and the corporate tax rate. 'APA' is an indicator variable for the possibility to enter into advance pricing agreements. 'APA x Corporate Tax Rate' is the inte-
raction term of this indicator variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Log Fixed Assets' depicts the logarithm of the fixed asset stock and 'Log Costs of Employees' stands for the loga-
rithm of the costs of employees. 'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 10=no corruption). 'GDP (per capita)' stands for the host 
country's gross domestic product (per capita). 'GDP Growth Rate' accounts for the growth of GDP. 'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate in % of the total 
labor force. Industry-year-effects are based on one-digit NACE-codes. 
Source: own calculations.  
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Comparing Specification (1) of Table 15 and Specification (1) of Table 13 shows 
that, while without controlling for APA procedures profit shifting activity is dam-
pened by 52.8% (=1.709/3.24) through the existence of transfer pricing legislations, 
it is fully compensated by the additional existence of APA procedures. Overall, a 
negative impact of the corporate tax rate on reported profits is found which is dam-
pened by the introduction of transfer pricing regulations and the existence of bilateral 
APA procedures. 
Different Tax Measures 
In this section, a tax differential is used instead of the corporate tax rate. The tax dif-
ferential is calculated by determining the unweighted average tax rate of all corporate 
group members (ownership >50%) of the firm and deducting it from the corporate 
tax rate in the firm's host country.
138
  
Therefore, the larger the absolute value of the tax differential, the greater is the dif-
ference between the firm's tax burden and that of the entire group. It is a positive 
number, if the host country's tax rate is larger than the average of the group. In that 
case, we assume that profits should be shifted out of the country to other group 
members. In case, the tax differential is negative, the firm could be used for inward 
profit shifting as its tax burden is lower than the average tax burden of the group. 
The results confirm those expectations, the greater the tax differential, the lower is 
the reported EBIT. Quantitatively, if the difference between the host country's tax 
rate and the average tax rate of the entire group increases by 1 percentage point, the 
reported EBIT decreases by 1.4% (Specification (1)) in a country where no transfer 
pricing regulations exist. Note that for negative numbers of the tax differential, this 
stands for an approximation of the firm's tax burden to that of the group. In that case, 
less profit is shifted into the firm's host country since its relative advantage decreas-
es. For positive numbers, it increases the relative tax disadvantage of the firm's loca-
tion and accordingly increases outward profit shifting. 
                                                 
138
 The group structure was determined by identifying the global ultimate owner of the observed firm 
and all available subsidiaries. The corporate tax rate of each subsidiary with an ownership of greater 
than 50% was then used to calculate an unweighted average. If the global ultimate owner was not 
available, the immediate shareholder was used. If the immediate shareholder was also not available, 
the subsidiaries of the firm itself were used. 
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Table 16: Regression Results V 
Table 16: Robustness Checks: Different Tax Measures, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009 
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings Before Interest and Taxes  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tax Differential -1.427*** 
(0.363) 
-1.436*** 
(0.367) 
-1.479*** 
(0.382) 
-1.054*** 
(0.338) 
-1.037*** 
(0.343) 
-1.031*** 
(0.358) 
Tax Differential x Time 0.031 
(0.030) 
0.032 
(0.031) 
0.016 
(0.034) 
0.040 
(0.029) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
0.032 
(0.033) 
Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation 0.105*** 
(0.032) 
  0.138*** 
(0.031) 
  
Existence of TP Leg. x Tax Differential 1.054*** 
(0.385) 
  0.667* 
(0.359) 
  
Category 2  0.102*** 
(0.037) 
0.072* 
(0.039) 
 0.141*** 
(0.036) 
0.126*** 
(0.037) 
Category 3  0.106*** 
(0.032) 
0.072** 
(0.034) 
 0.138*** 
(0.031) 
0.124*** 
(0.033) 
Category 2 x Tax Differential  1.079*** 
(0.410) 
1.191*** 
(0.423) 
 0.615 
(0.387) 
0.615 
(0.402) 
Category 3 x Tax Differential  1.032** 
(0.399) 
1.256*** 
(0.431) 
 0.703* 
(0.372) 
0.782* 
(0.405) 
APA   -0.006 
(0.027) 
  -0.032 
(0.026) 
APA x Tax Differential   -0.116 
(0.239) 
  -0.094 
(0.234) 
Log Costs of Employees 0.502*** 
(0.017) 
0.502*** 
(0.017) 
0.493*** 
(0.018) 
0.210*** 
(0.014) 
0.210*** 
(0.014) 
0.208*** 
(0.014) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.087*** 
(0.008) 
0.087*** 
(0.008) 
0.087*** 
(0.008) 
-0.198*** 
(0.008) 
-0.198*** 
(0.008) 
-0.197*** 
(0.008) 
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Corruption Index 0.037*** 
(0.013) 
0.037*** 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
GDP 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
GDP per Capita -5.71e-14 
(1.64e-13) 
-5.12e-14 
(1.66e-13) 
2.29e-13 
(1.90e-13) 
3.51e-13** 
(1.53e-13) 
3.42e-13** 
(1.56e-13) 
5.98e-13*** 
(1.80e-13) 
GDP Growth 0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00003*** 
(9.29e-6) 
0.00003*** 
(9.38e-6) 
0.00003*** 
(9.48e-6) 
Unemployment 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0007 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.1790 0.1790 0.1776 0.0370 0.0370 0.0367 
# Obs 87,152 87,152 85,415 87,152 87,152 85,415 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observa-
tional unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's earn-
ings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 'Tax Differential' depicts the difference between the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible sur-
charges and the unweighed average tax rate of all group members. 'Tax Differential x Time' stands for the interaction term of the tax differential and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 
for the years 1999-2009). 'Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation' describes an indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country. 'Existence of 
TP Leg. x Tax Differential' stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and the tax differential. 'Category 2' and 'Category 3' stand for indicator variables for catego-
ries 2 and 3 (1= no or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but is required to 
exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement exists in national tax law, but must only be available upon request). 'Category 2 x Tax Differential' and 
'Category 3 x Tax Differential' describe the interaction term of the respective category and the tax differential. 'APA' is an indicator variable for the possibility to enter into advance 
pricing agreements. 'APA x Corporate Tax Rate' is the interaction term of this indicator variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Log Fixed Assets' depicts the logarithm of the fixed asset 
stock and 'Log Costs of Employees' stands for the logarithm of the costs of employees. 'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 
10=no corruption). 'GDP (per capita)' stands for the of the host country's gross domestic product (per capita). 'GDP Growth Rate' accounts for the growth of the GDP. 
'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate in % of the total labor force. Industry-year-effects are based on one-digit NACE-codes. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Also in this setting, the results show that the existence of transfer pricing regulations 
decreases profit shifting. The positive coefficient of the interaction term of the differ-
ent measures for transfer pricing and the tax differential show that the tax effect is 
dampened by the existence of (stricter) transfer pricing rules. Interestingly, the coef-
ficient of the transfer pricing variables is now positive as well. This might appear 
surprising at first sight, but it has to be noted, that this coefficient applies to situa-
tions where the tax differential is zero (as compared to a corporate tax rate of zero in 
the previous estimations). This means it is now not the case, that the coefficient 
measures the introduction of transfer pricing regulations in low-tax countries, but 
much rather in countries where the corporate tax rate is equal to the average tax rate 
of the group. Profit shifting activities, thus, become more difficult and reported EBIT 
increases. 
Table 16 also shows that these findings are robust to different measures for the de-
pendent variable (EBIT in Specifications (1)-(3) or EBIT over total assets in Specifi-
cations (4)-(6)) as well as different measures for transfer pricing regulations. Howev-
er, a significant impact of the APA indicator cannot be found in this setting. 
5.1.7 Conclusion of Results 
The aim of this study was to investigate multinational profit shifting within Europe 
and to assess whether international shifting is significantly dampened by the intro-
duction and tightening of transfer price documentation requirements. As transfer 
pricing is widely acknowledged to be an (perhaps the most) important income shift-
ing channel (see e.g. Clausing (2003) and Buettner/Wamser (2012)), many countries 
have implemented transfer pricing documentation requirements in recent years to 
hedge against profit outflows through intra-firm price distortions. As these rules, 
especially the stricter versions, imply significant compliance costs by multinational 
firms and bind resources within tax authorities, evaluating their effectiveness in re-
stricting transfer pricing behavior by MNEs is crucial to assess their welfare implica-
tions. 
It is assumed that this study is the first to assess the link between transfer price do-
cumentation and multinational income shifting behavior. For that purpose, informa-
tion on transfer price legislations in 26 European countries over the past decade was 
collected and linked to panel data on multinational firms in the EU.  
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In line with previous studies, evidence for multinational profit shifting from high-tax 
to low-tax countries is found. These shifting activities, however, are reduced by the 
introduction of transfer pricing regulations, i.e. the tax rate sensitivity is reduced by 
approximately 52.7% through the introduction of transfer pricing regulations. It is 
also found that, in addition to this effect, profit shifting activities decrease over time, 
i.e. by 5.7% per year.  
The results, furthermore, indicate that the stricter the transfer pricing rules, the great-
er is the influence on reported profits. But one has to keep in mind that the impact of 
transfer pricing regulations on high- and low-tax countries has to be distinguished. 
While the introduction of such rules prevents the outward flow of profits from high-
tax countries, it also prevents the inward flow of profits in low-tax countries. The 
consequence on reported profits is, therefore, twofold.  
The same effect can be accounted to the existence of bilateral APA procedures in 
national tax authorities, which demonstrate sophisticated administrative structures, 
precisely the existence of APA procedures fully compensates profit shifting activities 
in countries with transfer pricing legislation. It is also showed that the alternative use 
of a tax differential measure instead of the corporate tax rate, confirms the expecta-
tions and also shows that transfer pricing regulations are instrumental in decreasing 
profit shifting. Finally, the results are robust to different measures for profit shifting 
and for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations.  
Overall, the results show that profit shifting activity has decreased in Europe due to 
the introduction of anti-avoidance legislation. From that follows that transfer pricing 
regulations are, although they imply great administrative burden for both taxpayers 
and tax authorities, a valid instrument to prevent profit shifting across borders. Fur-
thermore, the results provide implications for the design and enforcement of transfer 
pricing regulations for tax legislators. They show that especially documentation re-
quirements as well as sophisticated administrative structures play an important role 
for the prevention of cross-border profit shifting. 
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5.2 The Impact of Anti-Avoidance Measures on Profit Shifting in Developing 
Countries
139
  
5.2.1 Scope of the Study 
The comparison in Chapter 2.2.3 shows that developing countries are even more sub-
ject to profit shifting activities of multinational companies than developed countries. 
A considerable amount of taxable income is shifted out of such countries due to, 
among others, tax reasons. At the same time, developing countries do often not have 
the capacities to implement sophisticated administrative structures in order to combat 
tax avoidance. Nevertheless, several countries have started to introduce anti-
avoidance measures which are more or less rigorously enforced. 
This study, thus, aims at analyzing the impact of two different kinds of anti-
avoidance measures, namely thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing regulations, 
on profit shifting activities in 17 developing countries worldwide. The information 
was collected for the years 1999 to 2008 and merged to firm data provided by Bureau 
van Dijk‟s ORBIS database.   
In a first step, general profit shifting behavior of multinational enterprises will be 
examined by determining the impact of the statutory tax rate on reported profits, con-
trolling for firm, industry, and host-country characteristics. In a second step, the in-
troduction or tightening of anti-avoidance measures will be analyzed. Due to con-
straints in the data base, this will be done using an overall anti-profit-shifting varia-
ble which controls for the existence of thin capitalization rules and/or transfer pricing 
regulations. Finally, both anti-avoidance measures will be analyzed separately by 
examining the two different channels of income shifting, i.e. intercompany trade and 
intercompany financing, in order to confirm the results. 
5.2.2 Literature Overview  
Similarly to the first study provided in Chapter 5.1, this study also adds to the grow-
ing literature on international profit shifting. The studies presented in Chapter 5.1.2 
can, thus, be equally referred to when outlining the existing literature on this topic. 
However, none of the studies especially focuses on developing countries, which is 
also due to data constraints. Fuest/Riedel (2010) have pointed out this lack of empiri-
cal investigations and suggest several approaches and data sources to close this gap.  
                                                 
139
 The following sections are based on Lohse/Riedel (2012b). 
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In 2011, Fuest/Hebous/Riedel (2011) have made use of one of the outlined approach-
es. They used the MiDi-database provided by the German Bundesbank to compare 
the tax rate sensitivity of the share of intercompany debt financing for developed and 
developing countries. They argue that the share of intercompany debt financing 
should be higher in high-tax countries as it is a common channel for profit shifting. 
The results confirm this expectation for both groups of countries, i.e. developed and 
developing countries. However, the tax rate sensitivity is significantly larger in de-
veloping countries, which suggests that those countries are more affected by profit 
shifting activities. 
As the previous chapter points out, a great number of both, developed and develop-
ing, countries worldwide has introduced or tightened anti-profit-shifting legislation, 
namely transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules, over the past decade. 
While few studies exist that examine the impact of certain kinds of anti-avoidance 
regulations on profit shifting in developed countries (Ruf/Weichenrieder (2012), Bu-
ettner/Overesch/Schreiber/Wamser (2012), Chapter 5.1), until now, no empirical 
study exists which examines the impact of such measures especially in developing 
countries. Therefore, this study aims at contributing to previous findings by analyz-
ing the impact of transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization rules on profit 
shifting activities in developing countries. 
5.2.3 Data 
The study uses firm level data provided by the ORBIS database of Bureau van Dijk, 
which is the worldwide version of the AMADEUS database used in the first study. It 
also comprises information on financial and accounting data, including balance 
sheets, profit and loss accounts, as well as financial indicators. The study focuses on 
17 developing countries worldwide over the years 1999 to 2008. Unfortunately, 
ownership information is not available in the data, i.e. not all firms are necessarily 
affiliates of a multinational enterprise. Since purely domestic firms do not have an 
opportunity to shift profits cross-border, no profit shifting activity should be detecta-
ble for this group of companies. Therefore, using the entire sample will possibly dis-
tort the results and decrease the impact of the statutory tax rate on reported profitabil-
ity. However, if a relationship can nevertheless be found, it indicates that profit shift-
ing is taking place and might even be of greater impact when analyzing multinational 
affiliates only. Table 17 depicts a country distribution of the firms in the sample. 
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Table 17: Country Statistics II 
Country Firm Number 
Argentina 74 
Brazil 187 
Chile 213 
China 113,180 
Colombia 143 
Ecuador 41 
India 3,080 
Indonesia 1 
Malaysia 4 
Mexico 18 
Moldova 671 
Peru 624 
Philippines 1,826 
Russia 59,874 
Thailand 632 
Ukraine 12,087 
Venezuela 7 
Sum 192,662 
Source: own composition. 
In total, the sample comprises 597,226 observations from 192,662 firms. Thus, each 
firm is observed for 3.1 years on average. The country statistics show that the cover-
age of firm data varies considerably between countries. China and Russia are strong-
ly represented in the sample and account for the great majority of all firms. This 
composition of the data has to be considered in the empirical analysis. 
The firm data is matched with information on the corporate tax system in the respec-
tive host country, i.e. the statutory corporate tax rate and information on anti-
avoidance measures. Furthermore, host country characteristics, such as GDP, GDP 
per capita, the unemployment rate, the real interest rate, and a corruption perception 
index, are added to control for different aspects of economic and administrative de-
velopment. In the following, the employed tax information and the descriptive statis-
tics of the data will be further discussed. 
Information on Domestic Tax Systems 
The first component of the domestic tax system that is controlled for is the statutory 
corporate tax rate. It is calculated taking local business taxes as well as surcharges 
into account.
140
 A comparison of the tax rates in the considered countries shows that 
they have, after a slight increase between 1999 and 2001, significantly decreased 
                                                 
140
 Information is collected using Ernst & Young worldwide corporate tax guides. 
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over time, i.e. from 31% in 1999 to 25.75% in 2008.
141
 In contrast to European coun-
tries, however, maximum as well as minimum tax rates have been rather constant, 
with the exception of Moldova which completely abolished the corporate income tax.  
The second component of tax information employed is information on the anti-
avoidance measures implemented in the respective countries. On the one hand, coun-
tries may have introduced thin capitalization rules which prevent excessive debt fi-
nancing. As outlined in Chapter 4.2, the design of thin capitalization rules varies 
across countries and is difficult to assess quantitatively. Therefore, only an indicator 
variable indicating whether such rules exist will be used.
142
 Out of the considered 
countries, only two countries (Argentina and Ukraine) had thin capitalization rules in 
force in 1999, but another seven countries introduced such rules during the consi-
dered time period. 
On the other hand, the transfer pricing regulations employed in the domestic tax law 
will be considered. As described in Chapter 4.1.9, transfer pricing regulations can be 
categorized according to their strictness. For this study, three different categories will 
be distinguished which are outlined in Table 18.
143
 
Table 18: Categorization of Transfer Pricing Regulations II 
Category  Description 
Category 0 No general anti-avoidance regulations; no documentation re-
quirements 
Category 1 Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not 
introduced in national tax law, but may be required to exist in 
an audit 
Category 2 Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement exists 
in national tax law and a disclosure may be required in addi-
tion 
Source: own composition. 
Table A14 in the Appendix depicts the allocation of the considered countries to the 
different categories and shows that several countries have tightened their rules over 
the years 1999 to 2008. Precisely, while in the first year that information was availa-
ble, the average category was 1.3, it is 1.7 in 2008. 
                                                 
141
 See also Chapter 2.2.1 and Table A2 in the Appendix. 
142
 See Table A13 in the Appendix. 
143
 Note that, analogically to the previous chapter, a recategorization was conducted. In this setting, 
categories are numbered 0 to 2 as category 0 still is the original category 0 as defined in Chapter 4.1.9. 
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This development shows that both components of anti-avoidance measures have 
been introduced or tightened in many countries of the sample. Not a single country 
has abolished or loosened such regulations. However, when analyzing the impact of 
anti-avoidance measures on profit shifting activities, the distribution of countries in 
the data has to be considered. Due to the overrepresentation of some countries, the 
data shows, counterintuitively, a rather high negative correlation of thin capitaliza-
tion rules and transfer pricing regulations. I.e., in the data set, where thin capitaliza-
tion rules are implemented, there are no or only very lax transfer pricing regulations 
and vice versa. This correlation is, however, not found when analyzing anti-
avoidance measures on a country level. Much rather, it is driven by four countries in 
the sample: China and India, which both have rather strict transfer pricing regula-
tions, but no thin capitalization rules, and Russia and Ukraine, which both have thin 
capitalization rules, but very generous transfer pricing regulations. These combina-
tions are surprising as one would expect that countries engaging in combating tax 
avoidance make use of both measures. The reasons for this structure are not clear and 
may be justified historically (for the historic Indian tax policy on transfer pricing see 
e.g. Dash/Krishnan (2010)), but, nevertheless, all four countries already have or cur-
rently discuss introducing the missing component of the two anti-avoidance meas-
ures. 
This negative correlation, however, imposes a multicollinearity problem on the em-
pirical model.
144
 Therefore, an overall anti-profit-shifting measure will be employed 
which controls for the existence of both components. This measure will be calculated 
as the sum of transfer pricing and thin capitalization existence indicator variables. In 
this way, both components are equally weighted and the anti-profit-shifting measure 
takes on the values 0 to 2. The transfer pricing indicator variable will take on the 
value one if transfer pricing regulations are allocated to category 2 and zero other-
wise. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Besides the information on the domestic tax systems, other host country characteris-
tics have been added. GDP serves as a proxy for market size, GDP per capita for the 
development level of the host country, the unemployment rate stands for the econom-
ic state and the corruption perception index provided by Transparency International 
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 Note that an analog correlation cannot be found in the AMADEUS data set used in the first study. 
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describes circumstances in governance institutions. The real interest rate is used to 
control for costs of financing when estimating the impact of thin capitalization rules 
on the reported debt ratio. 
The debt ratio was calculated as the sum of non-current and current liabilities over 
total assets. Furthermore, outliers are not included, i.e. where the debt ratio was 
smaller than zero or larger than one, the observation was dropped. Table 19 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the data.  
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics II 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT)* 
538,478 4,664.6 75,112.1 1 2.83e+07 
Pre-tax Profits* 476,337 2,884.81 43,361.6 1 1.26e+07 
Debt over Total Assets* 597,226 0.5931 0.2825 0 1 
      
Total Assets* 597,226 33,745.7 558,141.6 1 1.75e+08 
      
Corporate Tax Rate 597,226 0.2901 0.0491 0 0.385 
      
Anti-Profit-Shifting Measure 476,337 0.9955 0.1090 0 2 
Existence of Transfer Pricing 
Legislation 
538,478 0.5146 0.4998 0 1 
Transfer Pricing Legislation 538,478 1.5145 0.4999 0 2 
Existence of Thin Capitalization 
Rules 
597,226 0.4319 0.4953 0 1 
      
Real Interest Rate
▼
 597,226 -1.0120 4.3241 -11.539 47.327 
GDP per Capita
▪
 597,226 1,810.31 695.8 407 9,890 
GDP
▪
 597,226 1.14e+12 7.92e+11 1.47e+09 2.69e+12 
Corruption Index
♦
 597,226 2.9408 0.4875 1.7 7.5 
Unemployment
▲
 597,226 5.5084 1.5776 1.4 19.6 
Notes: Firm data is exported from ORBIS database offered by Bureau van Dijk (2010)  
* taken from unconsolidated accounts, in thousand USD 
▼ 
in % (Source: World Development Indicator  Database, World Bank) 
▪
 in USD, constant prices, year 2000 (Source: World Development Indicator  Database, World Bank) 
♦ 
index ranges from 1 (high level of corruption) to 10 (no corruption)  (Source: Transparency Interna-
tional) 
▲
 in % of total labor force (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank) 
 
Source: own calculations. 
5.2.4 Estimation Strategy 
The presented data is used to test different models. In a first step, the impact of the 
outlined anti-profit-shifting measures (APS) will be examined. This is done using the 
following model 
𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝜏𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . 
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𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  stands for the profit or loss before taxes of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. For this model, 
the profit before tax is used rather than the EBIT as used in Chapter 5.1, because it is 
affected by both channels of profit shifting, i.e. transfer pricing and intercompany 
debt financing. In contrast, EBIT does not include interest payments and should, 
thus, not be affected by thin capitalization rules. Furthermore, a logarithmic trans-
formation is used for 𝑃𝐿𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  as its distribution is strongly asymmetric. 
The statutory corporate tax rate is depicted by 𝜏𝑖𝑡  and the overall anti-profit-shifting 
measure by 𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡  . It is expected that cross-border profit shifting takes place and, 
thus, reported profitability should be lower in high-tax countries which means 
𝛽1 < 0. In line with the previous study, it is expected that the introduction or tighten-
ing of anti-avoidance measures decreases the tax rate sensitivity of profit shifting as 
it becomes more difficult to transfer taxable income through intercompany debt fi-
nancing and/or trade, i.e. it is expected that  𝛽2 > 0. Finally, due to the inclusion of 
the interaction term, 𝛽3 measures the impact of the anti-profit-shifting variable in 
countries with a statutory corporate tax rate of zero. Such low-tax countries usually 
benefit from inward profit shifting and, thus, the effect of the introduction of anti-
avoidance measures in those countries is less clear. While thin capitalization rules 
only have an influence on outward profit shifting by limiting the amount of deducti-
ble interest, transfer pricing regulations also affect inward profit shifting as they set 
guidelines for the pricing of transactions in either direction. Therefore, with the in-
troduction or tightening of transfer pricing regulations, the profitability is expected to 
decrease in low-tax countries as inward profit shifting is restricted which means 
𝛽3 < 0. As the anti-profit-shifting measure also includes thin capitalization rules, the 
effect might be reduced. 
In a second step, both channels of profit shifting, i.e. intercompany trade and debt 
financing, will be examined separately in order to confirm the results of the first step. 
As previously outlined, it is not expected that thin capitalization rules have an impact 
on EBIT as it does not account for interest payments. Therefore, EBIT can be used to 
estimate solely the impact of transfer pricing regulations. The model will have the 
following form 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝜏𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . 
Again, the impact of the statutory corporate tax rate on reported EBIT will be ana-
lyzed and it is expected that the introduction or tightening of transfer pricing regula-
5 Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Anti-Avoidance Measures on Profit Shifting 
156 
 
tions (𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) decreases this impact. Again, the coefficient 𝛽3 depicts the effect of 
transfer pricing regulations in zero-tax countries and is expected to be negative. 
In order to test for profit shifting through intercompany debt financing, the impact of 
thin capitalization rules on the debt ratio, i.e. debt over total assets, of the firms is 
examined. Since the data does not allow for a distinction between external and inter-
nal debt, all debt is used which will bias the results as usually only internal debt, i.e. 
between related entities, is affected by thin capitalization rules. The following model 
will be applied 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
In this model, a higher debt ratio stands for increased outward profit shifting activi-
ties. Thus, the statutory corporate tax rate is expected to have a positive impact on 
debt ratio (𝛽1 > 0), since firms located in high-tax countries use intercompany fi-
nancing for outward profit shifting. Thin capitalization rules are expected to curtail 
such activities, therefore it is expected that 𝛽2 < 0. Note that the model does not in-
clude an interaction term as thin capitalization rules only limit outward profit shifting 
and should, thus, have the same effect on low- and high-tax countries. 
All models also include a set of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . The firm size is controlled for 
by including total assets.
145
  Furthermore, the host country characteristics presented 
above (GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and corruption perception index) 
are included. The real interest rate is controlled for in the debt ratio model to account 
for costs of financing. Industry-year effects using one-digit NACE-Codes are also 
included to control for external effects to firms of the same industry over time. Final-
ly, firm fixed effects control for time-constant firm heterogeneity.  
5.2.5 Empirical Study 
As previously outlined, the empirical study will be divided into two parts. In a first 
part, the impact of overall anti-avoidance measures on profit shifting activities will 
be studied, while in the second part, the different channels of profit shifting will be 
more closely examined. 
                                                 
145
 Note that the study conducted in Chapter 5.1 included fixed assets and costs of employees to con-
trol for firm size. But both variables show only a very poor coverage in this data set, so that total as-
sets are used instead. 
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5.2.5.1 Impact of Anti-Profit-Shifting Legislation 
In the first set of regressions, the logarithm of the profit before taxes is used as the 
dependent variable. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which account for clus-
tering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. 
In Specification (1), the tax rate sensitivity of reported profitability is estimated for 
all firms in the sample. The results show that an increase in the statutory corporate 
tax rate has a highly significant and negative effect on reported profits, i.e. an in-
crease of the tax rate of 1 percentage point decreases reported profits before taxes by 
2.4%. This result is in line with the expectations that firms subject to high corporate 
taxes tend to shift profits across borders.  
Specification (2) includes an anti-profit-shifting measure which is constructed as the 
sum of the indicator variables for the existence of thin capitalization rules and for 
transfer pricing regulations, where the indicator variable for transfer pricing regula-
tions takes on the value 1 for regulations referring to category 2 as defined above. 
The results show that the introduction or tightening of anti-profit-shifting legislation 
significantly reduces the tax rate sensitivity of reported profits. Quantitatively, the 
introduction of one component of anti-avoidance measure reduces the tax rate sensi-
tivity by 71% (=5.036/7.054). The coefficient of the anti-profit-shifting measure is 
negative, which might seem surprising. However, as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, due to the inclusion of the interaction term, the coefficient measures the impact 
of the introduction or tightening of anti-profit-shifting legislation in countries with a 
statutory corporate tax rate of zero. Since those countries benefit from inward profit 
shifting, anti-profit-shifting measures may lead to a decrease of reported profits. Pre-
cisely, the results show that up to a statutory tax rate of 32.1% (=1.616/5.036) profits 
decrease, while they increase for higher tax rates. 
Specifications (3) and (4) show the results of the corresponding estimates on only the 
large companies in the sample. Large companies are defined according to the Bureau 
van Dijk standard and have to report either total assets larger than USD 28,000,000 
or operating revenues larger than USD 14,000,000. This restriction takes into ac-
count that the data set does not allow for a distinction of multinational firms. It was 
assumed that large firms are more likely to be multinational and, thus, have the op-
portunity to shift profits to foreign affiliates. However, the results show that, indeed, 
the same effects can be found for the restricted sample, but they are weaker than for 
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the entire sample. In addition, the coefficient of determination (within R-squared) is 
lower. Thus, the underlying assumption cannot be confirmed. For the following es-
timations, the results for large firms will, therefore, not be reported in addition.   
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Table 20: Regression Results VI 
Table 20: Anti-Profit-Shifting Legislation, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2008 
Dependent Variable: Log Profit Before Taxes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Corporate Tax Rate -2.397*** 
(0.353) 
-7.054*** 
(1.348) 
-1.914*** 
(0.551) 
-5.050*** 
(1.773) 
Anti-Profit-Shifting Legislation  -1.616*** 
(0.448) 
 -1.139** 
(0.520) 
Anti-Profit-Shifting Leg. x Coporate Tax Rate  5.036*** 
(1.369) 
 3.110* 
(1.711) 
Log Total Assets 0.585*** 
(0.005) 
0.586*** 
(0.005) 
0.399*** 
(0.013) 
0.399*** 
(0.013) 
Corruption Index -0.188*** 
(0.026) 
-0.178*** 
(0.026) 
-0.429*** 
(0.048) 
-0.430*** 
(0.048) 
Log GDP 2.9995*** 
(0.676) 
3.164*** 
(0.678) 
3.212*** 
(0.863) 
3.409*** 
(0.869) 
Log GDP per Capita -1.820** 
(0.779) 
-1.929** 
(0.782) 
-2.349** 
(0.915) 
-2.599*** 
(0.920) 
Unemployment 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
-0.044** 
(0.021) 
-0.046** 
(0.021) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.2481 0.2481 0.1489 0.1490 
# Obs 476,337 476,337 165,289 165,289 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observa-
tional unit is the firm. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's profit before taxes. 'Corporate tax rate' depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including 
local income taxes and possible surcharges. 'Anti-Profit-Shifting Legislation' describes the sum of the indicator variables for the existence of thin capitalization rules and for transfer 
pricing legislation in a given country. 'Anti-Profit-Shifting Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of such a variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Log Total Assets' 
depicts the logarithm of the total asset stock. 'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 10=no corruption). 'GDP (per capita)' stands 
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for the host country's gross domestic product (per capita). 'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate in % of the total labor force. Industry-year-effects are based 
on one-digit NACE-codes. 
Source: own calculations. 
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5.2.5.2 Different Channels of Profit Shifting Activities 
In this section, the two different channels, namely intercompany trade and debt fi-
nancing, will be examined separately in order to confirm the results of the previous 
section. Firstly, estimations on intercompany trade will be conducted using the loga-
rithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as the dependent variable as this 
measure is not expected to be influenced by thin capitalization rules. Secondly, the 
effect of thin capitalization rules on debt financing will be estimated using the debt 
ratio (i.e. debt over total assets) as the dependent variable.  
Transfer Pricing Regulations 
Specification (1) of Table 21 tests for the tax rate sensitivity of reported EBIT. 
Again, the coefficient is significant and negative, i.e. a 1 percentage point increase of 
the tax rate results in a 0.6% decrease of reported EBIT. 
Table 21: Regression Results VII 
 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observational unit is the firm. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
Table 21: Transfer Pricing Regulations, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2008 
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.556** 
(0.229) 
-0.660*** 
(0.245) 
-1.645*** 
(0.586) 
Existence of Transfer Pricing Regula-
tions 
 -0.315* 
(0.183) 
 
Existence of TP Reg. x Corporate Tax 
Rate  
 0.998** 
(0.450) 
 
Transfer Pricing Regulations   -0.295** 
(0.148) 
TP Regulations x Coporate Tax Rate   0.986** 
(0.441) 
Log Total Assets 0.614*** 
(0.005) 
0.614*** 
(0.005) 
0.614*** 
(0.005) 
Corruption Index 0.083*** 
(0.019) 
0.080*** 
(0.019) 
0.080*** 
(0.019) 
Log GDP -0.872** 
(0.438) 
-0.753 
(0.459) 
-0.755* 
(0.454) 
Log GDP per Capita 2.602*** 
(0.498) 
2.448*** 
(0.527) 
2.450*** 
(0.521) 
Unemployment 0.067*** 
(0.011) 
0.067*** 
(0.011) 
0.067*** 
(0.011) 
Industry-Year-Effects ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.3221 0.3221 0.3221 
# Obs 538,478 538,478 538,478 
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'Corporate tax rate' depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes 
and possible surcharges. 'Existence of Transfer Pricing Regulations' is an indicator variable which 
equals one for countries that implement transfer pricing regulations allocated to category 2 
(=documentation requirement exists in national tax law and a disclosure may be required in addition), 
and zero otherwise. 'Existence of TP Reg. x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of the 
indicator variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Transfer Pricing Regulations' is a categorial variable 
which ranges from 0 to 2 (0= no TP regulations, 1= TP regulations exist, but no statutory documenta-
tion requirement, 2=documentation requirement exists in national tax law and a disclosure may be 
required in addition). 'TP Regulations x Corporate Tax Rate' stands for the interaction term of the 
categorial variable and the corporate tax rate. 'Log Total Assets' depicts the logarithm of the total asset 
stock. 'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 
10=no corruption). 'GDP (per capita)' stands for the host country's gross domestic product (per capita). 
'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate in % of the total labor force. Industry-
year-effects are based on one-digit NACE-codes. 
Source: own calculations. 
In Specification (2), an indicator variable is included which equals one if transfer 
pricing regulations correspond to category 2 as defined above. The results show that 
the tax rate sensitivity of reported EBIT is fully compensated when introducing 
transfer pricing regulations of category 2. No profit shifting activities statistically 
different from zero can be found in this setting. This result is confirmed by Specifica-
tion (3) which uses a categorial variable ranging from 0 to 2 according to the strict-
ness of implemented transfer pricing regulations as an alternative regressor. It shows 
that the introduction of category 1-transfer pricing regulations reduces the tax rate 
sensitivity of reported EBIT by approximately 60% (=0.986/1.645). Moreover, no 
profit shifting activities statistically different from zero can be found for transfer 
pricing regulations allocated to category 2. 
Thin Capitalization Rules 
Specification (1) shows an estimation of the statutory corporate tax rate on the re-
ported debt ratio of the firm. The coefficient is highly significant and positive which 
suggests that in countries with higher tax rates, higher debt ratios are reported. This 
is in line with the expectation that the debt ratio is a proxy for profit shifting activi-
ties through intercompany debt financing. Quantitatively, if the tax rate increases by 
10 percentage points, the debt ratio increases by 5%. In addition, the real interest rate 
prevailing in the respective host country is included and shows the expected negative 
sign. This means where the real interest rate is higher, the debt ratio decreases due to 
higher costs of financing. 
Including the indicator variable for the existence of thin capitalization rules in Speci-
fication (2) shows the expected results. The existence of such rules has a negative 
impact on the reported debt ratio while the tax rate still has a positive impact. Cer-
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tainly, the results are distorted since all debt, internal and external, is included in the 
debt ratio. But, nevertheless, for the entire sample, the coefficient is still negative and 
stands for a 1.1% decrease of the debt ratio where thin capitalization rules exist. 
These results confirm the findings of Buettner/Overesch/ Schreiber/Wamser (2012) 
who also find that thin capitalization rules reduce the share of internal debt.  
Table 22: Regression Results VIII 
Table 22: Thin Capitalization Rules, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2008 
Dependent Variable: Debt Ratio 
   
 (1) (2) 
Corporate Tax Rate 0.450*** 
(0.030) 
0.413*** 
(0.034) 
Existence of Thin Capitalization 
Rules 
 -0.013** 
(0.007) 
Real Interest Rate -0.001*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0001) 
Log Total Assets 0.048*** 
(0.001) 
0.048*** 
(0.001) 
Corruption Index 0.047*** 
(0.003) 
0.047*** 
(0.003) 
Log GDP -0.259*** 
(0.053) 
-0.255*** 
(0.053) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.146** 
(0.059) 
0.135** 
(0.059) 
Unemployment 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Year-Effects ✔ ✔ 
Within R-Squared 0.0589 0.0589 
# Obs 597,226 597,226 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observational unit is the firm. 
The dependent variable is the firm's debt ratio calculated as debt over total assets. 'Corporate tax rate' 
depicts the host country's statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible sur-
charges. 'Existence of Thin Capitalization Rules' is an indicator variable which equals one for coun-
tries that implemented thin capitalization rules, and zero otherwise. 'Real Interest Rate' stands for the 
host country‟s real interest rate in %. 'Log Total Assets' depicts the logarithm of the total asset stock. 
'Corruption Index' is the Transparency International Corruption Index (1=high corruption, 10=no 
corruption). 'Log GDP (per capita)' stands for the logarithm of the host country's gross domestic prod-
uct (per capita). 'Unemployment' depicts the host country's unemployment rate in % of the total labor 
force. 
Source: own calculations. 
Concluding, both models have confirmed the findings of the first part and reveal in-
ternational profit shifting activities in developing countries. Intercompany trade and 
debt financing respond to changes in the statutory corporate tax rate and appear to be 
important channels for profit shifting. However, the results also show that through 
the introduction or tightening of anti-profit-shifting measures, developing countries 
may prevent extensive tax base erosion. 
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5.2.6 Conclusion of Results 
Developing countries are especially affected by outward profit shifting as previous 
studies have shown (see e.g. Baker (2005)). In addition, they often lack the resources 
to enforce anti-avoidance measures. Thus, it was the goal of this study to analyze 
whether developing countries have anti-avoidance measures in place and if so, 
whether they are effective in preventing tax base erosion.  
The results show that a considerable number of developing countries have introduced 
both, transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules, over the years 1999 to 2008. But, 
nevertheless, there still exist a number of countries that have only very lax transfer 
pricing regulations and no thin capitalization rules. 
Furthermore, the results of the estimations suggest that where anti-profit-shifting 
measures were introduced or tightened, they had the desired effect. While a highly 
significant tax rate sensitivity prevails in the sample, it was significantly reduced by 
a change in thin capitalization or transfer pricing regulations. This result is also con-
firmed in separate estimations for transfer pricing regulations and thin capitalization 
rules. The earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), which are presumably only af-
fected by transfer pricing regulations since they do not include interest payments, 
also show a high tax rate sensitivity which is reduced upon the introduction or tigh-
tening of transfer pricing regulations. Moreover, the impact of thin capitalization 
rules on the reported debt ratio was analyzed. The debt ratio also shows a high tax 
rate sensitivity which suggests that the channel of intercompany financing is used to 
shift profits across borders. But, where thin capitalization rules are introduced, the 
debt ratio decreases. 
The study provides evidence that the introduction and enforcement of anti-profit-
shifting measures in developing countries helps to prevent the erosion of the tax base 
and, thus, the loss of tax revenues. Anti-avoidance measures are, therefore, an impor-
tant means to secure a fair allocation of taxing rights for developing countries. 
5.3 Comparison of Results 
The presented studies examine the influence of anti-avoidance measures on profit 
shifting of multinational companies located in developed and developing countries. 
Although the scope of both studies differs, the problems assessed still partly overlap. 
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Where this is the case, it is interesting to compare the results for developed and de-
veloping countries.  
Firstly, the tax rate sensitivity of reported EBIT is found to be higher in developing 
countries than in developed countries, i.e. a 1 percentage point increase of the statu-
tory corporate tax rate reduces the reported EBIT of firms in developing countries by 
0.6% while it reduces the reported EBIT of firms in developed countries by only 
0.4%.
146
 This result is in line with the study by Fuest/Hebous/Riedel (2011) who 
show that profit shifting through intercompany debt financing in developing coun-
tries is twice as sensitive to tax rate changes than in developed countries. These find-
ings also relate to the studies on the magnitude of tax avoidance outlined in Chapter 
2.2.3 which provide evidence that developing countries a more affected by outward 
profit shifting than developed countries.  
Secondly, the impact of the introduction of transfer pricing regulations may also be 
compared. In both cases, the existence of transfer pricing regulations fully compen-
sates the negative tax rate effect on reported EBIT. Thus, it can be concluded that 
where transfer pricing regulations exist, in developed as well as in developing coun-
tries, they serve their purpose and function as a valid tool to prevent profit shifting. 
However, one has to be cautious when drawing conclusions from these results for the 
entire population of firms in developed and developing countries. In order to general-
ize the findings and to provide more reliable evidence, more studies would have to be 
evaluated in addition. While no further evidence can be found for the effect of trans-
fer pricing regulations, several studies exist on the tax rate sensitivity of profit shift-
ing. However, an additional evaluation of such studies is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
147
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 See Table 12 and Table 21.  
147
 For a meta-study on profit shifting, see, however, Heckemeyer/Overesch (2012). 
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6 Conclusion 
(1) The globalization of businesses in connection with the nationality of tax systems 
leads to an increasing international tax competition which is exploited by multi-
national enterprises through profit shifting activities. Such activities include in-
tercompany debt financing, the relocation of intangible assets, and transfer pric-
ing. Studies have shown that profit shifting causes a significant loss of tax reve-
nues which is even higher in developing countries. 
(2) In order to prevent profit shifting, several anti-avoidance measures have been 
introduced. Unilateral measures comprise general anti-avoidance rules, transfer 
pricing regulations, thin/fat capitalization rules, and disclosure requirements. 
However, the design and enforcement level of those instruments varies widely 
across countries. 
(3) Bilateral measures comprise double tax treaties and agreements on the exchange 
of information. The OECD as well as the UN Model Tax Convention include 
several anti-avoidance measures which mainly differ where the UN took account 
of the lack of administrative expertise in developing countries. Nevertheless, it 
has to be kept in mind that double tax treaties do not constitute taxing rights, but 
provide limits to domestic tax law. 
(4) Multilateral measures have been mainly initiated by the OECD, the European 
Union, and the UN. The OECD and EU projects on harmful tax competition 
aimed at an increasing tax cooperation across countries in order to prevent the 
loss of tax revenues. They constitute a reasonable means considering the nega-
tive impact of tax base erosion, on the one hand, and the positive implications of 
tax competition, on the other hand.  
(5) The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines serve as an internationally agreed basis 
for transfer pricing regulations in member and non-member countries which un-
dergoes regular amendments regarding changes in the transfer pricing circums-
tances. The UN Transfer Pricing Manual complements the Guidelines and is an 
important instrument for the promotion of such rules in developing countries. 
Moreover, the documentation requirements introduced by the European Union 
and the PATA allow for a common set of documents and, thus, reduce com-
pliance costs significantly. 
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(6) The scope of mutual assistance measures has been constantly increasing over the 
past and now widely includes a mandatory arbitration procedure as well as an 
override of bank secrecy. However, the awareness of this issue in national tax 
authorities is still rather low and has to be augmented in order to ensure the func-
tioning of the instruments. 
(7) Due to the three different implementation levels, there may be cases where two 
or more anti-avoidance measures are applicable simultaneously. For instruments 
for the mutual assistance in tax matters, it is generally true that the one with the 
widest scope may be applied. The interaction of unilateral instruments and tax 
treaties is, however, more difficult. Their compatibility largely depends on the 
interpretation of specific treaty provisions by jurisdictions.     
(8) Three different groups of anti-avoidance measures against profit shifting activi-
ties of multinational companies can be distinguished: specific measures which 
target particular transactions and are usually implemented in domestic tax law, 
supportive measures which aim at improving the administrative background, and 
the more general measures that intend to abolish harmful tax competition by 
coordinating the abolishment of certain harmful tax practices. 
(9) The presented anti-avoidance measures are generally in accordance with the 
principles of internation equity and neutrality as they aim at ensuring a fair allo-
cation of taxing rights. This is, however, only true where such measures are 
based on the internationally accepted arm‟s length principle. On the other hand, 
the principles of efficiency and simplicity may be violated by anti-avoidance 
measures as they, in many cases, impose a high compliance burden on taxpayers 
and tax authorities. Thus, both aspects have to be balanced against each other 
when deciding on the introduction and design of such measures. 
(10) The existing anti-avoidance measures form a solid framework which takes into 
account the current willingness of jurisdictions to give up national sovereignty. 
However, developing countries do not sufficiently take part in this framework. It 
is, therefore, important to provide such countries with guidance on the estab-
lishment and enforcement of anti-avoidance instruments. 
(11) Transfer pricing regulations comprise a great number of aspects which all add to 
some extent to the severity of such rules. In order to categorize transfer pricing 
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regulations according to their strictness, it can mainly be focused on the level of 
implemented documentation requirements because they not only stand for the 
level of control of transfer prices, but also express the level of enforcement. 
(12) A survey of 44 countries worldwide shows that the strictness of implemented 
transfer pricing regulations has increased over the past decade. Not a single 
country has loosened its regulations. Interestingly, a considerable difference ex-
ists between European and American and Asian countries. While in American 
and Asian countries a statutory documentation requirement is in all cases con-
nected with an annual disclosure of documents, the majority of European coun-
tries do not require disclosure. 
(13) Thin capitalization rules are employed in the great majority of the 53 surveyed 
countries. Over the past ten years a slight tendency towards fat capitalization 
rules, i.e. rules that apply to loans from third party lenders, can be observed. In 
addition, several countries have switched from a safe haven approach (fixed 
debt-to-equity ratio) to an income related approach. 
(14) The study on the impact of transfer pricing regulations on profit shifting activi-
ties in European countries confirms findings of previous studies and shows that a 
significant impact of the statutory corporate tax rate on reported firm profitabili-
ty exists. This tax rate sensitivity is, however, reduced by the introduction of 
transfer pricing regulations, i.e. 52.7% of the tax rate effect is captured by the in-
troduction of transfer pricing regulations. Furthermore, the results show that 
profit shifting activities in European countries decrease over time, precisely over 
the years 1999 to 2009 profit shifting activities are reduced by 5.7% per year. 
(15) Employing the measure for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations devel-
oped in the course of this thesis shows that with an increasing level of strictness, 
profit shifting activities are reduced even more. The same effect can be ac-
counted to the possibility to enter into Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) 
which is assumed to proxy for advanced administrative structures. 
(16) Examining the impact of anti-avoidance measure on profit shifting in developing 
countries shows similar results. While a highly significant tax rate sensitivity of 
reported profitability prevails, it is reduced by the introduction of transfer pric-
ing and/or thin capitalization rules. These results are confirmed when both chan-
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nels of profit shifting are examined separately. On the one hand, the tax rate sen-
sitivity of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) is reduced significantly by 
the introduction of transfer pricing regulations. On the other hand, the debt ratio 
reported by firms is also significantly affected by the existence of thin capitaliza-
tion rules. 
(17) A comparison of the results shows that the tax rate sensitivity of profit shifting is 
larger in developing countries than in developed countries, which confirms pre-
vious findings in the literature. The existence of transfer pricing regulations, 
however, fully compensates that effect in both groups of countries. This proves 
that where transfer pricing regulations are in place, they are equally successful in 
the prevention of profit shifting. 
(18) Both empirical studies show that anti-avoidance measures, i.e. transfer pricing 
regulations as well as thin capitalization rules, are a valid instrument in reducing 
and hampering profit shifting activities within multinational companies. They 
are, thus, an important means to protect national tax revenues and, consequently, 
sustain domestic welfare. Tax legislators may, furthermore, derive valid guid-
ance on the design and enforcement of anti-avoidance regulations from the re-
sults.  
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Table A1: Corporate Tax Rates in Developed Countries 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 34 34 34 34 34 34 25 25 25 25 25 
Belgium 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Croatia 35 35 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Czech   
Republic 
35 31 31 31 31 28 26 24 24 21 20 
Denmark 32 32 30 30 30 30 28 28 25 25 25 
Estonia 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 23 22 21 21 
Finland 28 29 29 29 29 26 26 26 26 26 26 
France 40 37.8 36.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35 34.4 34.4 34.4 34.4 
Germany 51.6 51.6 38.3 38.3 39.6 38.3 38.7 38.7 38.7 29.8 29.8 
Hungary 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 17.6 17.5 17.5 21.3 21.3 21.3 
Ireland 28 24 20 16 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Italy 41.3 41.3 40.3 40.3 38.3 37.3 37.3 37.3 37.3 31.4 31.4 
Luxembourg 37.5 37.5 37.5 30.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 29.6 29.6 28.6 28.6 
Netherlands 35 35 35 34.5 34.5 34.5 31.5 29.6 25.5 25.5 25.5 
Norway 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Poland 34 30 28 28 27 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 37.4 35.2 35.2 33 33 27.5 27.5 27.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 
Slovak  
Republic 
40 29 29 25 25 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 32.5 30 30 
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 26.3 
Switzerland 25 25 24.7 24.5 24.1 24.1 21.3 21.3 . . . 
United 
Kingdom 
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 
Mean 33.7 32.5 30.7 29.8 29.3 27.9 27 26.7 26.3 25.5 25.3 
Min 19.6 19.6 19.6 16 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Max 51.6 51.6 40.3 40.3 39.6 38.3 38.7 38.7 38.7 34.4 34.4 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A2: Corporate Tax Rates in Developing Countries 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Argentina 33 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Bulgaria 34.3 32.5 28 23.5 23.5 19.5 15 15 10 10 10 
Brazil 33 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 15 15 
Chile 15 15 15 16 16.5 17 17 17 17 17 17 
China 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 25 25 
Colombia 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 34 33 33 
Ecuador 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Indonesia 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 
India 35 38.5 38.5 35.7 36.8 35.9 36.6 33.7 33.7 34 34 
Latvia 25 25 25 22 19 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Lithuania 29 24 24 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Moldova . . . 25 25 20 18 15 15 0 0 
Montenegro . . . . 20 20 9 9 9 . . 
Mexico 34 35 35 35 34 33 30 29 28 28 28 
Malaysia 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 27 26 25 
Peru 30 30 30 30 27 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Philippines 33 32 32 32 32 32 32 35 35 35 30 
Romania 38 25 25 25 25 25 16 16 16 16 16 
Russia 35 35 35 24 24 24 24 24 24 20 20 
Serbia 20 20 20 20 14 12.3 10 10 10 10 10 
Thailand . . 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
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Ukraine 30 30 30 30 30 30 25 25 25 25 25 
Venezuela 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Vietnam . . 32 32 32 28 28 28 28 28 25 
Mean 30.5 29.8 29.7 28.2 27.4 26.7 25.2 25.0 24.7 23.3 22.8 
Min 15 15 15 15 14 12.3 9 9 9 0 0 
Max 38 38.5 38.5 35.7 36.8 35.9 36.6 35 35 35 35 
Source: own collection.
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Table A3: Transfer Pricing Existence and Applicability 
 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Existence TP regulations since 1998 
Applicability foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party > 50%; de facto; common 
Brazil 
Existence TP regulations since 1997, but not arm‟s length principle, instead: maximum price ceilings and minimum gross income floors 
Applicability foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party > 10%; common 
Canada 
Existence TP regulations since 1998 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
Chile 
Existence TP regulations since 1997 
Applicability n/a n/a foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Colombia 
Existence n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
Ecuador 
Existence 
general anti-avoidance rule which has never been applied in prac-
tice 
1.1.2005: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability 
- - - - foreign related entities 30.12.2007: foreign related 
entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party 
- - - - de facto; common 30.12.2007: > 25%; de facto; 
common 
Mexico 
Existence TP regulations since 1996 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Peru 
Existence 1.1.2001: TP regulations are introduced 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 30%; de facto; common 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
United 
States 
Existence TP regulations since 1968 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no threshold; de facto; common 
Venezuela 
Existence 
anti-avoidance 
rule regarding 
imports/exports 
28.12.2001: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability 
foreign related 
entities 
domestic and foreign related entities; entities in tax havens 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Existence TP regulations since 1981 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no threshold; de facto; common 
China 
Existence 
general anti-avoidance rule since 1991 (for foreign companies), 1993 (for domestic companies) 1.1.2008: introduction of TP 
regulations 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a > 25%; de facto; common 
India 
Existence 1.4.2001: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 26%; de facto; common 
Indonesia 
Existence TP regulations since 1984 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 25%; de facto; common 
Japan 
Existence TP regulations since 1986 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 50%; de facto; common 
Malaysia 
Existence 
general anti-avoidance rule  1.1.2009: 
additional anti-
avoidance rule 
is introduced 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
 175 
 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Rel. Party - - 1.7.2003: no threshold; de facto; common 
Philippines 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule since 1939 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thailand 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 
Applicability n/a 16.5.2002: domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a 16.5.2002: no threshold; de facto; common 
Vietnam 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 28.1.2006: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability foreign related entities 1.1.2004: domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - - - > 20%; de facto; common 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule (OECD guidelines have been issued for guidance in 1996) 
Applicability no provision in national tax law; OECD: foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no provision in national tax law; OECD: no threshold; de facto; common 
Belgium 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 19.7.2004: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Czech Re-
public 
Existence TP regulations since 1993 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 25%; de facto; common 
Denmark 
Existence TP regulations since 1998 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
Finland 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 1.1.2007: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 50%; de facto; common 
France 
Existence TP regulations since 1996 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Germany Existence TP regulations since 1983 
 176 
 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 25%; de facto; common 
Greece 
Existence TP regulations since 1994 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 
Existence TP regulations since 1992 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 50%; de facto; common 
Ireland 
Existence anti-avoidance rules specified for certain transactions (rule on foreign transactions is not applied in practice) 
Applicability n/a domestic related entities subject to tax incentives 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Italy 
Existence TP regulations since 1988 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Luxembourg 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 
Applicability n/a foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands 
Existence 
general anti-
avoidance rule 
1.1.2002: introduction of TP regulations  
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a no threshold; de facto; common 
Norway 
Existence TP regulations since 1999 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Poland 
Existence TP regulations since 1992 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party no threshold; de facto; common 1.1.2004: > 5%; de facto; common 
Portugal 
Existence 
general anti-
avoidance rule 
1.1.2002: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a > 10%; de facto; common 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Romania 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule since 1994 1.1.2004: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - 1.1.2004: > 25%; de facto; common 
Russia 
Existence TP regulations since 1999 
Applicability domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party > 20%; de facto; common 
Slovak Re-
public 
Existence TP regulations since 1993 
Applicability foreign related parties 
Rel. Party n/a > 25%; de facto; common 
Slovenia 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 1.1.2005: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a > 25%; de facto; common 
Spain 
Existence TP regulations since 1997 
Applicability n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.12.2006: > 25%; de facto; common 
Sweden 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule since 1928 1.1.2007: introduction of TP regulations 
Applicability foreign related entities 
Rel. Party - - - - - - no threshold; de facto; common 
Switzerland 
Existence general anti-avoidance rule 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rel. Party - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
Existence TP regulations since 1997 
Applicability n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 20%; de facto; common 
United 
Kingdom 
Existence TP regulations since 1999 
Applicability foreign related entities 1.4.2004: domestic and foreign related entities 
Rel. Party n/a n/a > 40%; de facto; common 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing and their Applicability 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year.   
Existence: general anti-avoidance rule: arm‟s length principle stated in the national tax code; guidelines may be based on general anti-avoidance rules.  
TP regulations: in addition documentation rules, definition of methods, related entities etc. exist in the law 
Related Party: de facto: de facto control (control of management; exercise of significant influence); common: under common control ;  
Poland: related party definitions apply to cross-border transactions, slightly different for domestic transactions. 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A4: Transfer Pricing Methods 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 22.10.2003: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, shipment value 
Priority best method best method, shipment value if applicable 
Brazil 
Methods CUP, RPM (fixed margins), Cost Plus (fixed margins) 
Priority method that yields lowest taxable income 
Canada 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Chile 
Methods CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Colombia 
Methods n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: most appropriate method 
Ecuador 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority 
n/a n/a n/a n/a - - - - 15.5.2008: 
CUP, RPM, 
Cost Plus, 
Profit Split, 
TNMM 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mexico 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority 
- - - - - - 1.1.2007: transaction-based over profit-based, 
priority for CUP 
Peru 
Methods n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, other 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a most appropriate method 
United 
States 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, CPM 
Priority best method 
Venezuela 
Methods n/a 28.12.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority  n/a most appropriate method, priority for CUP 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 
China 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, other 
Priority most appropriate method 
India 
Methods 1.4.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, other 
Priority 1.4.2001: most appropriate method 
Indonesia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Japan 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Malaysia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Philippines 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM, other 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a most appropriate method 
Thailand 
Methods n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Vietnam 
Methods 8.3.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 1.1.2006: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a most appropriate method 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Belgium 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Czech 
Republic 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Denmark 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Finland 
Methods none specified in domestic law, but OECD guidelines recognized 1.1.2007: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, 
TNMM 
Priority - - - - - - transaction-based over profit-based 
France 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Germany 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split 12.4.2005: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Greece 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP CUP 1.1.2009: CUP, 
RPM, Cost 
Plus, Profit 
Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - - 1.1.2009: 
transaction-
based over 
profit-based, 
priority for 
CUP 
Hungary 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, other 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Ireland 
Methods none specified in domestic law 
Priority - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 
Luxem-
bourg 
Methods none specified in domestic law, but OECD guidelines recognized 
Priority - - - - - - - - - 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Methods 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Nether-
lands 
Methods n/a 
 
CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Norway 
Methods none specified in domestic law, but OECD guidelines recognized 
Priority - - - - - - - - - 
Poland 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Portugal 
Methods n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Romania 
Methods n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 
Russia 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 
Priority CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 
Slovak 
Republic 
Methods 1.1.2001: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a transaction-based over profit-based 
Slovenia 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: transaction-based over profit-based 
Spain 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split 1.12.2006: CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, 
TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based, priority for CUP 1.12.2006: transaction-based over profit-based 
Sweden 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Switzer-
land 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Ukraine 
Methods n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP, RPM, Cost Plus 
Priority n/a n/a n/a n/a CUP preferred 
United 
Kingdom 
Methods CUP, RPM, Cost Plus, Profit Split, TNMM 
Priority transaction-based over profit-based 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries;  information as of 1 July of the respective year 
CUP: Comparable Uncontrolled Price, RPM: Resale Price Method, TNMM: Transfer Net Margin Method 
Source: own collection. 
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Table A5: Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1999 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content 
1.1.2001: 
long 
long long long long long long long long 
Brazil 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content long long long long long long long long long 
Canada 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Chile 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Colombia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2004: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no 1.1.2004: yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - - - short short short short short short 
Ecuador 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no 1.1.2005: yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - - - - long long long long long 
Mexico 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1997 
Disclosure 1.1.2001: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content long long long long long long long long long 
Peru 
Stat. Requ. 1.1.2001: statutory requirement 
Disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a yes yes yes yes yes 
Content n/a n/a n/a n/a short 1.1.2006: long long long long 
United 
States 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1994 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
 183 
 
Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Venezuela 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory 
requirement 
1.1.2002: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short short 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
China 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short 1.1.2008: long long 
India 
Stat. Requ. 1.4.2001: statutory requirement 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content long long long long long long long long long 
Indonesia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short 1.1.2009: long 
Japan 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Malaysia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 1.7.2003: no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Philippines 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Thailand 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Vietnam 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 28.1.2006: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no 28.1.2006: yes yes yes yes 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Content - - - - - short short short short 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Czech 
Republic 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Denmark 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1999 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content  short short short short short short short short short 
Finland 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2007: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no 1.1.2009: yes 
Content - - - - - - - - short 
France 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content  - - - - - - - - - 
Germany 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory requirement, but 
required in practice 
1.1.2003: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Greece 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory requirement, but 
required in practice 
1.1.2003: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ireland 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content  short short short short short short short short short 
Luxem-
bourg 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Nether-
lands 
Stat. Requ. 
no statutory 
requirement 
1.1.2002: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short short 
Norway 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2008: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no 1.1.2008: yes yes 
Content - - - - - - - short short 
Poland 
Stat. Requ. 1.1.2001: statutory requirement 
Disclosure 7.5.2001: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content short short short short short short short short short 
Portugal 
Stat. Requ. n/a 1.1.2002: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no 1.1.2002: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Content - short short short short short short short short 
Romania 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.7.2007: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Russia 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Slovak 
Republic 
Stat. Requ. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2009: 
statutory re-
quirement 
 186 
 
Country  National Regulations on Documentation Requirements  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Slovenia 
Stat. Requ. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.9.2006: statutory requirement 
Disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a yes yes yes 
Content n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a short short short 
Spain 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.12.2006: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 1.1.2007: statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Switzer-
land 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement, but required in practice 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
Stat. Requ. no statutory requirement 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
Stat. Requ. statutory requirement since 1999 
Disclosure no no no no no no no no no 
Content - - - - - - - - - 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
statutory requirement: documentation requirement is included in the national tax law (not administrative guidelines) 
short: a summary or an overview over transactions has to be submitted 
long: full documentation has to be submitted; in some cases, only a short content is applicable to small enterprises or low incomes (Ecuador, Mexico, Peru) 
Source: own collection. 
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Table A6: Deadlines of Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Country  National Regulations on Submission Deadlines 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return 5 months after fiscal year end 8 months after fiscal year end 
Brazil 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return 
30 Septem-
ber 
30 June 
Canada 
Full Doc. within 3 months of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end 
Chile 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Colombia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 15 days of request 
Tax Return - - - 2 September 30 June 11 July 22 July 
Ecuador 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a - - - - - 
Tax Return 
- - - - within 12 months of tax return within 6 
months of tax 
return 
Mexico 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return n/a 31 July 31 May n/a n/a 30 June 
Peru 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - - - - 
Tax Return n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 25 July 31 July 
United 
States 
Full Doc. n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return 15
th
 of third month after fiscal year end 
Venezuela 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tax Return - 30 June 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 2 weeks of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end  5 months after fiscal year end 15
th
 of seventh month after fiscal year end 
China 
Full Doc. n/a within 60 days of request - - 
Tax Return 4 months after fiscal year end 5 months after fiscal year end 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
India 
Full Doc. n/a - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return n/a 31 October 30 September 
Indonesia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a - 
Tax Return - 3 months after fiscal year end 4 months after fiscal year end 
Japan 
Full Doc. case by case 
Tax Return 2 months after fiscal year end 
Malaysia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end 7 months after fiscal year end 
Philippines 
Full Doc. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 45 days 
of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Thailand 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Vietnam 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return 
- - - - - 2 months after 
fiscal year end 
90 days after fiscal year end 
EUROPE 
Austria 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 3 weeks of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 
Full Doc. n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Czech 
Republic 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 15 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Denmark 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return 6 months after fiscal year end 
Finland 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
Tax Return 
- - - - - - - - 4 months after 
fiscal year end 
France 
Full Doc. within 60 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Germany Full Doc. n/a n/a within 60 days of request 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Greece 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - n/a n/a 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 3 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Ireland 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
Full Doc. n/a within 15 days of request 
Tax Return n/a n/a 10 months after fiscal year end 7 months after fiscal year end 
Luxem-
bourg 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Nether-
lands 
Full Doc. n/a within 3 months of request 
Tax Return 
- 6 months after fiscal year end 5 months after 
fiscal year end 
Norway 
Full Doc. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a within 4 weeks of request within 45 days 
of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - 31 May 31 May 
Poland 
Full Doc. within 7 days of request 
Tax Return 
- 9 months after 
fiscal year end 
3 months after fiscal year end 
Portugal 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a within 10 days of request 
Tax Return - 31 May 
Romania 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Russia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 10 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Slovak 
Republic 
Full Doc. 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 60 days 
of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Slovenia 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 90 days of request 
Tax Return n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 months after fiscal year end 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Spain 
Full Doc. case by case 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Switzer-
land 
Full Doc. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
Full Doc. - - - - - - - - - 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
Full Doc. n/a within 30 days of request 
Tax Return - - - - - - - - - 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
Source: own collection 
 
Table A7: Transfer Pricing Penalties 
Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Penalties  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argen- 
tina 
TP Penalty 
no no no 14.11.2003: 
yes 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 
50-100% of unpaid tax; up to 10 times unpaid 
tax in case of fraud; late interest (3% per month) 
14.11.2003: 100-400% of unpaid tax; up to 10 times unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (3% per 
month) 
Documentation n/a fixed fine for not filing return 14.11.2003: up to ARS 450,000 (~USD 150,000) for noncompliance 
Brazil 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest 75-150% of unpaid tax; late interest (federal interest rate) 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Documentation 
n/a 112.5-225% of unpaid tax if no documentation 112.5-225% of unpaid tax if no 
documentation ; 5% of transac-
tion price for incorrect or omit-
ted information; 0.02% of net 
revenue per day for failure to 
submit online 
Canada 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 10% of TP adjustment if certain threshold is exceeded (CAD 5mio. or 10% of gross revenue); late interest 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Chile 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment up to 30% of unpaid tax; up to 300% in case of fraud; late interest (1.5% per month) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Colom- 
bia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a up to 160% of unpaid tax 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2005: 1% of total value of transaction or 0,5% of net worth for wrong or late 
documentation (max. 30,000 TU) and for no filing of documentation (max. 40,000 
TU) 
Ecuador 
TP Penalty 
no no no no no no no 30.12.2007: 
yes 
yes 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Documentation 
- - - - - - - 30.12.2007: up to USD 15,000 
for incorrect or late filing of tax 
return 
Mexico 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
50-100% of unpaid tax; late interest  50-75% of unpaid tax; late inter-
est 
Documentation ~MXN 47,640-95,820 (~USD 4,100-8,300) for failure to file tax return 
Peru 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a up to 50% of unpaid tax 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a up to 30 TU (~USD 30,000) for noncompliance up to 0.6% of net income for 
noncompliance (max up to 25 
TU (~USD 27,500)) 
United 
States 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 20-40% of unpaid tax 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Vene- 
zuela 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a 25-200% of unpaid tax; late interest; imprisonment 
Documentation n/a 28.12.2001: 300-500 TU for failure to submit documentation; 10-50 TU for failure to file return (1 TU=~USD 16) 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 10-25% of unpaid tax; 50% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
China 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no 1.1.2008: yes yes 
Adjustment 
late interest 
(0.2% per day) 
1.5.2002: late interest (0.05% per day); up to 500% of unpaid tax in case of fraud 1.1.2008: additional special 
interest levy: federal interest rate 
+ 5% on tax adjustment; late 
interest (0.05% per day); up to 
500% of unpaid tax in case of 
fraud 
Documentation up to CNY 10,000 for late filing of tax return; up to CNY 50,000 for serious offense 
India 
TP Penalty 1.4.2001: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 1.4.2001: 100-300% of unpaid tax 
Documentation 
1.4.2001: 2% of aggregate value of international transactions for incorrect documentation; INR 100,000 (~USD 2,200) for failure to submit account-
ant‟s report 
Indo- 
nesia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest (2% per month, up to 48% of unpaid tax); 200-400% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; imprisonment 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Japan 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 10-15% of unpaid tax; 35% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (max. 7.3% per year) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Malaysia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
70-100% of unpaid tax; up to 300% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; imprisonment 1.1.2009: up to 
45% of unpaid 
tax 
Documentation 
15-70% of unpaid tax for incorrect return 1.1.2007: 15-45% of unpaid tax for incorrect 
return 
Philip- 
pines 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 25% surcharge on unpaid tax; 50% surcharge in case of fraud; late interest (20% per 
year) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Thailand 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment up to 200% of unpaid tax; late interest (1.5% per month (max. 100% of unpaid tax)) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Vietnam 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
up to 500% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (0.1% per day) n/a 10% of unpaid tax; 100-300% of 
unpaid tax in case of fraud; late 
interest (0.05% per day) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
EUROPE 
Austria 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 2% of unpaid tax; late interest (2% above federal interest rate) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest (7% per year) 
Documentation 10-200% of unpaid tax for failure to file (correct) tax return 
Czech 
Republic 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
0,05-0,2% of unpaid tax per day for first 500 days; afterwards late interest (140% of federal interest 
rate) 
1.1.2007: 20% of unpaid tax; late interest (federal 
interest rate +14%) 
Documentation 
up to CZK 2 mio. for non-financial obligations 
that are not fulfilled 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Denmark TP Penalty no no no no no 2.4.2006: yes yes yes yes 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Adjustment 
up to 200% of unpaid tax; 10% surcharge on 
unpaid tax; late interest (0.6% per month); im-
prisonment 
surcharge on unpaid tax (5.7% in 2004, 5.4% in 2005, 5.3% in 2006, 5.8% in 2007, 6.3% in 2008, 
6.1% in 2009); late interest (0.6% per month in 2004, 0.5% in 2005-2006, 0.6% in 2007-2009); im-
prisonment 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.4.2006: 200% of costs saved; minimum fine is increased by 10% 
of TP adjustment if applicable 
Finland 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 5-30% of TP adjustment; late interest (market rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to EUR 25,000 for noncompliance 
France 
TP Penalty yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment 40% of unpaid tax; 80% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (0.75% per month, 0.4% per month starting 2007) 
Documentation EUR 7,500 per year for insufficient documentation 1.1.2006: EUR 10,000 per year for insufficient documentation 
Germany 
TP Penalty no no no 1.1.2004: yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjustment late interest (0.5% per month) 
Documentation 
- - - 1.1.2004: 5-10% of TP adjustment if failure to submit documentation, min. EUR 5,000; late submis-
sion: EUR 100 per day, max. EUR 1 mio. 
Greece 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 10% of TP adjustment 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2% of unpaid tax per day for 
inaccurate return (max. 200% of 
unpaid tax) 
18.12.2008: 
10% of the 
value of the 
transaction for 
not filing 
documentation; 
2% per day for 
inaccurate 
return (max. 
200% of un-
paid tax) 
Hungary 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 50% of unpaid tax; late interest (200% of federal interest rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: up to HUF 2 mio. (~USD 10,000) per transaction for noncompliance 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ireland 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest 1.8.2002: 20-100% of unpaid tax; late interest (11.75% per year, 9.96% per year in 2009) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 100-240% of unpaid tax; late interest; 15.4.2000:  imprisonment 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Luxem-
bourg 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a late interest (0.6% per month) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Nether-
lands 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment  25-100% of unpaid tax; late interest 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Norway 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a up to 60% of unpaid tax; late interest (7% per year) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Poland 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment TP adjustment is taxed at 50%; late interest (200% of federal interest rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Portugal 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
20-100% of unpaid tax, up to 200% in case of fraud (max. EUR 30,000, fraud: EUR 110,000); late interest (7% per year in 2002-2004, 4% per year 
since 2005) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a up to EUR 100,000 for noncompliance 
Romania 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no 8.2.2008: yes yes 
Adjustment 
1.9.2000: late 
interest 
(0.15% per 
day) 
1.10.2001: 0.5% of unpaid tax per month;  
30.10.2001: late interest (0.06% per day) 
1.1.2006: 0.1% per day on unpaid tax 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.2.2008: up to RON 14,000 
(~EUR 3,900) for no documen-
tation 
Russia TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
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  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Adjustment 20% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest (1/300 of federal interest rate per day) 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Slovak 
Republic 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment 
n/a n/a n/a 1.1.2004: late interest (300% of federal interest rate) 31.12.2008: 
late interest 
(300% of ECB 
interest rate) 
Documentation n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Slovenia 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Documentation 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to SIT 6mio. (~EUR 24,000) for wrong or late 
documentation 
Spain 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no 19.2.2009: yes 
Adjustment 
50-150% of unpaid tax; late interest 19.2.2009: 
15% of TP 
adjustment 
Documentation 
- - - - - - - - 19.2.2009: 
EUR 1,500 per 
missing infor-
mation  
Sweden 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment  10-40% of unpaid tax 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Switzer-
land 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest 100-300% of unpaid tax in case of fraud; late interest 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 100% of unpaid tax 
Documentation - - - - - - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
TP Penalty no no no no no no no no no 
Adjustment late interest (market rate) 1.1.2004-31.3.2006: no penalties are imposed late interest (market rate) 
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Country  National Regulations on Transfer Pricing Penalties  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Documentation up to 100% of unpaid tax for incorrect tax return up to 100% of unpaid tax for incorrect tax return 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
TU: tax unit 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A8: Statute of Limitations 
Country National Regulations on Statute of Limitations 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina n/a 5 years from filing year end 
Brazil n/a 5 years from filing date 
Canada n/a 7 years from filing date 
Chile n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 years from filing date 
Colombia 2 years from filing date; 5 years if not filed 
Ecuador n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 years from filing date; 6 years if not filed 
Mexico 5 years from filing date 
Peru n/a n/a 4 years from filing year end; 6 years if not filed 
United States n/a up to 6 years from filing date; unlimited in case of fraud 
Venezuela n/a n/a 4 years from filing date; 6 years if noncompliance 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia n/a unlimited 
China n/a up to 10 years from tax year end 
India n/a 3 years from tax year end n/a 45 months from tax year end 
Indonesia 
10 years from tax year end 1.1.2008: 5 years from tax year 
end; unlimited in case of fraud 
Japan n/a 6 years from filing date 
Malaysia n/a n/a 6 years from tax year end; unlimited in case of fraud 
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Country National Regulations on Statute of Limitations 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Philippines n/a n/a 3 years from filing date; 10 years in case of fraud 
Thailand n/a up to 5 years from filing date; 10 years if not filed 
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 5 years from tax year end 
EUROPE 
Austria up to 15 years from tax year end 1.1.2005: up to 10 years from tax year end  
Belgium 
n/a 3 years from tax year end; 5 years in case of fraud 1.1.2009: 3 
years from tax 
year end; 7 
years in case of 
fraud 
Czech  
Republic 
up to 17 years from filing year end 1.1.2004: up to 15 years from filing year end 
Denmark n/a 5 years and 4 months from tax year end 
Finland n/a n/a 6 years from tax year end 
France 3 years from tax year end; 10 years in case of fraud 
Germany 4 years from filing year end; 10 years in case of fraud 
Greece 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 years from filing year end; 10 years in case of 
fraud 
Hungary 5 years from filing year end 
Ireland n/a 6 years from tax year end 1.1.2005: 4 years from filing year end 
Italy 4 years from filing year end; 8 years in case of fraud 
Luxembourg n/a n/a n/a n/a 5 years from filing date; 10 years in case of fraud 
Netherlands n/a 5 years from tax year end; 12 years if foreign income 
Norway n/a 10 years from tax year end 
Poland n/a n/a 5 years from filing year end 
Portugal n/a 4 years from tax year end 
Romania n/a 5 years from filing date; 10 years in case of fraud 
Russia n/a 3 years from tax year end 
Slovak Re-
public 
n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 10 years from filing year end 
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a up to 10 years from tax year end 
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Country National Regulations on Statute of Limitations 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Spain n/a 4 years from filing date 
Sweden n/a 6 years from tax year end 
Switzerland up to 15 years from filing year end 
Ukraine n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 years from tax year end; unlimited in case of fraud 
United King-
dom 
n/a n/a 6 years from tax year end; 21 years in case of fraud 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
Source: own collection 
 
Table A9: Advance Pricing Agreements 
Country National Regulations on Advance Pricing Agreements 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Brazil unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Canada 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Chile not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Colombia 
n/a n/a n/a n/a unilateral 5.1.2006: uni-
lateral, bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Ecuador 
not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 30.12.2007:  
unilateral 
unilateral 
Mexico 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Peru not available not available not available not available not available not available unilateral unilateral unilateral 
United States 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
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Country National Regulations on Advance Pricing Agreements 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Venezuela 
not available 28.12.2001: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
China 
unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 3.9.2004: uni-
lateral, bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
India not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Indonesia not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Japan 
1.6.2001: uni-
lateral, bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Malaysia 
not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 1.1.2009: uni-
lateral, bilat-
eral 
Philippines not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Thailand 
n/a unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
EUROPE 
Austria unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Belgium unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Czech Re-
public 
not available not available not available not available not available 1.1.2006: uni-
lateral 
unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Denmark 
n/a unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Finland unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
France 
bilateral bilateral bilateral 1.1.2004: 
unilateral bilat-
eral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
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Country National Regulations on Advance Pricing Agreements 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Germany 
not available not available not available not available not available 5.6.2006: bi-
lateral 
bilateral bilateral bilateral 
Greece not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Hungary 
not available not available not available not available not available not available 1.1.2007: uni-
lateral, bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Ireland unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Italy unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Luxembourg unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Netherlands 
1.4.2001: uni-
lateral, bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Norway not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Poland 
not available not available not available not available 1.1.2005: uni-
lateral 
1.1.2006: uni-
lateral, bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Portugal 
not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 17.7.2008: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Romania 
not available not available not available not available not available not available 12.6.2007: 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Russia not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Slovak Re-
public 
unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral unilateral 
Slovenia not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Spain 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
Sweden not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available not available 
Switzerland n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ukraine n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a unilateral unilateral unilateral 
United King-
dom 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
unilateral, 
bilateral 
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Country National Regulations on Advance Pricing Agreements 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
not available: no kind of advance pricing agreement is available, an exception might exist under a double tax treaty 
unilateral: an advance ruling by the domestic tax authorities is available 
bilateral: an advance pricing agreement between two jurisdictions is available (can be extended to a multilateral agreement) 
Source: own collection. 
 
Table A10: Thin/Fat Capitalization Rules 
Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 
interest 1.1.1999: interest on loans taken out by domestic financial enti-
ties, on loans granted by foreign banks approved by the Central 
Bank, on loans for imported assets, on investments in domestic 
financial entities 
22.10.2003: interest to foreign controlling entities 
safe haven 1.1.1999: 40% of interest always deductible, 60% only if 2,5:1 
debt-to-equity ratio (overall) and interest <50% of income before 
deduction of interest 
22.10.2003: 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence 1.1.1999: non-deductible, but excess can be carried forward 22.10.2003: excess interest treated as dividends 
Brazil  no thin-capitalization rules 
Canada 
interest interest to foreign controlling entities (>25%) 
safe haven 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2001: 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence excess interest is non-deductible 
Chile 
interest no thin-capitalization 
rules 
19.6.2001: interest to non-residents, exception: foreign bank approved by Central Bank 
safe haven - 19.6.2001: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - 19.6.2001: excess interest is taxed at 35% (CIT: 16%) 
Colombia  no thin-capitalization rules 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Ecuador 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 28.12.2007: interest 
to foreign related 
entities 
safe haven - 28.12.2007: 3:1 for-
eign debt-to-equity 
ratio 
consequence - 28.12.2007: excess 
interest is non-
deductible 
Mexico 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2005: interest to all 
related entities and for-
eign unrelated entities, 
except on bank loans 
1.1.2007: interest to foreign related 
entities and all unrelated entities 
safe haven - 1.1.2005: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - 1.1.2005: excess interest is non-deductible 
Peru 
interest no thin-capitalization rules interest to related entities 
safe haven - 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - excess interest is non-deductible 
United 
States 
interest ThinCap: interest to related entities; Earnings Stripping Rules: interest to foreign related entities 
safe haven ThinCap: no specific ratio, but 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio is assumed to be acceptable; Earnings Stripping Rules:1,5:1 debt-to-equity ratio and net 
interest expense in excess of 50% of the adjusted taxable income, then excess interest expense is not deductible 
consequence ThinCap: interest is treated as dividends; Earnings Stripping Rules: excess interest can be carried forward 
Venezuela 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 16.4.2007: interest to related enti-
ties 
safe haven - 16.4.2007: 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - 16.4.2007: excess interest treated 
as dividends 
ASIA/AUSTRALIA 
Australia 
interest interest to foreign related 
entities, if >15% foreign 
ownership 
1.7.2001: interest to foreign related entities, if controlled by foreign entities (>50%) or if controlling foreign entities 
(>50%) 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
safe haven 2:1 foreign debt-to-
foreign equity ratio 
1.7.2001: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence n/a excess interest is non-deductible 
China 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2008: interest to 
related parties 
safe haven - 1.1.2008: 2:1 debt-to-
equity ratio 
consequence - 1.1.2008: excess 
interest is non-
deductible 
India  no thin-capitalization rules 
Indonesia  the Director of General Taxation may reclassify loans as equity if tax advantages are provided 
Japan 
interest interest to foreign related entities 
safe haven 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence n/a 
Malaysia  no thin-capitalization rules 
Philippines  no thin-capitalization rules 
Thailand  no thin-capitalization rules 
Vietnam  no thin-capitalization rules, but certain requirements for minimum equity in case of foreign investment 
EUROPE 
Austria 
interest interest to controlling entities 
safe haven rather liberal guidelines to determine whether debt-equity ratio is adequate 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 
Belgium 
interest interest to controlling entities and directors 
safe haven 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 
Bulgaria 
interest 1.1.1999: all interest 1.1.2002: 
all interest, 
except 
bank loans 
1.1.2003: all interest, bank loans only if related 
safe haven 1.1.1999: 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio, then 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio, then interest deduction is limited to in- 1.1.2007: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio, 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
interest deduction is limited to interest 
income + 50% of positive financial 
result  
terest income + 75% of positive financial result then interest deduction is limited to 
interest income +75% of positive 
financial result 
consequence n/a excess interest can be carried forward for three 
years 
1.1.2007: excess interest can be 
carried forward for five years 
Croatia 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2005: interest to all controlling entities (>25%) 
safe haven - 1.1.2005: 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - n/a 
Czech Re-
public 
interest interest to foreign controlling entities  1.1.2005: interest to all related enti-
ties 
1.1.2008: all interest 
safe haven 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2008: 2:1 debt-to-
equity ratio for inter-
est to related entities, 
6:1 debt-to-equity 
ratio for all other 
interest 
consequence excess interest is treated as dividends 
Denmark 
interest 1.1.1999: interest to foreign related entities 1.1.2004: interest to all related entities 
safe haven 1.1.1999: 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2004: 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio and controlled debt exceeds 
DKK10million 
consequence 1.1.1999: excess interest is non-deductible  
Estonia  no thin-capitalization rules 
Finland  no thin-capitalization rules 
France 
interest interest to foreign controlling entities (>50%)  interest to foreign non-EU controlling 
entities (>50%)  
1.1.2007: interest to related entities 
safe haven 1,5:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2007: the highest is the limit: 
a) 1,5:1 debt-to-equity ratio, b) 
25% of total income, c) interest 
income 
consequence excess interest is non-deductible 1.1.2007: excess interest can be 
carried forward; deduction is re-
duced by 5% annually starting the 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2
nd
 year 
Germany 
interest interest to foreign controlling entities (>25%) 1.1.2004: interest to all controlling entities (>25%) 1.1.2008: all interest 
safe haven 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2001: 1,5:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2004: 1,5:1 debt-to-equity ratio if interest 
>EUR 250,000 
1.1.2008: 30% of 
EBITDA, net interest 
expense up to EUR 3 
mio. 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 1.1.2008: excess 
interest can be carried 
forward 
Greece  no thin-capitalization rules 
Hungary 
interest interest to related entities 1.1.2001: all interest, except bank loans 
safe haven 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2001: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence excess interest is non-deductible 
Ireland 
interest interest to foreign controlling entities 
(>75%) 
1.1.2002: interest to controlling entities outside EU (>75%) 
safe haven no fixed ratio 
consequence excess interest is treated as dividends 
Italy 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2004: interest to related entities 
safe haven - 1.1.2004: 
5:1 debt-
to-equity 
ratio; 
turnover 
exceeds 
EUR 
5,164,568.
99 
1.1.2005: 4:1 debt-to-
equity ratio; turnover 
exceeds EUR 
5,164,568.99 
1.1.2007: 
4:1 debt-
to-equity 
ratio, 
turnover 
exceeds 
EUR 7.5 
mio. 
1.1.2008: 30% of 
EBITDA 
consequence - 1.1.2004: excess interest is treated as dividends 1.1.2008: excess 
interest can be carried 
forward for 5 years 
Latvia 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2003: all interest except bank loans 1.1.2007: foreign interest except 
bank loans 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
safe haven - 1.1.2003: 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2007: deduction is limited to 
the lesser of: a) 4:1 debt-to-equity 
ratio, b) 1.2 times the average 
short-term credit rate on debt  
consequence - 1.1.2003: excess interest is non-deductible 
Lithuania 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2004: interest to controlling entities (>50%) 
safe haven - 1.1.2004: 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - 1.1.2004: excess interest is non-deductible 
Luxem-
bourg 
 no thin-capitalization rules 
Moldova  no thin-capitalization rules 
Montenegro  no thin-capitalization rules 
Netherlands 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2004: interest to related entities 
safe haven - 1.1.2004: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio + EUR500,000 
consequence - 1.1.2004: excess interest treated as dividends 
Norway  no thin-capitalization rules 
Poland 
interest 1.1.1999: interest to all 
related entities 
1.1.2001: interest to foreign related entities 1.1.2005: interest to all related entities 
safe haven 1.1.1999: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence n/a 
Portugal 
interest interest to related entities  1.1.2006: interest to non-EU related entities 
safe haven 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 
Romania 
interest no thin-capitalization rules n/a all interest, except on bank loans 
safe haven - 1.7.2002: 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio, 
then interest deduction is limited to 
interest income +10% of other income 
1.1.2005: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - 1.7.2002: excess interest can be carried forward 
Russia 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2002: interest to foreign controlling entities 
safe haven - 1.1.2002: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence - 1.1.2002: excess interest is treated as dividends 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Serbia 
interest no thin-capitalization 
rules 
1.7.2001: interest to related entities 
safe haven - 1.7.2001: interest deduction is limited to 4 times the equity multiplied by 110% of the National Bank interest rate; for 
foreign loans, interest rate of the other country is used 
consequence - 1.7.2001: excess interest can be carried forward one year 
Slovak Re-
public 
interest all interest n/a interest to related entities 1.1.2004: no thin-capitalization rules 
safe haven 4:1 debt-
to-equity 
ratio for 
related 
entities; 
35:1 debt-
to-equity 
ratio for 
unrelated 
entities 
n/a 4:1 debt-to-equity ratio for related 
entities 
- 
consequence n/a - 
Slovenia 
interest no thin-capitalization rules 1.1.2005: interest to controlling entities (>25%) 
safe haven - 1.1.2005: 8:1 debt-to-equity ratio 1.1.2008: 6:1 debt-to-
equity ratio 
consequence - n/a 
Spain 
interest interest to foreign related entities 1.1.2004: interest to non-EU foreign related entities 
safe haven 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 
Sweden  no thin-capitalization rules 
Switzerland 
interest interest to related entities on a loan with the character of equity 
safe haven list indicates the maximum amount of debt in relation to certain assets 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 
Turkey 
interest interest to related entities 
safe haven no fixed ratio, but has to be higher in comparison with similar enterprises 1.1.2006: 3:1 debt-to-equity ratio 
consequence excess interest treated as dividends 
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Thin/Fat-Capitalization Rules 
Country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Ukraine 
interest all interest (only if >50% foreign investment) interest to foreign controlling entities (only if >50% foreign 
investment) 
safe haven interest deduction is limited to interest income +50% of taxable profit 
consequence excess interest can be carried forward 
United 
Kingdom 
interest interest to foreign related entities 1.4.2004: thin-capitalization rules integrated into transfer pricing regime 
safe haven 1:1 debt-to-equity ratio - 
consequence excess treated as dividends - 
Underlined countries are OECD member countries; information as of 1 July of the respective year 
Source: own composition. 
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Table A11: Transfer Pricing Categories I 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . 2 
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . 3 
Czech   
Republic 
. . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Denmark . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Estonia . . . . . . . . 3 3 3 
Finland . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
France . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany . . 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Hungary . . 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Latvia . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 
Luxembourg . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 
Netherlands 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Norway . . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Poland . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Portugal 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Romania . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Slovak Re-
public 
. . . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 
Spain . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Sweden . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Switzerland . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Source: own composition. 
 
Table A12: Possibility to Enter into a Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreements 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech   
Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Slovak Re-
public 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
. . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: own composition. 
 
Table A13: Existence of Thin Capitalization Rules 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Source: own composition. 
 
Table A14: Transfer Pricing Categories II 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Brazil 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
China . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Colombia . . 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Indonesia . . 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
India . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Mexico 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Malaysia . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Peru 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Philippines . . . . . . . . 1 1 
Russia . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Venezuela 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: own composition. 
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